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INTRODUCTION
Mistakes happen, and happen often, because we are all too human. Mistakes thus
join company with death and taxes, those other two life certainties, but with an im-
portant difference: For death and taxes, rituals are prescribed and responses are
predictable, but when mistakes happen, all bets are off about what judgment will
follow. Will the mistake be forgiven, as Pope's "to forgive, divine" ending implies?
Or will the actor's mistake be judged culpable to a degree, though mitigated by the
mistake? Or will the mistake remit nothing, leaving the actor's culpability lessened
not a whit?
-Norman J. Finkel & Jennifer L. Groscup l
Employment discrimination takes many more forms than the
current models in our antidiscrimination laws explicitly recognize.
As new forms of employment discrimination are identified, courts
must decide whether or not to apply our existing statutes, which
many continue to believe were narrowly constructed to focus pri-
marily on conscious acts of prejudice. Litigants have had more suc-
cess challenging that notion with respect to Title I of the Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990 (the "ADA"),2 because Congress was
relatively clearer about the multifaceted nature of disability dis-
crimination. Legislators openly acknowledged that disability dis-
crimination may result not only from invidious animus, but simply
from "unthinking" conduct. 3 However, even under the ADA, courts
repeatedly face new types of conduct that appear to be "discrimina-
tory" in nature but that do not fit easily within the still rather lim-
ited concepts of discrimination that are formally described in the
statute. Courts often frame these questions solely as an issue of li-
ability. Judges either decide that an employer's conduct is "close
enough" to a prototypic form of discrimination to be treated simi-
larly, thereby triggering full liability, or they decide that the em-
ployer's conduct is "too far away" from prototypic discrimination
1. Norman J. Finkel & Jennifer L. Groscup, When Mistakes Happen: Commonsense Rules
of Culpability, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 65, 66 (1997).
2. Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12117
(1994)).
3. See 136 CONG. REC. H2599, H2622 (daily ed. May 22, 1990) (statement of Rep. Hoyer);
136 CONG. REc. H2421, H2440 (daily ed. May 17, 1990) (statement of Rep. Fish) (stating that
disability discrimination often "is not the malicious, violent, ugly discrimination experienced on
account of one's race, national origin or religion"); 134 CONG. REC. S5106, S5108 (daily ed. Apr.
28, 1988) (statement of Sen. Weicker) (stating that the proposed provisions encompass uninten-
tional discrimination); see also Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 296 (1985) (explaining that
"[flederal agencies and commentators on the plight of the handicapped similarly have found that
discrimination against the handicapped is primarily the result of apathetic attitudes rather than
affirmative animus").
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claims to be covered by the statute, thereby resulting in no liability
at all.
Just as the statutory definitions of discrimination are often
too narrow and rigid, so is this judicial liability-focused approach.
Framing the issue solely in terms of a liability question is at once
both overinclusive and underinclusive, imposing too great a pun-
ishment on some forms of discrimination, while leaving other forms
completely unchecked. When courts identify discriminatory em-
ployment practices that do not fit the primary statutory models of
"discrimination," courts should not limit themselves to an all-or-
nothing decision. A more flexible approach would place greater em-
phasis on tailoring various remedies to fit the particular type of
conduct. One way to achieve this shift in focus is to frame questions
about nonprototypic employment discrimination in the language of
tort law, which provides a more nuanced taxonomy of legal catego-
ries than is used in most discussions of antidiscrimination law.
Rather than relying so heavily on an intentional tort model, it
would be more useful to also discuss nonprototypic forms of em-
ployment discrimination in terms of strict liability or negligence
models, which already have embedded a concept of tailored reme-
dies. This approach would provide protection from a wider range of
discriminatory practices than the current all-or-nothing choices,
while recognizing that all forms of discrimination are not the same.
This Article uses one particular aspect of disability discrimination
law to help illustrate this "limited remedies" approach. 4
This Article is about mistakes, their origins, and what their
consequences should be. More specifically, it is about how the law
should deal with an employer that takes a negative employment
action against a nondisabled employee based on a mistaken belief
that the employee is disabled. While misperceived but otherwise
able-bodied 5 employees may not have been the primary concern of
4. Another example of this theme is presented in a prior article. See Michelle A. Travis,
Leveling the Playing Field or Stacking the Deck? The "Unfair Advantage" Critique of Perceived
Disability Claims, 78 N.C. L. REV. 901, 902-07, 993-1011 (2000). That article analyzed a related
issue involving the application of the ADA to a novel form of discrimination: whether the ADA
should protect individuals who are "regarded as" disabled by their employer, when those indi-
viduals need "reasonable accommodations" to perform the "essential functions" of the job. See id.
That analysis also illustrated the need for a shift in focus away from simply deciding whether or
not to impose liability to an analysis of how properly to tailor the available remedies to establish
a right that is consistent with the overarching goals of antidiscrimination law. See id. at 905-07,
993-1011.
5. Throughout this Article, I use "able-bodied" as a generic term to describe individuals
who do not have any physical or mental impairments that rise to the level of an actual disability
under the ADA.
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antidiscrimination legislation, an employer's mistake does not
make the consequences of discriminatory employment decisions any
less real. "It is of little solace to a person denied employment to
know that the employer's view of his or her condition is erroneous,"
one court has observed; "[t]o such a person, the perception of the
employer is as important as reality."6
The ADA has already embraced this principle, at least in
general terms. The ADA prohibits most employers from engaging in
disability-based discrimination in the terms, conditions, or privi-
leges of employment. 7 In taking this historic step, Congress recog-
nized that the fears, prejudice, and animus toward individuals with
disabilities are so pervasive that employment discrimination often
reaches beyond the decisionmakers' intended targets. 8 Accordingly,
the ADA not only protects individuals with substantially limiting
physical or mental impairments, but also individuals whose em-
ployer incorrectly regards them as disabled, even when no disability
exists. 9 This portion of the ADA's disability definition-known as
the "regarded as" or "perceived disability" prong' 0-pushes antidis-
crimination theory in a new direction: into the realm of mistakes.
Although a decade has passed since the ADA's enactment,
courts are just beginning to explore the boundaries of this new fron-
tier."' One question that courts currently are addressing is exactly
what types of misperceptions should be covered by this unique
statutory provision. Congress intended the perceived disability
prong to be a "catch-all" for individuals who do not technically qual-
ify as "disabled," but who nevertheless are subjected to an adverse
disability-based employment action. 12 In this way, the perceived
6. E.E. Black, Ltd. v. Marshall, 497 F. Supp. 1088, 1097 (D. Haw. 1980); see also Sch. Bd.
v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 283-84 (1987) (explaining that "society's accumulated myths and fears
about disability and disease are as handicapping as are the physical limitations that flow from
actual impairment," and that impairments that do not have an impact on ability can "neverthe-
less substantially limit that person's ability to work as a result of the negative reactions of oth-
ers").
7. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (1994). Since July 26, 1992, Title I of the ADA has applied to
all private employers "engaged in an industry affecting commerce" and employing "15 or more
employees for each working day in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding
calendar year." 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A) (1994); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(e)(1) (2001).
8. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 101-116, at 7 (1989).
9. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1994); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g).
10. See, e.g., Francis v. City of Meriden, 129 F.3d 281, 284-86 (2d Cir. 1997); Smaw v. Va.
Dep't of State Police, 862 F. Supp. 1469, 1472 (E.D. Va. 1994).
11. See Travis, supra note 4, at 986-88 & nn.349-64 (describing the late development, but
expected increase in, case law on perceived disability claims).
12. Arlene B. Mayerson, Restoring Regard for the "Regarded As" Prong: Giving Effect to
Congressional Intent, 42 VILL. L. REV. 587, 609 (1997).
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disability prong advances the social model of disability, in which
disability is viewed as a product of forces in the individual's envi-
ronment, not a product of inherently limiting personal traits. 3
In describing this goal, legislators suggested that employers'
misperceptions about nondisabled individuals may result from the
same type of group-based and often purposeful discrimination that
those with actual disabilities experience. 14 In other words, employ-
ers' negative views, fears, and misconceptions about disabilities are
so strong that employers may incorrectly label some able-bodied
workers with nondisabling conditions as "disabled," and treat those
individuals differently from the rest of the able-bodied workforce.
For example, a manager might reject all applicants with diabetes
based on the misconception that people with diabetes are "inferior"
in some way-perhaps believing that they are weak, undisciplined,
or unable to work long hours or perform stressful or strenuous jobs.
By viewing all individuals with the same diagnosis as an undiffer-
entiated group, and by taking negative employment actions based
on the assumption that all members of the group face similarly sub-
stantial limitations, the manager has erroneously treated the vast
majority of fully capable, nondisabled diabetics as "disabled."
That type of group-based decisionmaking can result either
from consciously held prejudiced beliefs or simply from the auto-
matic activation of long-ingrained group stereotypes. 15 Such group-
based responses certainly explain at least some of employers' mis-
takes about nondisabled employees, and there is no dispute that
those types of errors may support an ADA perceived disability
claim. 16 This is the case even if the manager's group-based deci-
sionmaking is "rational" or "efficient" for the employer. Even if the
13. See Anita Silvers, Formal Justice, in DISABILITY, DIFFERENCE, DISCRIMINATION:
PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE IN BIOETHICS AND PUBLIC POLICY 13, 75 (1998).
14. See 136 CONG. REC. E1972, E1913 (daily ed. June 13, 1990) (statement of Rep. Hoyer)
(stating that the bill adopts the Supreme Court's analysis in School Board v. Arline, 480 U.S.
273, 283-84 (1987), which focused on the perception of disability based on myths and fears); 29
C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(l) (2001) (same); see also H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 3, at 29-31 (1990), re-
printed in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 452-54 (providing examples of perceived disability claims, all
of which involved the application of group-based assumptions or conscious prejudice); id. pt. 2, at
53 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 335-36 (same); S. REP. No. 101-116, at 24 (1989)
(same).
15. See Laurie A. Rudman, Measuring the Automatic Components of Prejudice: Flexibility
and Generality of the Implicit Association Test, 17 SOC. COGNITION 437, 437-38 (1999) (describing
forms of unconscious, implicit prejudice and forms of conscious, explicit prejudice). See generally
Patricia G. Devine, Automatic and Controlled Processes in Prejudice: The Role of Stereotypes and
Personal Beliefs, in ATTITUDE STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION 181 (Anthony R. Pratkanis et al. eds.,
1989) (describing both the controlled and the automatic processes involved in group-based preju-
dice).
16. See infra notes 73-84 and accompanying text.
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manager is consciously treating all employees with a particular di-
agnosis as unemployable not out of animus, but because, on aver-
age, they tend to be more costly workers-i.e., even if the manager
rejects all diabetics not out of fear or loathing, but because the em-
ployer has evidence that, on average, people with diabetes tend to
take more sick days than people without-the perceived disability
prong will still apply. Both the statute and the legislative history
are clear that the perceived disability prong prohibits even "ra-
tional," statistical discrimination, by requiring employers to make
individual employee assessments to determine accurately whether
a particular employee's impairment is disabling or not. 17
But what about mistakes that are not motivated by prejudice
or group-based decisionmaking? How should the law treat what
courts often refer to as "innocent mistakes," where there is no evi-
dence that group-based assumptions or animus toward individuals
with disabilities played any role in forming an employer's misper-
ception about a nondisabled worker? 8 For example, what if the
manager understood that diabetes is only disabling for some indi-
viduals, and therefore the manager attempted to assess a particular
worker's diabetes on an individual basis, but the manager still in-
correctly concluded that the worker's mild condition was serious
enough to interfere with job performance? While this could occur if
the employment decisionmaker simply had inaccurate information
about the individual, the more troubling scenario is when the deci-
sionmaker has accurate information, but nevertheless arrives at an
erroneous assessment of the gravity of the employee's condition.
The statute does not explicitly address employer misperceptions of
nondisabling conditions that result from a proper individual as-
sessment. Courts are therefore struggling to apply the perceived
disability prong to these so-called "innocent mistakes." 19
As is often the case with questions of statutory scope, courts
have analyzed this problem as a liability issue, by simply deciding
whether or not this type of "wrong" fits within a traditional ADA
cause of action. Some courts have interpreted the ADA's language
narrowly and denied liability altogether when there is no evidence
that the employer's mistake was motivated by prejudice or group-
based generalizations 20-i.e., "the mistake [is] forgiven, as Pope's 'to
17. See infra notes 67-84, 471-73 and accompanying text.
18. See Taylor v. Pathmark Stores, Inc., 177 F.3d 180, 182-83, 191 (3d Cir. 1999).
19. See id. at 182-83; Deane v. Pocono Med. Ctr., 142 F.3d 138, 143-44 n.4 (3d Cir. 1998) (en
banc).
20. See infra notes 89-104 and accompanying text.
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forgive, divine' ending implies."21 In contrast, other courts have in-
terpreted the ADA expansively and imposed liability to the same
extent as for invidiously motivated mistakes or other forms of con-
scious, group-based decisionmaking 22-i.e., "the mistake remit[s]
nothing, leaving the actor's culpability lessened not a whit."23
Rather than taking one of these all-or-nothing approaches, how-
ever, courts could choose an intermediate alternative. Instead of
analyzing the question solely as a liability issue, courts could view
it as a remedies problem, by allowing a claim for so-called "innocent
mistakes," but circumscribing the remedies to reflect the less rep-
rehensible nature of this particular type of wrong 24-i.e., "the ac-
tor's mistake [is] judged culpable to a degree, though mitigated by
the mistake."25
To assess the courts' current approaches properly-and to
champion the intermediate alternative-requires more than just
employing the traditional methods of statutory interpretation,
which is as far as courts have gone. It also requires an understand-
ing of the origin and consequences of employers' misperceptions.
The source and impact of misperceptions is not, in the first in-
stance, a legal question, but one of social cognition. Because the
perceived disability prong deals solely with perceptual errors, 26 it
makes sense to look to social cognition research for insight into the
process by which perceptual errors occur and the harm that they
impose.
Social cognition is the study of interpersonal perception: how
the human mind processes information about social events. 27 If so-
21. Finkel & Groscup, supra note 1, at 66.
22. See infra notes 105-21 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court has not yet decided a
nonmotivational mistake case under the ADA's perceived disability prong. In its most recent
decision involving a perceived disability claim, the Court avoided the issue because the plaintiff
affirmatively alleged that the employer's mistake was "based on myth and stereotype." See Sut-
ton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 490 (1999). In describing the theory behind the per-
ceived disability claim, the Court stated that employers' misperceptions "often 'resul[t] from
stereotypic assumptions not truly indicative of ... individual ability.' " Id. at 489 (quoting 42
U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7) (1994) (alterations in original)). The word "often" suggests that the Court
might view conscious prejudice as only one of many potential sources of mistakes that could
support a perceived disability claim. See id. However, it is difficult to read much into the Court's
remark, because the only cases and regulations that the Court cited were ones that imply that
innocent mistakes may not be cognizable under the ADA's perceived disability prong, based on
the legislative purpose for that prong. See id. (citing Sch. Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 284 (1987);
29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2() (2001)).
23. Finkel & Groscup, supra note 1, at 66.
24. See Taylor, 177 F.3d at 182-83.
25. Finkel & Groscup, supra note 1, at 66.
26. See McCollough v. Atlanta Beverage Co., 929 F. Supp. 1489, 1498 (N.D. Ga. 1996).
27. See infra notes 123, 126 and accompanying text.
2002] 487
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cial scientists in this field have reached one common conclusion, it
is that people are, by necessity, imperfect information processors.
In our extraordinarily complex world, we constantly face the risk of
becoming incapacitated by information overload. 28 So we all take a
variety of cognitive "shortcuts" to process information more effi-
ciently. 29 In so doing, we all end up making mistakes. These percep-
tual errors are not "motivational," in that they are not driven by
conscious prejudice against or assumptions about a certain group of
individuals. 30 Rather, these are "nonmotivational" mistakes that
are the predictable byproduct of otherwise rational, efficient, and
typically accurate cognitive processing mechanisms, which often
work outside of our awareness. 31
By systematically determining what types of processing er-
rors people are likely to make and why, social cognition research
can help determine whether or not perceived disabilities are likely
to occur through mistakes that are not motivated by prejudice or
group-based decisionmaking. Two branches of social cognition are
particularly relevant to this endeavor: one explaining how we make
mistakes in assessing others' behavior in the past, and one explain-
ing how we make mistakes in predicting the behavior of others in
the future. The first branch is the study of "causal attribution."
Causal attribution theory attempts to explain the causes that we
assign to social events or to another person's conduct or perform-
ance. 32 In addition, causal attribution theory attempts to explain
the perceptual errors that we make during this attribution proc-
ess.3 3 To the extent that employers' mistaken perceptions of an
able-bodied worker as "disabled" are the result of employers mis-
assigning causes to workplace events or employee conduct, causal
attribution theory can provide useful insights about the errors that
result in ADA perceived disability claims. Causal attribution theory
can help assess whether nonmotivational mistakes are possible,
and what their impact might be. The second relevant branch of so-
cial cognition is the study of prediction errors. Social scientists have
discovered that our predictions of future performance and behavior
are efficiently-but imperfectly-based on cognitive shortcuts that
rely too heavily on prior causal theories and that systematically
28. See infra note 127 and accompanying text.
29. See infra note 127 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 123-25 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 123-24 and accompanying text.
32. See infra note 130-33 and accompanying text.
33. See infra Part II.A (analyzing causal attribution errors).
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bias predictions in identifiable ways.34 To the extent that employ-
ers' mistaken perceptions of an able-bodied worker as "disabled" are
the result of employers erroneously predicting the future impact of
nondisabling impairments, this literature similarly can be useful in
deconstructing the origin of perceived disability claims. Thus, com-
bining this social science research with the more traditional meth-
ods of statutory interpretation should provide the best foundation
for determining the proper scope of the ADA's perceived disability
prong.
Using social cognition research to help analyze perceived
disability claims is consistent with a broader trend in other areas of
discrimination scholarship, particularly scholarship on various
forms of "unconscious" race and sex discrimination. Relying heavily
on social science evidence, scholars have shown that much of pre-
sent-day race and sex discrimination stems not from consciously
held prejudice against minority groups and women. 35 Rather, these
scholars have demonstrated that stereotypes often work independ-
ently of invidious animus, by functioning as cognitive constructs,
categories, or organizing principles, which are triggered automati-
cally when someone perceives a social event. These cognitive proc-
esses can systematically bias one's perception, understanding, en-
34. See infra Part II.B (analyzing prediction errors).
35. See, e.g., JODY DAVID ARMOUR, NEGROPHOBIA AND REASONABLE RACISM: THE HIDDEN
COSTS OF BEING BLACK IN AMERICA 14, 72-77, 154-55 (1997) (using the "incontrovertible insights
of modern psychology" to argue that "most racial discrimination today is not rooted in conscious
animus," but is the result of "unconscious mental reflexes"); Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Con-
tent of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment
Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1164, 1186-88, 1216-17 (1995) (relying on social cognition
theory to argue that "a broad class of discriminatory employment decisions result not from dis-
criminatory motivation, but from normal cognitive processes and strategies that tend to bias
intergroup perception and judgment"); Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal
Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 323, 330-31, 336-39
(1987) (identifying "racism's primary source" as "a product of the unconscious," and describing
cognitive psychologists' model for understanding the unconscious nature of race discrimination);
Deborah J. Merritt & Barbara F. Reskin, The Double Minority: Empirical Evidence of a Double
Standard in Law School Hiring of Minority Women, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 2299, 2356-57 (1992)
(citing social psychology research that demonstrates unconscious forms of sex discrimination to
explain some of the inequality in law school faculty hiring and promotion); David Benjamin Op-
penheimer, Negligent Discrimination, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 899, 899-915 (1993) (noting recent
studies demonstrating "that most discrimination is not the result of malice, hatred, ill will, or
bigotry: it is the result of unintended and unconscious stereotyping"); Martha S. West, Gender
Bias in Academic Robes: The Law's Failure to Protect Women Faculty, 67 TEMP. L. REV. 67, 96-
97, 143-45 (1994) (arguing that Title VII antidiscrimination law "has not developed in ways that
are able to address the problem or remedy the effects of subconscious, unintentional discrimina-
tion"); see also Judith Olans Brown et al., Some Thoughts About Social Perception and Employ-
ment Discrimination Law: A Modest Proposal for Reopening the Judicial Dialogue, 46 EMORY
L.J. 1487, 1491, 1493-97 (1997) (noting that "there is now a large body of scholarship showing
the inevitability of bias: racism occurs through unconscious cognitive processes").
2002] 489
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coding, retention, and recall of social events, in ways that predicta-
bly disadvantage racial minorities and women.3 6
Thus far, ADA scholars have tended to focus on more tradi-
tional types of barriers to equal employment opportunity for indi-
viduals with disabilities. Many commentators have addressed the
significant structural, operational, social, and attitudinal barriers
that directly or indirectly limit workplace access. 37 More recent
scholarship has expanded this inquiry by encouraging broader in-
terdisciplinary analyses of disability rights issues.38 Thus far, how-
36. See ARMOUR, supra note 35, at 40-42, 75, 130-39 (explaining that racial stereotypes re-
sult in discrimination by causing people to "unconsciously interpret[ ] experiences to be consis-
tent with the underlying stereotype," to "selectively assimilat[e] facts that validate the stereo-
type while disregarding those that do not," and to be "primed to construe ambiguous behavior"
consistent with the stereotype); Brown et al., supra note 35, at 1493-97 (describing the stereotyp-
ing process as "a cognitive strategy that allows the mind to interpret information quickly"
through the use of automatic categorization and other "cognitive shortcuts"); Linda Hamilton
Krieger, Civil Rights Perestroika: Intergroup Relations After Affirmative Action, 86 CAL. L. REV.
1251, 1279, 1316, 1332 (1998) (arguing that much discrimination "occurs when an individual's
group status subtly, even unconsciously, affects a decision makers' [sic] subjective perception of
relevant traits," through "a variety of categorization-related cognitive biases" that affect the
"interpretation, retention, and utilization of incoming mixed or ambiguous information");
Krieger, supra note 35, at 1165, 1198 (explaining social cognition research indicating "that nor-
mal cognitive processes can lead to the creation and maintenance of social stereotypes . . . [,
which] represent simply one manifestation of generalized cognitive biases resulting from catego-
rization, differential attention to salient events, and the search for meaning and coherence," and
arguing that these cognitive processes are the basis for much racial discrimination in employ-
ment); Lawrence, supra note 35, at 336-39 (describing a cognitive approach to unconscious ra-
cism that stems from otherwise rational categorization processes); West, supra note 35, at 96-97,
143-45 (identifying forms of "subconscious, unintentional discrimination" that result "not from
illegal intent in the minds of a few, but from deeply entrenched gender and race stereotypes in
the minds of most of us").
37. See generally Peter David Blanck & Mollie Weighner Marti, Attitudes, Behavior and the
Employment Provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 VILL. L. REV. 345 (1997) (de-
scribing attitudinal forms of disability discrimination); Harlan Hahn, Accommodations and the
ADA- Unreasonable Bias or Biased Reasoning?, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 166, 174, 181
(2000) (using a sociopolitical perspective to identify employment barriers involving "[f]eatures of
the human-made environment that segregate disabled citizens," "prejudices derived from cul-
tural meanings," and "paternalism"); Mayerson, supra note 12, at 587, 589 (identifying disability
discrimination in the form of "outmoded, prejudicial and stereotypic mental or physical job crite-
ria" and "arbitrary fears and stereotypes"); Susan Schwochau & Peter David Blanck, The Eco-
nomics of the Americans with Disabilities Act, Part III: Does the ADA Disable the Disabled?, 21
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 271 (2000) (analyzing the three major economic theories of dis-
crimination against individuals with disabilities in the labor market); Silvers, supra note 13,
(discussing structural forms of disability discrimination); Susan Stefan, Delusions of Rights:
Americans with Psychiatric Disabilities, Employment Discrimination and the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 52 ALA. L. REV. 271, 273-74 (2000) (identifying unique social barriers to equal
employment for those with psychiatric disabilities).
38. See, e.g., Linda Hamilton Krieger, Foreword-Backlash Against the ADA- Interdiscipli-
nary Perspectives and Implications for Social Justice Strategies, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L.
1, 12 (2000) (describing the goals of a recent symposium of disability rights scholars in law, soci-
ology, psychology, political science, economics, history, and literature).
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ever, the approach that scholars have taken in analyzing race- and
sex-based discrimination in terms of cognitive processing biases has
not been systematically undertaken in the context of disability dis-
crimination law.3 9 This Article takes an initial step in that direc-
tion.
This Article begins in Part I by describing the relevant
statutory provisions and the various ways that courts have dealt
with employer misperceptions under the ADA's perceived disability
prong. Part II explains how social cognition research on cognitive
bias can help identify the origins of some of the employer misper-
ceptions underlying perceived disability claims. Specifically, Part II
analyzes the work of causal attribution theorists and the social sci-
ence literature on prediction errors to help explain why and when
employers may erroneously label nondisabled employees as "dis-
abled." This research indicates that at least some perceived dis-
abilities are likely to result not from consciously held, group-based
prejudices or generalizations, but from nonmotivational cognitive
processing errors.
Part III combines the social science data with an analysis of
more traditional methods of statutory interpretation to determine
how the ADA should deal with these types of claims. This analysis
concludes that in order to achieve all of Congress's objectives,
courts should apply the ADA's perceived disability prong to claims
involving nonmotivational mistakes, but such mistakes should not
trigger the same extent of liability as mistakes that are invidiously
motivated or otherwise the product of conscious, group-based deci-
sionmaking. Rather than adopting the current "no liability" ap-
proach of some courts, or the "full liability" approach of others, this
Article advocates a middle-ground alternative that focuses on tai-
loring remedies to fit the employer's conduct. In reaching this spe-
cific recommendation, this analysis illustrates the more general
principle that line-drawing at the remedy stage can be a far more
precise instrument for achieving the exact size and shape of a new
39. Several disability scholars have begun this process by identifying unconscious processes
as a potential source of disability discrimination and urging greater use of interdisciplinary
research to understand the implications of these processes under the ADA. See, e.g., Blanck &
Marti, supra note 37, at 348-50 (noting that "[c]onscious and unconscious attitudes may lead to
inaccurate perceptions and economically inefficient behavior by employers and others toward
qualified persons with disabilities," and suggesting that "interdisciplinary research is needed");
see also Karen M. Kramer & Arlene B. Mayerson, Obesity Discrimination in the Workplace: Pro-
tection Through a Perceived Disability Claim Under the Rehabilitation Act and the Americans
with Disabilities Act, 31 CAL. W. L. REV. 41, 64-72 (1994) (using literature and data from social
science studies to identify the stigmatizing attitudes and stereotypes that prevent obese indi-
viduals from obtaining equal employment opportunity).
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substantive right than the rather blunt tools available through de-
cisionmaking solely at the liability stage.
I. CURRENT ADA LAW ON PERCEIVED DISABILITY CLAIMS
AND EMPLOYERS' MISPERCEPTIONS
The employment provisions in Title I of the ADA are part of
a "comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimi-
nation against individuals with disabilities."40 The ADA extended
disability-based antidiscrimination protection broadly into the pri-
vate sector. 41 Under Title I, private employers with fifteen or more
employees are prohibited from discriminating against any "quali-
fied individual with a disability," with regard to hiring, training,
compensation, promotion, termination, or any other terms and con-
ditions of employment. 42 The ADA thus effectively added "disabil-
ity" to the list of other statuses already protected by federal law,
including race, color, religion, sex, national origin, and age. 43
To state an employment discrimination claim under the
ADA, an employee or job applicant 44 usually must demonstrate
three things. First, the plaintiff must have a "disability.'" 45 Second,
the plaintiff must be a "qualified individual," which means that the
plaintiff can perform the "essential functions" of the job, "with or
40. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (1994).
41. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A) (1994). The ADA was modeled after its predecessor, the Reha-
bilitation Act of 1973, which only prohibited disability discrimination by federal agencies, see 29
U.S.C. § 791(b) (1994), large federal contractors, see 29 U.S.C. § 793(a) (1994), and programs or
activities receiving federal financial aid, see 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1994). Importing the Rehabilita-
tion Act's definition of disability into the ADA has been described as a matter of political expedi-
ency, with potentially negative, unintended consequences. See generally Anita Silvers & Michael
Ashley Stein, Disability, Equal Protection, and the Supreme Court: Standing at the Crossroads of
Progressive and Retrogressive Logic in Constitutional Classification, 35 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM
(forthcoming 2002) (providing that, by relying on the Rehabilitation Act case law, courts are
incorporating retrogressive social views of people with disabilities). Nevertheless, courts use case
law under the Rehabilitation Act to help interpret analogous sections of the ADA, 29 C.F.R. app.
§ 1630.2(g) (2001), so this Article cites to Rehabilitation Act cases where helpful to analyze ADA
issues.
42. § 12111(5)(A); 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (1994); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.4 (1999).
43. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2001) (governing em-
ployment discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, and national origin); Age Dis-
crimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994) (governing employment discrimina-
tion on the basis of age).
44. The ADA protects both current employees and job applicants. See § 12112(a) (prohibit-
ing discrimination in "hiring"). For convenience, I refer to both of these categories as "employees"
throughout this Article.
45. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(2), 12112(a) (1994).
2002] PERCEIVED DISABILITIES 493
without reasonable accommodation." 46 And third, the employer
must take an adverse employment action against the plaintiff "be-
cause of' the disability.47 This Article focuses on the first of these
three requirements: determining when an employee or job applicant
is "disabled."
This threshold determination often distinguishes disability
discrimination claims from employment discrimination claims
based on race or sex. 48 Proving that an employee has a "disability"
is usually an essential element of an ADA claim. In many situa-
tions, if an employee has a "disability," then the ADA applies, and if
the employee does not have a "disability," then the ADA is inappli-
cable. 49 Thus, the ADA's status marker plays not only a prohibitory
role, but also an exclusionary one. Disability identifies the charac-
teristic upon which employers may not discriminate, and it often
draws the line between those who are and are not protected in the
first place. For race and sex, the statutory status marker plays only
the former role. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the federal
statute governing race and sex discrimination in the workplace,
simply prohibits employers from considering race and sex when
making employment decisions. 50 Although Title VII was concerned
primarily with discrimination against minorities and women, Title
VII protects all individuals from race-based or sex-based decision-
making.51 Because of the additional exclusionary role played by dis-
46. §§ 12111(8), 12112(a).
47. § 12112(a)-(b).
48. See Fredregill v. Nationwide Agribusiness Ins. Co., 992 F. Supp. 1082, 1091 (S.D. Iowa
1997) ("[The ADA] is different from most other civil rights laws in that it is not always obvious
whether a person is in the protected class.").
49. See Leslie Francis & Anita Silvers, Introduction: Achieving the Right to Live in the
World, in AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES: EXPLORING IMPLICATIONS OF THE LAW FOR INDIVIDUALS
AND INSTITUTIONS, at xiii, xxiii (Leslie Pickering Francis & Anita Silvers eds., 2000); Steven L.
Willborn, A Nested Model of Disability Discrimination, at 3 (1999), available at
http://www.people.virginia.edu/-dll2k/bottom.html. There are a few exceptions to this rule. For
example, some courts hold that a nondisabled individual may state a claim against an employer
for violating the ADA's prohibition against prehire medical inquiries. See, e.g., Griffin v. Steeltek,
Inc., 160 F.3d 591, 592-93, 595 (10th Cir. 1998). The ADA also protects all qualified employees
against discrimination on the basis of their "relationship or association" with someone who has a
disability. See § 12112(b)(4); 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.8 (2001).
50. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1994); Willborn, supra note 49, at 2.
51. See McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 278-80 (1976); see also Mi-
chael D. Moberly, Perception or Reality?: Some Reflections on the Interpretation of Disability
Discrimination Statutes, 13 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 345, 367 (1996) (quoting S. REP. No. 93-1297
(1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6373, 6389-90); Willborn, supra note 49, at 2-3. The
status markers of "color" and "national origin" are similar to race and sex in that all individuals
are covered by the statute. In contrast, the status markers of "religion" and "age" play more
analogous roles to the status marker of "disability" under the ADA. Because Title VII's ban on
religious discrimination only protects those with sincerely held religious beliefs, see Shelton v.
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ability status, the threshold determination of who is "disabled" is
frequently the central and determinative issue in an ADA discrimi-
nation claim. This determination is complicated by the fact that,
unlike race and sex, physical and mental impairment falls along a
vast continuum. Accordingly, the ADA's drafters were forced to
draw some very difficult lines.
Congress drew these lines by defining "disability" in three
different ways. First, the ADA protects individuals with actual dis-
abilities, which include any "physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such
individual."52 Second, the ADA protects individuals who have a "re-
cord of' an actual disability. 58 This prong covers people who do not
currently have an actual disability, but who have had a substan-
tially limiting impairment in the past. 54 And third, the ADA pro-
tects individuals who are mistakenly "regarded as" having an ac-
tual disability by their employer. 5 Under the third definition, the
employee lacks a substantially limiting physical or mental impair-
ment, but the employer's mistaken belief that the employee has
such an impairment is enough to trigger statutory protection. 56 This
Article addresses the scope of the third definition: the "regarded as"
or "perceived disability" prong.
To establish a perceived disability, an employee must show
that the employer mistakenly regarded the employee as having the
type of impairment described in the ADA's actual disability prong.5 7
In other words, the employer must mistakenly believe that the em-
ployee has a "physical or mental impairment that substantially lim-
its a major life activity," when such an impairment does not exist.
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") has is-
sued implementing regulations identifying three categories that fit
this definition:
Univ. of Med. & Dentistry, 223 F.3d 220, 224 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (1994)),
"religion" plays both an exclusionary and a prohibitory role. Similarly, the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act's ban on age discrimination only protects those who are forty years of age and
older, 29 U.S.C. § 631(a) (1994), thereby using a particular age both to identify who obtains
statutory protection and to define the characteristic that employers must ignore. Accordingly,
courts must also make a threshold determination of whether the plaintiff falls within the pro-
tected category for employment discrimination claims based on religion and age.
52. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (1994).
53. § 12102(2)(B).
54. See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(k) (2001).
55. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(C).
56. See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(l).
57. See § 12102(2); 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(l); Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471,
489-90 (1999).
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1) The individual may have an impairment which is not substantially limiting but
is perceived by the employer ... as constituting a substantially limiting im-
pairment; [or]
2) The individual may have an impairment which is only substantially limiting
because of the attitudes of others toward the impairment; or
3) The individual may have no impairment at all but is regarded by the em-
ployer .. as having a substantially limiting impairment. 58
The EEOC regulations provide an example of each of these
three categories.5 9 The first category would cover an employee with
controlled high blood pressure, if the employer erroneously exag-
gerates the gravity of the condition. 0 Even if the employee's high
blood pressure does not constitute an actual disability because it
does not substantially limit any major life activities, the employee
is covered by the ADA if the employer incorrectly views the condi-
tion as substantially limiting.6 1 If, for example, the employer reas-
signs the employee to less strenuous work based on unsubstanti-
ated fears that people with high blood pressure are prone to heart
attacks, the employee could state an ADA perceived disability
claim. 62 The second category of perceived disabilities might cover an
employee who has a prominent facial scar or disfigurement, or a
condition that periodically causes an involuntary jerk of the head,
none of which substantially limit any of the employee's major life
activities. 63 If the employer believes that the employee is unable to
work with customers because of their negative reactions to the em-
ployee's condition, then the employee could establish the second
type of perceived disability discrimination claim. 64 The third cate-
gory of perceived disabilities would protect a completely unimpaired
employee whom the employer mistakenly believes has an actually
disabling condition, such as when an employer believes an un-
founded rumor that an employee is infected with the Human Im-
munodeficiency Virus ("HIV"). 65
58. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2().
59. See id.
60. See id.
61. See id.
62. See id. See generally Anita Silvers & Michael Ashley Stein, Protecting Genomics' Prom-
ise: An Equality Paradigm for Preventing Discrimination Based on Genetic Identity, 9 VA. J. Soc.
POL'Y & L. (forthcoming 2002) (analyzing whether the EEOC's statements could support a per-
ceived disability claim by individuals who have been identified as having a genetic risk of becom-
ing ill or bestowing illness on their children).
63. See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(l).
64. See id.
65. See id.
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In reality, very few perceived disability discrimination
claims involve the completely unimpaired employees hypothesized
in the EEOC's third category. 66 The vast majority of claims involve
the first two categories of perceived disabilities, which share one
important commonality. Individuals in both of the first two catego-
ries do have some type of physical or mental "impairment." The im-
pairment is just not "substantially limiting," and therefore does not
qualify as an actual disability. The EEOC's first two categories pro-
tect these individuals when an employer mistakenly views their
nondisabling impairments as worse than they actually are.
What causes employers to exaggerate the gravity of nondis-
abling impairments and to mistakenly regard them as "disabili-
ties"? When Congress decided to include perceived disabilities in
the ADA's disability definition, Congress recognized that these mis-
takes may be the product of the same type of prejudice or group-
based assumptions that the ADA's general antidiscrimination man-
date was designed to prevent.6 7 Employers often hold generalized
assumptions and fears about "the disabled" as an undifferentiated
and uniform group. For example, prejudiced employers may choose
not to associate with individuals with disabilities because of feel-
ings of aversion, disdain, or pity. Or they may assume incorrectly
that all individuals with disabilities are less productive, less safe,
and have poorer attendance records, that all individuals with dis-
abilities will be rejected by coworkers and customers, or that all
individuals with disabilities impose higher insurance, liability, and
workers' compensation costs. 6 8 By making these types of negative,
group-based assumptions, employers discriminate against the ex-
traordinary number of individuals with disabilities for whom these
particular traits obviously do not apply.
But incorrectly assigning traits to all members of a group is
not the only invidious effect of prejudice and group-based decision-
making. Viewing individuals with disabilities as an undifferenti-
66. See John M. Vande Walle, Note, In the Eye of the Beholder: Issues of Distributive and
Corrective Justice in the ADA's Employment Protection for Persons Regarded as Disabled, 73
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 897, 904, 911 n.112 (1998).
67. See 136 CONG. REC. E1972, E1913 (daily ed. June 13, 1990) (statement of Rep. Hoyer)
(stating that the bill adopts the Supreme Court's analysis in School Board v. Arline, 480 U.S.
273, 283-84 (1987), which focused on the perception of disability based on myths and fears); 29
C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(l) (same); see also H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 29-31 (1990), reprinted in
1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 452-54 (providing examples of perceived disability claims, all of which
involved the application of group-based assumptions or conscious prejudice); id. pt. 2, at 53,
reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 335-36 (same); S. REP. No. 101-116, at 24 (same).
68. See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(l).
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ated group not only causes employers to fail to distinguish between
group members who do and do not possess particular traits, but it
may also cause employers to fail to distinguish between similar em-
ployees who are and are not members of the group in the first place.
In other words, an employer that views "the disabled" as an undif-
ferentiated group (or, more likely, that views all individuals with a
particular condition or diagnosis as an undifferentiated group) may
fail to distinguish between individuals with similar impairments,
some of whom are "substantially limited in a major life activity"
and therefore fall within the ADA's actual disability category, and
some of whom are not so limited and therefore fall outside of the
protected group. For example, a manager who knows that asthma
can be a disabling impairment and who views "people with asthma"
as an undifferentiated group may categorize all asthma sufferers as
"disabled," even though asthma is not a disabling condition for most
individuals. Thus, prejudice against or generalizations about "the
disabled" may not only cause an employer to assign traits incor-
rectly to members of the category who do not possess those traits,
but it may also cause an employer to assign the category label in-
correctly to individuals who are not members of the category at all.
In recognition of this second effect of disability-based deci-
sionmaking, the ADA rejects the concept of "status-blind" assess-
ment that underlies Title VII. While the antidiscrimination man-
date in Title VII essentially orders the employer to ignore an em-
ployee's race, color, sex, or national origin, the ADA's antidiscrimi-
nation mandate requires the employer to think actively about an
employee's disability. 69 In part, this is necessary because of the
ADA's requirement that employers "reasonably accommodate" indi-
viduals with disabilities by providing appropriate workplace modifi-
cations to facilitate performance. 70 Because individuals with the
same condition, impairment, or diagnosis will have a very wide
range of capabilities, the ADA requires the employer to make an
individual assessment of an employee's physical or mental impair-
69. See Pamela S. Karlan & George Rutherglen, Disabilities, Discrimination, and Reason-
able Accommodation, 46 DUKE L.J. 1, 2-3 (1996) (noting that "unlike Title VII, the ADA also
requires employers to take some disabilities into account").
70. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5) (1994). Title VII contains a very limited version of an accommo-
dation duty with respect to religious-based discrimination. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000eG) (1994). How-
ever, because religion raises constitutional questions under the Establishment Clause that are
not raised in the disability context, courts have interpreted Title VII's religious accommodations
provision extremely narrowly. See Karlan & Rutherglen, supra note 69, at 6-7; see also H.R. REP.
No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 40 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 463 (distinguishing the
ADA's "significant" accommodation duty from Title VII's "insignificant" duty to accommodate
religious beliefs).
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ments. 71 Congress theorized that group-based prejudices and as-
sumptions could only be overcome by forcing employers to deal with
employees on an individual basis. 72 The corollary expectation was
that once employers assessed individual impairments individually,
employers would stop making mistakes.
When Congress adopted the perceived disability prong, Con-
gress clearly intended it to cover misperceptions and judgments
that result from an employer's failure to make this required indi-
vidual assessment. 73 For example, if an employer believes that all
people with epilepsy pose safety risks in unsupervised positions,
and the employer applies that group-based assumption to disqualify
all job applicants with epilepsy, the perceived disability prong will
protect all of the rejected applicants with epilepsy, including those
who are not substantially limited by their condition and who are
71. See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.9 (2001) (stating that the ADA "requires the individual as-
sessment of . . . the specific physical or mental limitations of the particular individual"); 29
C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3) (2001) (describing the "interactive process" that employers may need to
initiate with individual employees); see also Toyota Motor Mfg. v. Williams, 122 S. Ct. 681, 692
(2002) (holding that "Congress intended the existence of a disability to be determined in . . . a
case-by-case manner," which requires "[a]n individualized assessment of the effect of an impair-
ment"); Barnett v. U.S. Air, Inc., 228 F.3d 1105, 1113-15 (9th Cir. 2000) (describing employers'
obligations), cert. granted inpart, 121 S. Ct. 1600 (2001).
72. See 136 CONG. REC. S9680, S9681 (daily ed. July 13, 1990) (statement of Sen. Kennedy)
(explaining that the ADA's "fundamental premise" is that "disabled Americans should be judged
on the basis of facts"); 136 CONG. REC. S9527, S9542 (daily ed. July 11, 1990) (statement of Sen.
Dole) (stating that the ADA's goal was to ensure that employment decisions "must be made
about individuals, not groups, and must be based on facts, not fears"); 136 CONG. REC. S7422,
S7437 (daily ed. June 6, 1990) (statement of Sen. Harkin) ("The thesis of the Americans with
Disabilities Act is simply this: That people with disabilities ought to be judged on the basis of
their abilities; they should not be judged nor discriminated against based on unfounded fear,
prejudice, ignorance, or mythologies; people ought to be judged based upon the relevant medical
evidence and the abilities they have."); 136 CONG. REC. H2599, H2632 (daily ed. May 22, 1990)
(statement of Rep. Owens) (stating that the ADA's goal is to prohibit the use of "averages and
group-based predictions," by requiring employers to make employment decisions "based on facts,
not on presumptions as to what a class of individuals with a particular disability can or cannot
do"); 135 CONG. REC. S10765, S10798 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1989) (statement of Sen. Simon) ("The
ADA is designed to ensure that persons with disabilities are treated as individuals and that
employment decisions are not made on the basis of stereotypes."); 135 CONG. REC. S4979, S4985
(daily ed. May 9, 1989) (statement of Sen. Harkin) ('The ADA sends a clear and unequivocal
message to people with disabilities that they are ... to be judged as individuals on the basis of
their abilities and not on the basis of presumptions, generalizations, misperceptions, ignorance,
irrational fears, patronizing attitudes, or pernicious mythologies.").
73. See 136 CONG. REC. E1972, E1913 (daily ed. June 13, 1990) (statement of Rep. Hoyer)
(stating that the bill adopts the Supreme Court's analysis in School Board V. Arline, 480 U.S.
273, 283-84 (1987), which focused on the perception of disability based on myths and fears); 29
C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(l) (same); see also H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 29-31 (1990), reprinted in
1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 452-54 (providing examples of perceived disability claims, all of which
involved the application of group-based assumptions or conscious prejudice); id. pt. 2, at 53,
reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 335-36 (same); S. REP. No. 101-116, at 24 (same).
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only "regarded as" disabled by the employer. 74 That type of mis-
take-a mistake based on the conscious application of generaliza-
tions about "the disabled" as a group, or about all those with a par-
ticular diagnosis-falls squarely within the intended scope of the
perceived disability prong. 75
Courts have had no trouble agreeing on this point. In Cook v.
Rhode Island, for example, the court allowed a job applicant to
bring a perceived disability discrimination claim when a medical
facility rejected her application because of her morbid obesity.76 Al-
though morbid obesity is not an actual disability for many indi-
viduals because it does not substantially limit any major life activi-
ties, the employer "failed to make specific inquiries into [the appli-
cant's] physical abilities and instead relied on generalizations re-
garding an obese person's capabilities." 77 By acting on negative,
group-based assumptions, the employer mistakenly regarded the
applicant's morbid obesity as a substantially limiting impairment,
incorrectly believing that obesity is always an automatically dis-
qualifying condition. 78 The court described the employer's conduct
as the "strict inverse" of an individual inquiry and, therefore, a
"graphic illustration" of impermissible discrimination. 79
The court reached a similar conclusion in Mendez v. Gearan,
when a job applicant sued the Peace Corps after it rejected her for
an overseas position. 80 The job applicant had dysthymia, a chronic
form of mild depression, which is not an actual disability for many
individuals because it does not substantially limit any major life
74. See Taylor v. Pathmark Stores, Inc., 177 F.3d 180, 192-93, 193 n.8 (3d Cir. 1999) (ex-
plaining that the perceived disability prong would apply to "[a]n employer who regards a kind of
impairment-epilepsy, for example-as disqualifying all people affected by the impairment for a
wide range of jobs," rather than "educat[ing] itself about the varying nature of impairments and
[making] individualized determinations about affected employees"); see also id. at 193 (explain-
ing that an employer will be held liable under the perceived disability prong if the employer
acted on a group-based assumption that "anyone with bipolar disorder or HIV infection is sub-
stantially limited in a major life activity," because "[an employer with such a belief is failing to
make an individualized determination").
75. See id. at 192-93, 193 n.8 ("[A]n employer who is informed that a particular individual
has epilepsy might overestimate the limiting effects of that individual's epilepsy because of a
general perception about the severity of epilepsy. If the employer mistakenly overestimates the
degree of a person's impairment based on perceptions about the nature of the impairment, it is
not basing its decision on an individualized evaluation.").
76. 10 F.3d 17, 20-21, 23, 27 (1st Cir. 1993) (applying the analogous language in the Reha-
bilitation Act of 1973).
77. Id. at 22, 27.
78. See id. at 26-28.
79. Id. at 27.
80. 956 F. Supp. 1520, 1522 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (applying the analogous language in the Reha-
bilitation Act of 1973).
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activities. 81 Nevertheless, the Peace Corps failed to assess the ap-
plicant's condition on an individual basis. 82 Relying on group-based
assumptions about individuals with mental impairments, the Peace
Corps mistakenly assumed that the applicant's dysthymia was a
substantially limiting impairment. 8 The court held that the Peace
Corps regarded the applicant as disabled when it deemed her un-
able to perform any overseas assignments and automatically de-
ferred her application for one full year.8 4
Until recently, courts and commentators have seemed to as-
sume that perceived disabilities could only be the result of these
types of conscious, motivational mistakes. 8 The assumption was
that if employers engaged in the necessary individual assessment,
they would stop acting on prejudice and group-based generaliza-
tions and, in turn, would determine accurately whether or not an
employee had an actual disability. However, even if the first part of
this assumption is correct-i.e., even if individual assessment does
prevent employers from acting on consciously held prejudice and
making group-based decisions-increasing evidence indicates that
the second part of this assumption is not. As Professor Linda Ham-
ilton Krieger has argued in the Title VII context, "the assumption
that, absent discriminatory animus, employment decisionmakers
are rational actors . . . [who] make even-handed decisions using op-
timal inferential strategies" is simply incorrect.86
Courts are now starting to identify cases in which the em-
ployment decisionmaker has mistakenly regarded a nondisabling
impairment as a disability, even after conducting the individual
assessment that Congress believed would prevent such mistakes.
Courts have sometimes referred to these types of errors as "inno-
cent mistakes," in that they are not motivated by the same group-
81. Id. at 1522-24.
82. Id. at 1527-28.
83. Id. at 1525-29.
84. Id. at 1525-26.
85. See, e.g., Kramer & Mayerson, supra note 39, at 49 (arguing that the EEOC guidelines
"command an examination of whether societal prejudices associated with disability ha[ve]
impermissibly played a role in an employer's decision"); Christine L. Kuss, Comment, Absolving
a Deadly Sin: A Mledical and Legal Argument for Including Obesity as a Disability under the
Americans with Disabilities Act, 12 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 563, 583 (1996) (stating that
the perceived disability prong "is appropriate for a person who has experienced discrimination
because of the 'myths, fears, and stereotypes' associated with a certain disability"); see also 29
C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(l) (2001) (stating that "if an individual can show that an employer.., made
an employment decision because of a perception of disability based on 'myth, fear or stereotype,'
the individual will satisfy the 'regarded as' part of the definition of disability"); cases cited supra
notes 76-84 and accompanying text.
86. Krieger, supra note 35, at 1167, 1181.
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based animus or assumptions that caused the misperceptions de-
scribed in the cases above.8 7 Typically, courts have viewed these
types of mistakes as far less serious than mistakes caused by group-
based decisionmaking. In the words of one court: "[A] mistake about
the extent of a particular employee's impairment made in the
course of an individualized determination is further from the core of
the ADA's concern ... ,"88
Viewing these types of mistakes as merely peripheral to the
ADA's objectives, many courts have held that the perceived disabil-
ity definition simply does not apply. These courts have decided that
an employee is only protected under the perceived disability prong
if there is evidence that disability-based prejudice or assumptions
motivated the employer's mistaken belief. In reaching this conclu-
sion, these courts essentially equate the "mistake" element with an
element of intent.8 9 They will not apply the perceived disability
definition unless the employer's mistaken perception "raise[s] the
specter of what appears to be the [ADA's] primary target": invidi-
ously motivated discrimination. 90 Thus, these courts reject ADA li-
ability altogether for nonmotivational mistakes that occur during
an individual assessment. Rondon v. Wal-Mart, Inc. is an example
of this approach. 91 In Rondon, the plaintiffs doctor advised him to
avoid repetitive twisting and bending, lifting more than five
pounds, and working for extended periods for three weeks after in-
juring his back at work.92 Although the plaintiffs back injury was
likely to be a nondisabling, temporary condition, the plaintiffs em-
ployer permanently discharged him from his pharmacist position
87. See, e.g., Taylor v. Pathmark Stores, Inc., 177 F.3d 180, 193 (3d Cir. 1999); Deane v. Po-
cono Med. Ctr., 142 F.3d 138, 143 n.4, 144 (3d Cir. 1998) (en banc).
88. Taylor, 177 F.3d at 193.
89. See, e.g., Colwell v. Suffolk County Police Dep't, 158 F.3d 635, 646 (2d Cir. 1998) (hold-
ing that "whether an individual is regarded as having a disability turns on the employer's per-
ception of the employee and is therefore a question of intent"); Francis v. City of Meriden, 129
F.3d 281, 284 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that the perceived disability definition "turns on the em-
ployer's perception of the employee, a question of intent"); Monroe v. Cortland County, 37 F.
Supp. 2d 546, 555 (N.D.N.Y. 1999) (stating that the employee "bears the burden of showing the
[employer] regarded him as being disabled," and that this question "focuses on the intent of the
employer"); see also Johnson v. Boardman Petroleum, Inc., 923 F. Supp. 1563, 1569 (S.D. Ga.
1996) (rejecting an employee's perceived disability claim for failure to show "that her termination
was motivated by [her employer's] discriminatory animus towards this disability").
90. See Milatz v. Frito-Lay, Inc., No. 95-6184, 1997 WL 12933, at *3 (10th Cir. Jan. 15,
1997) (affirming the dismissal of a perceived disability claim alleging that the employer mistak-
enly regarded the employee's nondisabling carpal tunnel syndrome as a disability, in part be-
cause the misperception did not reflect invidious intent).
91. No. C-97-0369 MMC, 1998 WL 730843, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 8, 1998).
92. Id. at*1.
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shortly after learning of the impairment.93 The Rondon court dis-
missed the plaintiffs claim that his employer mistakenly regarded
his nondisabling lower back strain as a disability. 94 The court held
that because "[b]ack strains are generally not the subject of 'myth,
fear, or stereotype' resulting in a prejudicial overestimation of an
employee's actual impairment," the employer's mistake was not
covered by the perceived disability prong.9
Other courts have taken a similarly narrow view of the
ADA's perceived disability definition and denied coverage whenever
an employer undertakes an individual assessment, even if the as-
sessment results in error.9 6 In Miller v. Airborne Express, the em-
ployee's perceived disability claim was based on an employer's al-
leged mistaken perception that the employee's nondisabling knee
injury was disabling. 97 The plaintiff had injured his knee on the job
and was unable to kneel, squat, lift, climb, or stand for extended
periods. 98 Although the plaintiff was not substantially limited in
any major life activities, his employer refused to consider him for
his prior position as a driver/dockworker, purportedly due to an er-
roneous view of the severity of the plaintiffs condition. 99 Because
the court believed that individuals with knee injuries "do not typi-
cally suffer from societal prejudice and misconception," and there
was no evidence that prejudice motivated the employer's mistake,
the court held that the perceived disability prong did not apply.100
93. Id.
94. Id. at *7.
95. Id. at *6 (quoting 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(l) (2001)).
96. See, e.g., Wooten v. Farmland Tools, 58 F.3d 382, 386 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding that an
employer's misperception of an employee's abilities was not covered by the perceived disability
definition because the mistake "was not based upon speculation, stereotype, or myth," but was
based on information in a doctor's note provided by the employee); Collins v. Yellow Freight Sys.,
Inc., 942 F. Supp. 449, 453 (W.D. Mo. 1996) (dismissing employee's perceived disability claim
where the employer's misperception about the employee's back injury was not based on "archaic
attitudes, erroneous perceptions, and myths" about individuals with disabilities, but instead was
based on a doctor's written evaluation); Schluter v. Indus. Coils, Inc., 928 F. Supp. 1437, 1450
(W.D. Wis. 1996) (dismissing employee's perceived disability claim because the employer's mis-
taken conclusion that the employee's nondisabling vision impairment was actually disabling
"was based not on any invidious stereotype .... but on plaintiffs failure to respond to his inquiry
about other work at the company and her expressed belief that she would be unable to perform
any other job").
97. No. 3:98-CV-0217-R, 1999 WL 47242, at *6 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 22, 1999) (interpreting ADA
case law and regulations in order to rule on a claim under an analogous state law disability
discrimination provision).
98. Id. at *1, 4.
99. Id. at *1-2.
100. Id. at *6 (interpreting the purpose of the perceived disability prong narrowly as "pro-
tect[ing] individuals from myths, fears, or stereotypes associated with certain physical conditions
and disabilities"); see also Wright v. Ill. Dep't of Corr., 204 F.3d 727, 731 (7th Cir. 2000) (requir-
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The discrimination claim in Howard v. Navistar Interna-
tional Transportation Corp. met with a similar fate. 101 The Howard
court held that an employer's mistaken perception of an employee's
nondisabling "tennis elbow" as a disability was also beyond the
scope of the perceived disability prong.10 2 "This provision of the
ADA is designed to combat invidious stereotypes regarding disabled
members of society," the court explained.1 0 3 Because the employee
"failed to produce any evidence of the existence of invidious stereo-
types against individuals with tennis elbow," the court held the
perceived disability definition to be inapplicable. 10 4
While these courts may be correct that individual assess-
ment errors are further from the ADA's "core," this fact is likely to
be of little solace to the employees who still find themselves without
a job, a raise, or a promotion because an employment decisionmaker
acted on a mistaken belief. For that reason, other courts have taken
the opposite approach to these nonmotivational misperceptions.
These courts have interpreted the perceived disability definition
broadly, applying it whenever the employer mistakenly regards a
nondisabling impairment as a disability, regardless of the origin of
the mistake. 10 5 For these courts, " 'even an innocent misperception
ing an employer's mistaken perception of a nondisabling impairment to be "based on 'myth, fear
or stereotype' " in order to satisfy the ADA's "regarded as" prong (quoting 29 C.F.R. app. §
1630.2(l)); McDowell v. Farmland Indus., Inc., No. 98-3100, 1999 WL 311477, at *2 (10th Cir.
May 18, 1999) (same); Muller v. Auto. Club, 897 F. Supp. 1289, 1297 (S.D. Cal. 1995) (same).
Although courts could interpret "myths" and "stereotypes" as unintentional forms of discrimina-
tion, they appear to equate those terms with conscious prejudice, which they then require as an
essential element of a perceived disability claim.
101. 904 F. Supp. 922, 929-30 (E.D. Wis. 1995).
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 930; see also Barber v. Pepsi-Cola Pers., 78 F. Supp. 2d 683, 691-92 (W.D. Mich.
1999) (holding that the perceived disability prong did not apply to an employer's mistaken per-
ception of an employee's nondisabling shoulder injury because" 'a person with a shoulder injury
does not suffer from perception of disability based on myth, fear, or stereotype'" (quoting Blair v.
Prof. Corps. Mgmt. Co., No. 97-3593, 1999 WL 17648, at *2 (6th Cir. Jan. 4, 1999)) (citing 29
C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(l))).
105. See, e.g., Riemer v. Ill. Dep't of Transp., 148 F.3d 800, 806-08 (7th Cir. 1998) (sustaining
a perceived disability claim even though the employer's misperception of an employee's nondis-
abling asthma as a disability was based on a doctor's report, not on myth, prejudice, or invidious
stereotype); Deane v. Pocono Med. Ctr., 142 F.3d 138, 144 (3d Cir. 1998) (en banc) (finding a
triable issue on a perceived disability claim by a registered nurse whose employer exaggerated
the gravity of her condition, and holding that whether or not the employer was motivated by
prejudice "is not determinative"); Johnson v. Am. Chamber of Commerce Publishers, Inc., 108
F.3d 818, 819 (7th Cir. 1997) ("If for no reason whatsoever an employer regards a person as dis-
abled-if, for example, because of a blunder in reading medical records it imputes to him a heart
condition he has never had-and takes adverse action, it has violated the statute unless some
other portion of the law affords it a defense."); DiSante v. Henderson, No. CIV. A. 98-5703, 2000
WL 250225, at 1-2, 7, 10 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 2, 2000) (denying employer's summary judgment motion
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based on nothing more than a simple mistake of fact as to the
severity, or even the very existence, of an individual's impairment
can be sufficient to satisfy the statutory definition of a perceived
disability.' "106 These courts do not equate the mistake element of
the perceived disability definition with an element of intent;
instead, they view the definition as imposing an absolute duty on
the employer to get its assessment right. 10 7 Whether the employer's
mistake was motivated by group-based assumptions or not, the em-
ployer is held fully liable under the ADA.
The court in Taylor v. Pathmark Stores, Inc. described this
broad approach to the ADA's perceived disability prong. 08 In Tay-
lor, the employer conducted the necessary individual assessment of
an employee who had an injured ankle. 10 9 However, because of a
variety of "miscommunications and misinterpretations," the em-
ployer mistakenly viewed the nondisabling condition as an actual
disability that substantially limited the employee's ability to lift,
walk, or stand. 110 While the court agreed with the employer that its
mistake was not "infected with stereotypes or prejudice against the
disabled," the court still denied the employer's summary judgment
motion on the employee's perceived disability claim, holding that
"an employer's innocent mistake (which may be a function of 'goofs'
or miscommunications) is sufficient to subject it to liability under
the ADA.""' In reaching this conclusion, the court acknowledged
on a perceived disability claim under the Rehabilitation Act where the employer misperceived
the employee's nondisabling obsessive compulsive disorder as a disability, because the employee
"need not prove animus on the part of [the] defendant; an innocent mistake may still support
liability"); Bicknell v. Thomas Tile & Carpet, Inc., No. 98-C-3256, 1999 WL 261738, at *7 (N.D.
Ill. Apr. 16, 1999) (denying employer's summary judgment motion on a perceived disability claim
by a salesperson whose carpal tunnel syndrome was allegedly viewed as imposing significant and
indefinite lifting restrictions, because " '[elven an innocent misperception based on nothing more
than a simple mistake of fact' " is covered by the ADA's perceived disability prong (quoting
Deane v. Pocono Med. Ctr., 142 F.3d 138, 144 (3d Cir. 1998) (en banc))); see also E.E. Black, Ltd.
v. Marshall, 497 F. Supp. 1088, 1097 (D. Haw. 1980) (noting in dicta that the perceived disability
definition in the Rehabilitation Act applies to "those individuals who are perceived as having a
handicap, whether an impairment exists or not, but who, because of attitudes or for any other
reason, are regarded as handicapped by employers" (emphasis added)).
106. Deane, 142 F.3d at 144.
107. See Taylor v. Pathmark Stores, Inc., 177 F.3d 180, 190-92 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding that
an employee may bring a perceived disability claim even if the employer is "innocently wrong
about the extent of his or her impairment," because the employer "has the initial responsibility to
evaluate employees correctly"); id. at 191-92 ("An employer ... has to be right when it decides
that ... restrictions are permanent and that they prevent the employee from performing a wide
class of jobs .... ).
108. Id. at 182-83, 190-92.
109. Id. at 183.
110. Id. at 188, 190.
111. Id. at 182-83, 190-92, 196.
PERCEIVED DISABILITIES
that Congress was concerned with "eliminating society's myths,
fears, stereotypes and prejudices with respect to the disabled." 112
But the court interpreted the "regarded as" language more broadly
to bar all mistakes about employees' limitations, regardless of the
origin of the employer's misperception.11 3 Even though the employer
was "innocently wrong" about the employee's nondisabling condi-
tion, the court still applied the perceived disability prong, holding
that "prejudice is not required for a successful 'regarded as'
claim. ... 114
In reaching its conclusion, the Taylor court followed a prior
decision in Deane v. Pocono Medical Center.115 The perceived dis-
ability discrimination claim in Deane was based on a medical cen-
ter's mistaken belief that a registered nurse's nondisabling wrist
injury was a disabling impairment. 116 The Pocono Medical Center
had conducted the necessary individual assessment and correctly
determined that the employee's injury made her unable to lift more
than fifteen to twenty pounds or to perform repetitive manual
tasks.1 7 However, the nurse alleged that the Pocono Medical Cen-
ter had also viewed her limitations as "far worse than they actually
were," by concluding incorrectly that she was "unable to lift more
than ten pounds, push or pull anything, assist patients in emer-
gency situations, [and] move or assist patients in the activities of
daily living ... ,"118 There was evidence that, despite undertaking
an individual assessment, the employer "fundamentally misunder-
stood and exaggerated the limitations that the wrist injury im-
posed," and mistakenly believed that the nurse was unable to per-
form CPR, to use medical equipment, or to do any job involving pa-
tient care. 119 Even though there was no evidence that group-based
112. Id. at 191 (citing Deane v. Pocono Med. Ctr., 142 F.3d 138, 144 (3d Cir. 1998) (en banc)).
113. Id. at 182-83, 190-92.
114. Id. at 192. The court did make one distinction between perceived disability claims in
which the employer's mistake is and is not based on prejudice. Id. at 182-83, 192-93. The court
decided to recognize a "limited defense" for employers when there is evidence that the employee
was responsible for the employer's mistaken perception, but the defense was only allowed in the
"innocent mistake" scenario. Id. The court explained that "[i]f an employer regards a plaintiff as
disabled based on a mistake in an individualized determination of the employee's actual condi-
tion rather than on a belief about the effects of the kind of impairment the employer regarded
the employee as having," then the employer will still be subject to a perceived disability claim,
but "the employer will have a defense if the employee unreasonably failed to inform the employer
of the actual situation." Id. at 193.
115. Id. at 182-83, 191, 194 (citing Deane, 142 F.3d at 144-45).
116. 142 F.3d at 141-46.
117. Id. at 141.
118. Id. at 142.
119. Id. at 142, 145.
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assumptions played a role in the employer's misperceptions, the
court held that lack of prejudice was "not determinative," and it
allowed the employee to bring a perceived disability claim.1 20 "Al-
though the legislative history indicates that Congress was con-
cerned about eliminating society's myths, fears, stereotypes, and
prejudices with respect to the disabled," the court explained, "even
an innocent misperception based on nothing more than a simple
mistake of fact" may support an ADA claim. 121
These two sets of cases illustrate the two extreme positions
that most courts have taken on nonmotivational mistakes: either
imposing full liability, or imposing no liability at all. On the sur-
face, these two approaches appear to be based simply on differing
interpretations of the ADA's statutory language and legislative in-
tent. However, other assumptions appear to be at work below the
surface. Although rarely made explicit, courts' views about employ-
ers' nonmotivational misperceptions seem to be driven by courts'
divergent assumptions about whether these types of mistakes really
occur, and if so, just how harmful they really are. Thus, this Article
begins by exploring these underlying questions about the origins
and consequences of mistakes. Is an employer's misperception of a
nondisabling impairment as disabling likely to be caused by some-
thing other than animus against or conscious assumptions about
"the disabled"? If so, what type of harm is likely to flow from such
mistakes? These questions are largely ones about social perception
and decisionmaking, which are the stomping grounds not of law-
yers, but of cognitive social psychologists.
II. USING SOCIAL COGNITION TO EXPLAIN THE SOURCE AND
IMPACT OF EMPLOYERS' MISPERCEPTIONS
A man of genius makes no mistakes. His errors are volitional and are the portals of
discovery.
-Ulysses 1 22
Cognitive social psychology or "social cognition" studies how
the human mind perceives, processes, understands, and responds to
social and interpersonal events.1 23 The growth of this field reflected
120. Id. at 144.
121. Id.
122. JOHN BARTLETT, THE SHORTER BARTLETT'S FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 197 (1964).
123. See David L. Hamilton et al., Social Cognition and Classic Issues in Social Psychology,
in SOCIAL COGNITION: IMPACT ON SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 1, 2-5 (Patricia G. Devine et al. eds.,
1994); see also Brown et al., supra note 35, at 1493-94 (describing social cognition as the field of
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a general shift away from motivation-based models of social psy-
chology, which had focused on individual needs and desires as the
source of attitudes and interpersonal behavior. 124 Social cognition
theory takes a nonmotivational approach to interpersonal judgment
and decisionmaking, by looking for explanations in the information-
processing mechanisms of the human brain. 125 Social cognition
theorists study the strategies that we use, often outside of our con-
scious awareness, to select, filter, organize, store, and recall infor-
mation from our complex perceptual environment, and how we use
that information to make social judgments and decisions. 126
Cognitive social psychologists have discovered that we use a
variety of cognitive "shortcuts" to simplify the otherwise over-
whelming task of understanding our social world. 127 While these
psychology that applies methodologies from cognitive psychology to issues in social psychology,
by analyzing the "processes though which people perceive and order their social worlds," and by
studying "how people interpret, analyze, remember, and use information that they perceive
about the social world"); Krieger, supra note 36, at 1257 (defining social cognition theory as the
sub-discipline of social psychology that studies patterns of human cognition that bias social
perception).
124. See MILES HEWSTONE, CAUSAL ATTRIBUTION: FROM COGNITIVE PROCESSES TO
COLLECTIVE BELIEFS 60 (1989); James L. Hilton, Interaction Goals and Person Perception, in
ATTRIBUTION AND SOCIAL INTERACTION: THE LEGACY OF EDWARD E. JONES 127, 130-31 (John M.
Darley & Joel Cooper eds., 1998).
125. DAVID 0. SEARS ET AL., SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 142 (6th ed. 1988) (describing the differ-
ence between motivational biases that result from conscious needs and desires, and cognitive
biases that result from the search for "a coherent, clear understanding of [the] environment[ ]");
Krieger, supra note 35, at 1164-65, 1187-88, 1216, 1239 (distinguishing between motivational
biases that result from the "intent to discriminate," and cognitive biases that are "an unwelcome
byproduct of otherwise adaptive cognitive processes," and arguing that race discrimination often
results from the latter); see also ARMOUR, supra note 35, at 14, 75-76, 154-55 (distinguishing
between racial discrimination that is "rooted in conscious animus" and discrimination that stems
"from unconscious mental reflexes"); Amy L. Wax, Discrimination as Accident, 74 IND. L.J. 1129,
1130 (1999) (noting that "[s]cholars addressing the problem of discrimination against socially
disfavored groups have distinguished between two types of bias in a variety of social settings:
'conscious,' deliberate, or purposeful animus, and 'unconscious,' inadvertent, or automatic forms
of bias").
126. See supra note 123.
127. See HEWSTONE, supra note 124, at 94 (explaining that because humans are "capacity-
limited information-processors," the need to process large amounts of information requires peo-
ple to use "heuristics," which are cognitive strategies to simplify complex tasks); Brown et al.,
supra note 35, at 1493-97 (1997) (explaining that the "basic premise of social cognition is 'infor-
mation overload,' the theory that the normal human mind cannot possibly notice, let alone ana-
lyze and use, every bit of social information it encounters," and that people therefore adopt cogni-
tive "shortcuts" to "process information as quickly and efficiently as possible"); see also RICHARD
NISBETT & LEE ROSS, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT
254-55, 269-70 (1980) (explaining a variety of efficient cognitive processing techniques); John S.
Carroll & John W. Payne, The Psychology of the Parole Decision Process: A Joint Application of
Attribution Theory and Information Processing Psychology, in COGNITION AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR
13, 22 (John S. Carroll & John W. Payne eds., 1976) (describing studies demonstrating that
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cognitive shortcuts are efficient and typically adaptive-in fact,
even essential-researchers have discovered that they often lead to
predictable perceptual errors or "cognitive biases."'128 We are imper-
fect information processors, and we all make mistakes in assessing
social events. These perceptual mistakes are not motivational in
origin. They are not caused by conscious needs or desires, in the
way that group-based animus may cause a prejudiced employer to
attribute traits mistakenly to every member of a disfavored group,
or the way that even a "rational" statistical discriminator might use
group-based generalizations as a proxy for relevant characteristics
that are costly to assess on an individual basis. Rather, these errors
are the unintentional result of normal but imperfect, and often
automatic and unconscious, cognitive processing mechanisms. 129
These cognitive biases creep into two stages of the employment de-
cisionmaking process: when the decisionmaker assesses an em-
ployee's past behavior, and when the decisionmaker makes judg-
ments about what the employee's future performance is likely to be.
Parts A through D below analyze two branches of social cognition
that study these decisionmaking stages: the fields of causal attribu-
tion theory and prediction bias.
"humans often resort to heuristic procedures when faced with such tasks as probability estima-
tion and prediction").
128. See HEWSTONE, supra note 124, at 94 (explaining that cognitive shortcuts or "heuristics"
are effective because they allow people to simplify complex attribution tasks efficiently, but the
outcomes are not always normatively correct); SEARS ET AL., supra note 125, at 134-41 (describ-
ing a variety of "cognitive biases" that result from our automatic cognitive simplification mecha-
nisms); Brown et al., supra note 35, at 1493-97 (explaining how the efficiency of cognitive short-
cuts, of which people are "generally unaware," comes at the price of "being less than fully logical,
thorough, or accurate," and being prone to "exaggerations, oversimplifications, [and] generaliza-
tions"); Carroll & Payne, supra note 127, at 22 (explaining that while our cognitive heuristics are
necessary to simplify social judgments and are often accurate, they also cause systematic mis-
takes); Krieger, supra note 36, at 1257 (explaining that social cognition theory has identified
"how patterns of human cognition, while adaptive in many important respects, lead to systematic
errors which bias social perception and judgment in a variety of predictable ways"); cf. Krieger,
supra note 35, at 1216 (arguing that the primary sources of racial discrimination are cognitive
biases that are "an unwelcome byproduct of otherwise adaptive cognitive processes"). See gener-
ally Lee Ross, The Intuitive Psychologist and His Shortcomings: Distortions in the Attribution
Process, in 10 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 173, 198-200 (Leonard Berowitz
ed., 1977) (identifying and analyzing cognitive processing mistakes); Joshua Susskind et al.,
Perceiving Individuals and Groups: Expectancies, Dispositional Inferences, and Causal Attribu-
tions, 76 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 181, 181-82 (1999) (analyzing the unique cognitive
processing errors that occur when people are perceiving individuals rather than groups).
129. See supra note 125.
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A. Errors in Assessing the Past
1. Causal Attribution Theory
Causal attribution theory, which is a branch of the broader
field of social cognition, focuses on one type of cognitive processing
mechanism: the process by which people arrive at explanations for
social events. 130 When people observe others' actions or behavior,
they ask themselves what the cause of that conduct might be.' 3 '
Causal attribution is the cognitive process by which people answer
that question and link an observed behavior or other social event to
some causal antecedent.3 2 The goal of causal attribution theory is
to understand "how a person infers or attributes cause and what
happens once he does."1 33 According to causal attribution theorists,
the attribution process is ubiquitous. We constantly make causal
attributions about virtually every salient event in our social lives. 134
Causal attributions are usually rapid and automatic assessments,
and we are often unaware that we are making a causal inference at
all.' 35 People make causal attributions of other people's behavior as
a way to understand their social environment. 136 These attributions
are highly adaptive because an understanding of past behavior al-
lows people to predict future behavior and, in turn, to feel more in
130. See SUSAN T. FISKE & SHELLEY E. TAYLOR, SOCIAL COGNITION 57-95 (1991); HEWSTONE,
supra note 124, at 37; SEARS ET AL., supra note 125, at 117; Carroll & Payne, supra note 127, at
18; Irene Hanson Frieze, The Role of Information Processing of Making Causal Attributions for
Success and Failure, in COGNITION AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR 95, 95 (John S. Carroll & John W.
Payne eds., 1976); Gerald Metalsky & Lyn Y. Abramson, Attributional Styles: Toward a Frame-
work for Conceptualization and Assessment, in ASSESSMENT STRATEGIES FOR COGNITIVE-
BEHAVIORAL INTERVENTIONS 13, 26 (Philip C. Kendall & Steven D. Holan eds., 1981); Ross, su-
pra note 128, at 174; Michael Ross & Garth J.O. Fletcher, Attribution and Social Perception, in 2
THE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 73 (3d ed. 1985).
131. See HEWSTONE, supra note 124, at 37.
132. See id.; Carroll & Payne, supra note 127, at 18; Frieze, supra note 130, at 95; Metalsky
& Abramson, supra note 130, at 26; Ross, supra note 128, at 175; Ross & Fletcher, supra note
130, at 73.
133. Carroll & Payne, supra note 127, at 18.
134. See Frieze, supra note 130, at 95; Metalsky & Abramson, supra note 130, at 37; see also
Reid Hastie, Causes and Effects of Causal Attribution, 46 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 44,
44 (1984) ('When we perceive events we are almost irresistibly drawn to seek their sources or
causes. This tendency is especially strong when the events are the actions of other people.").
135. See Metalsky & Abramson, supra note 130, at 26, 37.
136. See HEWSTONE, supra note 124, at 61; SEARS ET AL., supra note 125, at 118; Frieze, su-
pra note 130, at 95; Richard R. Lau & Dan Russell, Attributions in the Sports Pages, 39 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 29, 29 (1980); Ross & Fletcher, supra note 130, at 73; Bernard
Weiner, A Theory of Motivation for Some Classroom Experiences, 71 J. EDUC. PSYCHOL. 3, 3
(1979).
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control of social interactions. 37 Thus, causal attributions are a very
efficient way to help people interact and make social judgments and
decisions.138
When employers are engaged in the ADA's required individ-
ual assessment of employees' impairments, causal attributions are
very likely to occur. The more involved the observers are in the
situation, the more likely they are to engage in causal inferences
about other people's behavior. 39 Specifically, an observer is more
likely to make causal attributions for another person's behavior if
the observer expects to interact with the other person in the fu-
ture, 140 if the observer is required to predict the other person's fu-
ture behavior, 41 if the observer wants to control the other person's
conduct, 42 or if the observer is in some way dependent on the other
person's performance for achieving a desired goal. 4 3 All of these
137. See HEWSTONE, supra note 124, at 61; SEARS ET AL., supra note 125, at 117-18; Carroll
& Payne, supra note 127, at 18; Frieze, supra note 130, at 95; Harold H. Kelly, Attribution in
Social Interaction, in ATTRIBUTION: PERCEIVING THE CAUSES OF BEHAVIOR 1, 22 (Edward E.
Jones et al. eds., 1972); Krieger, supra note 36, at 1281 (explaining that, "[r]ightly or wrongly, we
assume that understanding why something has happened will improve our power to predict or
even control what will happen in the future"); Lau & Russell, supra note 136, at 29; Metalsky &
Abramson, supra note 130, at 17; Jerri P. Town & John H. Harvey, Self-Disclosure, Attribution,
and Social Interaction, 44 Soc. PSYCHOL. Q. 291, 291 (1981); Oscar Ybarra & Walter G. Stephan,
Attributional Orientations and the Prediction of Behavior: The Attribution-Prediction Bias, 76 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 718, 718, 726 (1999). See generally Ross & Fletcher, supra note
130, at 104 (collecting social science studies that provide empirical support for the hypothesis
that "people make attributions, in part, to enhance their control over the environment").
138. See Lau & Russell, supra note 136, at 29; cf. ARMOUR, supra note 35, at 36 (making a
similar observation about the adaptive value of stereotypes, which "are merely statistical gener-
alizations, probabilistic rules of thumb that, when accurate, help people make speedy and often
difficult decisions in a world of imperfect information").
139. See John H. Harvey et al., Unsolicited Interpretation and Recall of Interpersonal Events,
38 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 551, 552 (1980).
140. See HEWSTONE, supra note 124, at 45-46 (providing empirical support); see, e.g., Harvey
et al., supra note 139, at 559-62 (describing a study finding that subjects who described their
thoughts and feelings after watching videotaped episodes of people engaging in various behaviors
provided more causal attributions in their descriptions when they anticipated having a future
interaction with one of the videotaped actors); Kerri Yarkin-Levin, Anticipated Interaction, Attri-
bution, and Social Interaction, 46 SOC. PSYCHOL. Q. 302, 304-09 (1983) (describing a similar
study with similar results).
141. See HEWSTONE, supra note 124, at 43 (providing empirical support); Ross & Fletcher,
supra note 130, at 93 (same); see, e.g., John S. Carroll & Richard L. Weiner, Cognitive Social
Psychology in Court and Beyond, in COGNITIVE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 213, 227-28 (Albert H. Has-
torf & Alice M. Isen eds., 1982) (describing a study finding that parole decisionmakers who were
required to predict inmates' risk of future criminal behavior were particularly likely to make
causal attributions for the inmates' prior crimes).
142. See Ross & Fletcher, supra note 130, at 93 (providing empirical support).
143. See Hastie, supra note 134, at 45 (providing empirical support); Thomas A. Pyszczynski
& Jeff Greenberg, Role of Disconfirmed Expectancies in the Instigation of Attributional Process-
ing, 40 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 31, 32 (1981) (summarizing research demonstrating
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circumstances that tend to increase observers' causal attribution
activity are present in an employer-employee interaction. The em-
ployer is highly involved in job-related decisions such as hiring, fir-
ing, and promotion. This involvement is heightened because the
employer expects to have long-term interactions with employees
who are hired or retained, and therefore the employer must predict
what the employee's future performance is likely to be. Because the
employer's business outcome relates to employee productivity, the
employer wants to control employee performance, upon which the
employer's bottom line ultimately depends. Thus, social science re-
search predicts that an employer's decisionmaking process about
employees is particularly likely to trigger the cognitive processes
involved in causal attribution.
In addition to routine employee evaluations at times of hir-
ing, firing, and promotion, employers also assess employees when
performance or behavior raises a question about the employees' ca-
pabilities. Not surprisingly, cognitive social psychologists have
demonstrated that observers make more causal attributions for an-
other person's behavior when asked or required to provide an ex-
planation, 144 which is typically the case when an employer must
decide whether or not to respond to a particular instance of em-
ployee conduct. 145 In addition, observers engage in increased causal
attribution activity after observing an unexpected behavior 146 or a
"that the perceiver's outcome dependency on a target person may be another determinant of the
onset of attributional processes").
144. See HEWSTONE, supra note 124, at 111; NISBETT & ROSS, supra note 127, at 183; Ross &
Fletcher, supra note 130, at 93.
145. See Blanck & Marti, supra note 37, at 355-56 (describing one general category of per-
ceived disability claims that "involve[ ] alleged employment discrimination ... in circumstances
where the appropriateness of an employee's workplace behavior is at issue ... [but] the behavior
at issue is not always related to an underlying disability recognized by the law").
146. See HEWSTONE, supra note 124, at 43-45 (1989) (providing empirical support); SEARS ET
AL., supra note 125, at 121 (same); Hastie, supra note 134, at 44-45, 48, 50, 52-53 (same); Ross &
Fletcher, supra note 130, at 93 (same); Weiner, supra note 136, at 4 (same); see also Bertram F.
Malle & Joshua Knobe, Which Behaviors Do People Explain? A Basic Actor-Observer Asymmetry,
72 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 288, 288-89 (1997) (explaining why unexpected events are
so likely to elicit causal inferences).
For example, one early study found that unexpected outcomes of sporting events elicited
more causal attributions in the newspaper sports pages than did sporting events with expected
outcomes. See Lau & Russell, supra note 136, at 34-35. In another study, subjects observed vari-
ous conduct by a confederate actor. See Pyszczynski & Greenberg, supra note 143, at 33-36. In
some situations, the actor's conduct confirmed the observer's expectations: the actor either
agreed to a request for a very small favor or refused a request for a very large favor. See id. In
other situations, the actor's conduct disconfirmed the observer's expectations: the actor either
refused a request for a very small favor or agreed to a request for a very large favor. See id. The
study found that subjects sought out attribution-relevant information significantly more in the
disconfirming than the confirming interactions. See id.
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negative event, 147 particularly when the other person fails to obtain
a desired goal. 148 Those are precisely the types of events that would
prompt an employer to evaluate an employee's capabilities. Recall
that most perceived disability discrimination claims involve em-
ployees who do possess some type of nondisabling physical or men-
tal impairment, which the employer concludes is actually dis-
abling. 49 In the typical case, the employer's evaluation process is
triggered when a previously nonimpaired employee suffers an ill-
ness or injury that might impact the employee's performance, or
when the employer otherwise recognizes that an impairment exists.
The employer often must assess whether conduct is related to the
impairment, determine the gravity of the impairment, and judge
the likelihood that the impairment will impact performance in the
future. That scenario contains all of the ingredients for increasing
the likelihood that the employer will use causal attributions in the
decisionmaking process.
The fact that an employer's evaluation of an employee's im-
pairment is likely to involve causal attributions, however, does not
by itself shed any particular light on the origins of perceived dis-
abilities. To assess the origins of perceived disabilities, one needs to
know not only that employment decisionmakers are using causal
attributions, but also whether the causal attribution process is con-
tributing to misperceptions. If the causal attribution process can
explain why an employer might erroneously regard a nondisabling
impairment as a disability, that would help answer the underlying
question of whether perceived disabilities indeed may result from
nonmotivational mistakes.
Causal attribution theorists can assist in this endeavor.
These researchers have discovered that although the causal attri-
bution process is typically effective and highly adaptive, its utility
does not come without a price. While our rapid and often uncon-
scious attribution process has the benefit of extraordinary effi-
ciency, it yields imperfect results. Social scientists have demon-
strated not only that people will make perceptual errors during the
causal attribution process, but, more importantly, they have also
147. See HEWSTONE, supra note 124, at 46 (providing empirical support); Krieger, supra note
36, at 1267 (noting that "attributions are much more common following negative events than
following positive events"); see also Malle & Knobe, supra note 146, at 288-89 (explaining why
negative events are so likely to elicit causal inferences). See generally David L. Hamilton &
Robert K. Gifford, Illusory Correlation in Interpersonal Perception: A Cognitive Basis of Stereo-
typic Judgments, 12 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 392 (1976) (providing empirical support).
148. See HEWSTONE, supra note 124, at 44-45, 111 (providing empirical support).
149. See supra notes 58-63 and accompanying text.
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identified the specific types of errors that people are likely to make.
These researchers have characterized potential causes along three
primary dimensions, which are described in Part II.A.2, and they
have discovered predictable attribution biases along each dimen-
sion. More specifically, causal attribution theorists have demon-
strated that we systematically tend to overattribute to certain types
of causes, and we systematically tend to underattribute to others.1 50
By mapping these known causal attribution biases onto the ele-
ments of an ADA perceived disability claim, the analysis in Part
II.A.3 will show that we predictably err in ways that tend to facili-
tate misperceptions of nondisabling conditions as disabling. In other
words, the social science evidence supports the view that perceived
disabilities can have purely cognitive origins, independent from in-
vidious prejudice or other forms of group-based decisionmaking,
and that these types of errors may be a fairly common event.
2. The Causal Attribution Dimensions
When a person (the "observer") views the behavior or per-
formance of another person (the "actor"), particularly under the
conditions described above, the observer will rapidly assign a
"cause" to the actor's conduct. 151 According to causal attribution
theorists, observers attribute social events to causes that lie along
three primary dimensions: (1) internal versus external; (2) stable
versus variable; and (3) global versus specific. 152
150. See HEwSTONE, supra note 124, at 60 (explaining that people demonstrate clear biases
by making rapid judgments from limited information); SEARS ET AL., supra note 125, at 134
(same); Lyn Y. Abramson et al., Learned Helplessness in Humans: Critique and Reformulation,
87 J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOL. 49, 59 (1978) (noting support for finding "systematic biases and errors
in the formation of attributions").
151. See HEWSTONE, supra note 124, at 37; Metalsky & Abramson, supra note 130, at 26, 37.
152. See Metalsky & Abramson, supra note 130, at 45-46; Christopher Peterson et al., The
Attributional Style Questionnaire, 6 COGNITIVE THERAPY & RES. 287, 288 (1982); Martin E.P.
Seligman et al., Depressive Attributional Style, 88 J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOL. 242, 242-43 (1979).
Some social scientists have theorized the existence of a fourth causal attribution dimension
that characterizes causes as either "volitional" or "nonvolitional," based on how much control the
actor has over the outcome. See, e.g., HEWSTONE, supra note 124, at 33; SEARS ET AL., supra note
125, at 120; Weiner, supra note 136, at 6. However, social scientists have not agreed uniformly
that this dimension exists independent from the other dimensions. See, e.g., HEWSTONE, supra
note 124, at 68. In addition, ADA case law holds that the volitional nature of one's impairment is
not legally relevant. See Cook v. Rhode Island, 10 F.3d 17, 24 (1st Cir. 1995) (rejecting an em-
ployer's argument that an employee's morbid obesity could not be covered by the ADA if it was a
voluntary condition under the employee's control). Similarly, some recent research has criticized
attribution scholarship for overemphasizing the internal/external dimension, arguing that an
even more nuanced taxonomy would better explain naturally occurring inferential behavior. See
Bertram F. Malle et al., Conceptual Structure and Social Functions of Behavior Explanations:
Beyond Person-Situation Attributions, 79 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 309, 309-18 (2000)
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The first causal attribution dimension characterizes poten-
tial causes as either "internal" or "external" to the actor. 15 3 When
the observer views the actor's behavior, the observer identifies ei-
ther something about the actor, or something about the environ-
ment or situation, as the primary cause of the social event. 54 The
former are internal attributions; the latter are external attribu-
tions. 155 If the observer concludes that the actor's behavior was
caused by the actor's effort, friendliness, impatience, or intelligence,
for example, the observer is making an internal attribution. 56 If the
observer concludes that the actor's behavior was caused by the
weather, the difficulty of the task, a looming deadline, or even luck,
the observer is making an external attribution. 157 In other words,
internal causal attributions involve "something about the person"
who is being observed, while external causal attributions involve
"something about the situation" in which the actor's behavior is
taking place. 158
The second causal attribution dimension characterizes po-
tential causes as either "stable" or "variable."'159 Stable causes are
(arguing that behavior explanations can also be distinguished as "reasons, causal histories of
reasons, and enabling factors"). However, the three standard causal attribution dimensions still
dominate attribution literature and research.
153. See HEWSTONE, supra note 124, at 30-31 (explaining the historical development of the
internal/external dimension); SEARS ET AL., supra note 125, at 118 (identifying the inter-
nal/external dimension as the "central issue in most perceptions of causality"); Ross, supra note
128, at 184 (coining the term, "fundamental attribution error," to describe the tendency to over-
attribute others' behavior to internal rather than external causes). This dimension has also been
referred to as the "person" versus "environment" dimension, or the "dispositiona' versus "situ-
ational" dimension, but the internal versus external description is the most flexible concept to
encompass these other taxonomies. See HEWSTONE, supra note 124, at 30-31; SEARS ET AL., supra
note 125, at 119.
154. See HEWSTONE, supra note 124, at 30-31; SEARS ET AL., supra note 125, at 119; Ross,
supra note 128, at 184.
155. See HEWSTONE, supra note 124, at 30-31; SEARS ET AL., supra note 125, at 119; Ross,
supra note 128, at 184.
156. See HEWSTONE, supra note 124, at 30; SEARS ET AL., supra note 125, at 119; Weiner, su-
pra note 136, at 6. Internal attributions include all causes internal to the actor to whose behavior
the observer is trying to attach a causal antecedent, including moods, attitudes, personality
traits, abilities, emotions, preferences, health, or physical or mental conditions. See HEWSTONE,
supra note 124, at 30; SEARS ET AL., supra note 125, at 119; Weiner, supra note 136, at 6.
157. See HEWSTONE, supra note 124, at 30; SEARS ET AL., supra note 125, at 119; Weiner, su-
pra note 136, at 6. External attributions include all causes external to the actor to whose behav-
ior the observer is trying to attach a causal antecedent, including aspects of the environment or
task, pressure from the situation or others, and rewards or punishments. See HEWSTONE, supra
note 124, at 30; SEARS ET AL., supra note 125, at 119; Weiner, supra note 136, at 6.
158. Peterson et al., supra note 152, at 288; see Ross, supra note 128, at 184.
159. See HEWSTONE, supra note 124, at 33; SEARS ET AL., supra note 125, at 119; Weiner, su-
pra note 136, at 6. Some researchers refer to this dimension as the "stable" versus "unstable"
dimension. See, e.g., Weiner, supra note 136, at 6.
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relatively permanent features that are likely to produce the same
outcome or behavior in the same situation at a different point in
time. 160 In contrast, variable causes are relatively fleeting features
that are likely to produce different outcomes or behavior in the
same situation over time. 16' Stable attributions thus identify "non-
transient" causes, while variable attributions identify causes that
are "transient."'162 An observer who attributes an actor's perform-
ance to the actor's intelligence, for example, is making a stable at-
tribution. 163 Because an actor's intelligence level typically remains
constant over time, that causal antecedent suggests that the actor
would perform similarly every time that the actor faces a particular
task. On the other hand, an observer who attributes an actor's be-
havior to the actor's effort or to luck is making a variable attribu-
tion. 64 Because an actor's effort or the vagaries of "luck" are likely
to fluctuate, those causal antecedents suggest that the actor may
perform differently the next time that the actor is facing the same
situation.
As these examples illustrate, the stable/variable dimension
cuts across or is orthogonal to the internal/external dimension. In-
ternal causes can be stable or variable, as can external causes. 165
For example, intelligence is an internal and stable causal attribu-
tion, whereas effort is an internal and variable causal attribu-
160. See HEWSTONE, supra note 124, at 33; SEARS ET AL., supra note 125, at 119; Weiner, su-
pra note 136, at 6-8; see also Ross & Fletcher, supra note 130, at 90 (explaining that when an
observer attributes an actor's performance to a stable cause, it increases the observer's expecta-
tions that the actor will perform similarly on the same task in the future).
161. See HEWSTONE, supra note 124, at 33; SEARS ET AL., supra note 125, at 119; Weiner, su-
pra note 136, at 6.
162. See Peterson et al., supra note 152, at 288; see also Abramson et al., supra note 150, at
56 ("Stable factors are thought of as long-lived or recurrent, whereas unstable factors are short-
lived or intermittent."); Metalsky & Abramson, supra note 130, at 23 ("Stable factors are fixed
and likely to persist over time whereas unstable factors are variable and unlikely to persist over
time.").
163. See, e.g., SEARS ET AL., supra note 125, at 119 (listing "intelligence" as an example of a
stable causal attribution).
164. See, e.g., SEARS ET AL., supra note 125, at 119 (listing "effort" as an example of a vari-
able causal attribution); Weiner, supra note 136, at 5-6 (listing "luck" as an example of a variable
causal attribution).
165. See HEWSTONE, supra note 124, at 33; SEARS ET AL., supra note 125, at 119; Weiner, su-
pra note 136, at 6.
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tion. 166 Task difficulty is an external and stable causal attribution,
whereas luck is an external and variable causal attribution.167
The first two causal attribution dimensions also cut across or
are orthogonal to the third dimension, which characterizes poten-
tial causes as either "global" or "specific."'168 Global causes can be
internal or external and stable or variable, just as specific causes
can be internal or external and stable or variable. 169 Whereas the
stable/variable dimension captures the concept of "temporal gener-
alization," meaning whether or not the same outcome will occur in
the same situation at different times, the global/specific dimension
captures the concept of "stimulus generalization," meaning whether
or not the same outcome will occur with different situational stim-
uli. 170 Global causes are factors that are likely to produce the same
outcome or behavior in different situations. 171 Specific causes are
factors that are likely to produce different outcomes or behavior
when the situation is changed. 172 For example, if the actor fails a
math exam, an observer might attribute the failure to the actor's
generalized intelligence (e.g., "the actor is dumb"), or the observer
might attribute the failure to task-specific ability (e.g., "the actor
has poor math skills").173 The former is a global attribution because
it suggests that the actor also will perform similarly in different
situations (i.e., the actor also will fail an English exam). 174 The lat-
ter is a situation-specific attribution, which suggests that the actor
might perform differently if the situation changed (i.e., the actor
might pass an English exam). 175
166. See, e.g., SEARS ET AL., supra note 125, at 119; see also id. at 117 (explaining that a per-
sonality trait is an internal and stable causal attribution, while a temporary illness, such as a
stomach ache, is an internal and variable causal attribution); Weiner, supra note 136, at 4-7
(listing "ability" as an example of an internal and stable causal attribution, and "effort" as an
example of an internal and variable causal attribution).
167. See Weiner, supra note 136, at 4, 6-7; see also Abramson et al., supra note 150, at 56.
168. See Abramson et al., supra note 150, at 56-57; Peterson et al., supra note 152, at 288.
169. See Abramson et al., supra note 150, at 57.
170. Weiner, supra note 136, at 7.
171. See Abramson et al., supra note 150, at 57 (explaining that "[gllobal factors affect a wide
variety of outcomes"); Peterson et al., supra note 152, at 288 (explaining that "causes present in a
variety of situations" are considered global).
172. See Abramson et al., supra note 150, at 57 (explaining that "specific factors" do not "af-
fect a variety of outcomes"); Peterson et al., supra note 152, at 288 (explaining that specific
causes are not "present in a variety of situations," but are "more circumscribed").
173. See Weiner, supra note 136, at 7.
174. See id. (distinguishing between task-specific abilities and general traits).
175. See id.
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A single cause may be characterized by its location on each
of these three primary causal attribution dimensions. 176 For exam-
ple, attributing an actor's poor performance to the actor's incompe-
tence is an internal, stable, and global causal attribution. Incompe-
tence is something about the actor, it is likely to be nontransient
and produce similar performance for the actor on the same task in
the future, and it probably will produce poor performance for the
actor in other situations as well. 177 On the other hand, attributing
the actor's poor performance to the difficulty of the task is an ex-
ternal, stable, and specific causal attribution. Task difficulty is
something about the environment, it is likely to be nontransient
and produce similar performance when the actor faces the same
task at other times, but the actor may perform quite differently
when the task is changed. 78 Thus, the three causal attribution di-
mensions form a two-by-two-by-two array of causal attribution
categories-(internal/external) x (stable/variable) x (global/spe-
cific)-making eight different categories in all.1 79
176. See Abramson et al., supra note 150, at 67 (discussing studies of causal attributions of
depressed students). Some social scientists have criticized causal attribution theory because of
the potential variations in the way experimenters can categorize the same explanation by sub-
jects. See, e.g., Peterson et al., supra note 152, at 289 ("[T]here is no guarantee that an attribu-
tion regarded by an attribution theorist as, for example, unstable is so regarded by all subjects;
some may believe that low effort is a stable characteristic of the individual, while others may
perceive it as unstable."); see also Malle et al., supra note 152, at 310 (arguing that attribution
research is flawed because it focuses solely on the "linguistic surface" of subjects' responses,
while ignoring the underlying conceptual structure of the responses). However, most cognitive
attribution theorists believe that there is sufficient consistency in categorization to make the
dimensions useful as a research construct. See Peterson et al., supra note 152, at 292 (describing
experimental methods that undermine this criticism). One way that experimenters have ad-
dressed this criticism is by asking subjects in causal attribution studies not just to attribute a
social event to a particular cause, but also to characterize the cause along the three dimensions.
See id. For example, in a study that looked at the causal attributions that people make for failing
to obtain a job, the experimenters' questionnaire asked the subject to identify what the subject
believed was the major cause of the failure, and also to rank from one to seven whether that
cause was "due to something about you or to something about other people or circumstances,"
whether that cause would "again be present" in the same situation in the future, and whether
that cause would "also influence other areas of your life." See id. In that way, experimenters
could be certain that their categorization of a particular cause along the three dimensions was
similar to others' categorization of that same cause.
177. See Abramson et al., supra note 150, at 67.
178. See id.
179. See Seligman et al., supra note 151, at 242-43 (identifying the three causal attribution
dimensions); see also Abramson et al., supra note 150, at 57 (same); Peterson et al., supra note
152, at 288 (same).
To illustrate the eight causal attribution categories, consider the following scenario: a stu-
dent who is taking the GRE has just completed the math portion and, during the break before
the English portion, the student tells a friend that she has performed very poorly on the math
exam. Cf. Abramsnn et al., supra note 150, at 56-58, 57 tbl. 2 (using a similar example). The
friend ponders whether the student will do poorly on the upcoming English portion of the exam,
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3. Mapping the Causal Attribution Dimensions onto the Elements
of an ADA Perceived Disability Claim
For a nondisabled employee to state a perceived disability
discrimination claim, the employee must show that the employer
mistakenly regarded the employee as having an actually disabling
condition. 80 As explained above, the ADA defines an actual disabil-
ity as a physical or mental "impairment" that "substantially limits"
one or more "major life activities.' 1 Thus, to meet the perceived
disability definition, a nondisabled employee must show that the
employer mistakenly regarded the employee as having a physical or
mental impairment that substantially limits one of the employee's
major life activities, when one or more of those elements actually do
not exist. Because employers often arrive at their assessments by
making attributions for an employee's behavior or performance, the
elements of the perceived disability definition may be mapped onto
the causal attribution dimensions defined above.
First, for an employer to regard an employee as having a
physical or mental "impairment," the employer must make an in-
ternal rather than an external causal attribution. The ADA defines
an impairment as:
1) Any physiological disorder, or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical
loss affecting one or more of the following body systems: neurological, muscu-
loskeletal, special sense organs, respiratory (including speech organs),
cardiovascular, reproductive, digestive, genito-urinary, hemic and lymphatic,
skin, and endocrine; or
and whether the student would do better by taking the math portion again the next time the
GRE is given. During this thought process, the friend is likely to attribute the student's poor
math performance to one of many potential causes, including: (1) that the student lacks intelli-
gence, which is an internal, stable, and global cause; (2) that the student lacks math ability,
which is an internal, stable, and specific cause; (3) that the student was exhausted or ill, which is
an internal, variable, and global cause; (4) that the student got fed up with doing math problems,
which is an internal, variable, and specific cause; (5) that the testing service gives unfair tests,
which is an external, stable, and global cause; (6) that the testing service asks unfair math prob-
lems, which is an external, stable, and specific cause; (7) that this was an unlucky day for test-
takers, which is an external, variable, and global cause; or (8) that the student was unlucky
during the math portion of the test, which is an external, variable, and specific cause. See id. The
friend is most likely to predict poor performance on the upcoming English portion of the exam
and on a future GRE math exam if the friend makes an internal, stable, and global causal attri-
bution for the student's poor performance on the prior math exam. See id. at 62.
180. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(C) (1994); Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 489-90
(1999); 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(/) (2001).
181. § 12102(2)(A).
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2) Any mental or psychological disorder, such as mental retardation, organic
brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and specific learning disabili-
ties. 182
The regulations specifically exclude from this definition any condi-
tion that relates to the employee's external environment rather
than to the employee's internal, physiological or psychological
make-up. 8 3 According to the regulations, "environmental, cultural,
and economic disadvantages are not impairments" for purposes of
the ADA. 18 4 The regulations list poverty and lack of education as
examples of such external conditions. 8 5
This distinction means that an employer must make an in-
ternal causal attribution for a nondisabled employee's behavior in
order for the perceived disability prong to protect that employee. If
an employer observes an employee having difficulty reading, for
example, the perceived disability prong will only apply if the em-
ployer attributes the difficulty to a cause that originates within the
employee. As the regulations explain:
[Ain individual who is unable to read because he or she was never taught to read
would not be an individual with a disability because lack of education is not an
impairment. However, an individual who is unable to read because of dyslexia
would be an individual with a disability because dyslexia, a learning disability, is
an impairment. 188
Thus, if observers tend to err in the direction of making internal,
rather than external, attributions for employee behavior, that type
of cognitive bias would tend to facilitate the occurrence of perceived
disabilities. In fact, that is exactly what social psychologists have
found.
The first causal attribution bias that researchers have dis-
covered is that when observers make attributions for other people's
behavior, the observers tend to overattribute to internal causes and
underattribute to causes that are external. 8 7 This cognitive bias is
182. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h) (2001).
183. See id.
184. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(j); id. § 1630.2(h) ("It is important to distinguish between condi-
tions that are impairments and ... environmental, cultural and economic characteristics that
are not impairments.").
185. See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(h).
186. Id. § 1630.2(j).
187. See Ross, supra note 128, at 193-94. Most social scientists attribute the development of
research on this attribution bias to a seminal study in 1967. See, e.g., HEWSTONE, supra note
124, at 50-51 (citing Edward E. Jones & Victor A. Harris, The Attribution of Attitudes, 3 J.
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 1 (1967)); NISBETT & Ross, supra note 127, at 121 (same); SEARS
ET AL., supra note 125, at 124-26 (same). In that study, experimenters asked subjects to read
another student's exam answer from a political science course. See Jones & Harris, supra, at 4.
Some subjects were told that the exam question asked the student to criticize Fidel Castro's
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so robust and pervasive that social scientists call it "the fundamen-
tal attribution error."188 The fundamental attribution error refers to
observers' consistent tendency to overestimate the role of an actor's
internal, dispositional characteristics and to underestimate the
power of the situation in controlling the actor's behavior.189
In one well-known experiment demonstrating this phenome-
non, experimenters asked subjects to observe two actors participate
in a general knowledge "quiz game."'90 The subjects watched as the
experimenter randomly designated one actor to be the "questioner"
and one actor to be the "contestant."' 91 The experimenter told the
subjects that the questioner's task was to write ten general knowl-
edge questions that were difficult and esoteric and that would dis-
play the questioner's own particular expertise.192 The subjects then
watched the questioner pose the ten questions to the contestant. 193
Given the setup of the game, it was virtually inevitable that the
Cuba; some subjects were told that the exam question asked the student to defend Fidel Castro's
Cuba; and some subjects were told that the exam question asked the student to write either a
defense or a criticism. See id. The subjects were then asked to predict the student's true atti-
tudes. See id. Even when the exam question assigned the direction of the essay (an external
cause), the subjects incorrectly attributed the essay to the personal beliefs of the student (an
internal cause). See id. at 5-7. Follow-up studies consistently confirmed that "the average subject
in these experiments attaches insufficient weight to the constraining force of authoritative direc-
tions to behave in a certain way." Id. at 8-11, 22.
More recent research has identified this bias as partially culturally determined, finding that
non-European-American subjects use more situational attributions for others' behavior. See, e.g.,
Leonard S. Newman, Why Are Traits Inferred Spontaneously? A Developmental Approach, 9 SOC.
COGNITION 221, 247 (1991); E. Rhee et al., Spontaneous Self-Description and Ethnic Identities in
Individualistic and Collectivistic Cultures, 69 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 142, 142-52
(1995).
188. Ross, supra note 128, at 184, 193-94 (coining the term and stating that this attribution
bias "has been noted by many theorists" and "disputed by few"); see also Yaacov Trope & Ruth
Gaunt, Processing Alternative Explanations of Behavior: Correction or Integration?, 79 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 344, 344 (2000) (concluding that "[florty years of social psycho-
locial research . . .have provided considerable empirical support" for this finding). Empirical
support for the fundamental attribution error dates as far back as 1944. See HEWSTONE, supra
note 124, at 13 (citing F. Heider, Social Perception and Phenomenal Causality, 51 PSYCHOL. REV.
358, 361 (1944) (finding that individuals have a tendency to perceive persons as origins of events
and underestimate other factors that are responsible for the event)).
189. See HEWSTONE, supra note 124, at 50; NISBETT & ROSS, supra note 127, at 120-22;
SEARS ET AL., supra note 125, at 136; Ross, supra note 127, at 184, 193-94; Lee D. Ross et al.,
Social Roles, Social Control and Biases in Social-Perception Processes, 35 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 485, 492 (1977); see also Krieger, supra note 36, at 1329; Krieger, supra note 35, at
1204-05. For a review of the literature on this process of "spontaneous trait inference," see James
S. Uleman et al., People as Flexible Interpreters: Evidence and Issues from Spontaneous Trait
Inference, 28 ADVANCES EXPERIMENTAL Soc. PSYCHOL. 211, 212-67 (1996).
190. See Ross et al., supra note 189, at 485, 490-91.
191. See id. at 485-87, 490-91.
192. See id. at 485-87.
193. See id. at 485-87, 490-91.
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contestant would perform poorly. The contestant's poor performance
was due to the extraordinarily strong role-conferred advantage of
the questioner: if the experimenter had assigned the questioner to
be the contestant, the questioner also would have performed poorly
in that disadvantaged role. 194
After the game was over, the experimenters asked the ob-
servers to rate the questioner's and the contestant's general knowl-
edge. 9 5 The observers ignored the power of the situation and at-
tributed the outcome to internal traits of the actors, rating the
questioner as vastly more knowledgeable than the contestant. 196 In
so doing, the observers "failed to recognize ... that the questioners
did not possess any superiority in general knowledge-they merely
had exploited the opportunity to choose the particular topics and
specific items that most favorably displayed their general knowl-
edge." 197 This illustration of the fundamental attribution error is
particularly striking given that the observers had complete and ex-
plicit information about the powerful situational constraints. 198
Outside the laboratory, people are unlikely to have such complete
information and therefore may be even more prone to this attribu-
tion bias.
Another study that attempted to create a more "real world"
attribution situation supports that prediction. In this study, ex-
perimenters arranged to have some subjects (the "observers") watch
other subjects (the "actors") respond to an experimenter's request to
volunteer additional time. 199 The observers were not aware that the
event was part of the experiment until after the event took place, so
the observers' reactions to the event presumably were unaffected by
the laboratory setting. 200 The experimenters found that the amount
of money that they offered the actors-an external cause-was the
major determinant of whether or not the actors agreed to the re-
quest to volunteer time.20 1 Actors who were offered a small amount
of money generally declined, while actors who were offered a large
amount of money generally accepted, regardless of the actors' per-
194. See id. at 485-88.
195. See id. at 491.
196. See id.
197. Id.
198. See id. at 485 ("The role-conferred advantages and disadvantages in the self-
presentation of general knowledge in the quiz game were neither subtle nor disguised.").
199. See Richard E. Nisbett et al., Behavior as Seen by the Actor and as Seen by the Observer,
27 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 154, 155-58 (1973).
200. See id.
201. See id. at 156-57.
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sonal traits.2 2 However, when the experimenters later asked the
observers about the event, the observers tended not to attribute the
actors' responses to the amount of money offered, but rather to
characteristics of the individual actors (e.g., the observers would
conclude that an actor agreed to volunteer time because the actor
was "generous").20 3 By incorrectly assigning an internal cause to the
actors' behavior, the observers exhibited the fundamental attribu-
tion error.2 4 The actors themselves, however, were more likely to
provide accurate situational attributions, demonstrating that the
fundamental attribution error occurs when people are assessing the
causes of other people's behavior rather than their own.20 5 Social
scientists have replicated this "actor-observer difference" in a wide
variety of other situations. 20 6
202. See id.
203. See id.
204. See id. at 157.
205. See id.
206. See, e.g., NISBETT & ROSS, supra note 127, at 123-25 (describing studies supporting this
assertion); Nisbett et al., supra note 199, at 158-60 (describing a study in which subjects were
asked to choose between various trait descriptions for themselves and others, finding that sub-
jects were more likely to believe their own behavior "depends on the situation" and were more
willing to assign nonsituation-specific traits to others); Dennis T. Regan & J. Totten, Empathy
and Attribution: Turning Observers into Actors, 32 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 850, 850
(1975) (demonstrating empirically the tendency to make more internal attributions for other
people's behavior than for the same behavior by oneself); Michael R. Wolfson & Gerald R. Salan-
cik, Observer Orientation and Actor-Observer Differences in Attributions for Failure, 13 J.
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 441, 441 (1977) (listing studies demonstrating the "tendency for
persons to attribute their own behaviors to external or situational factors but to attribute the
behavior of others to internal or dispositional factors"); see also Krieger, supra note 35, at 1205
(citing studies that support this actor-observer difference); Malle & Knobe, supra note 146, at
288 (noting that "many studies have shown that... actors prefer[ ] situation causes and observ-
ers prefer[ ] person causes").
In one typical study, experimenters asked male college students to explain why they chose
their own major and why their best friend chose his major. See Nisbett et al., supra note 199, at
158-60. The study found that subjects were much more likely to provide internal causal attribu-
tions for their best friend's behavior (i.e., saying that their best friend chose his major because of
a personal characteristic of the best friend), while providing external causal attributions when
describing their own behavior (i.e., saying that they chose their own major because of various
characteristics of the major). See id.
One exception to this finding is that observers tend not to make the fundamental attribution
error when observing members of a preferred ingroup. Observers typically attribute negative
outcomes by members of a preferred ingroup to external and variable causes-i.e., treating them
the same as they would themselves. See generally Thomas F. Pettigrew, The Ultimate Attribution
Error: Extending Allport's Cognitive Analysis of Prejudice, 5 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
BULL. 461 (1979) (reviewing research and studies demonstrating that observers attribute behav-
ior by preferred ingroups to situational contexts); Joseph G. Weber, The Nature of Ethnocentric
Attribution Bias: Ingroup Protection or Enhancement?, 30 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 482,
484-503 (1994) (providing empirical support for this proposition).
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Social scientists have posited two primary explanations for
the pervasiveness of the fundamental attribution error and the ac-
tor-observer difference. The first reason is perceptual 2 7 and is
based on "salience," which is a measure of how much something at-
tracts an observer's attention.208 People simplify their cognitive
processing by focusing on the most salient stimuli around them,
and salience leads to the perception of causality, whether or not the
most salient stimuli are actually the most causally influential. 209
When observers attribute a cause for an actor's behavior, the actor
is more salient than the environment in which the actor is behav-
ing, which tends to increase internal causal attributions. 210 In con-
trast, when observers attribute causes for their own behavior, the
perceptual focus is reversed, making the environment more salient
and increasing the level of external causal attributions. 211
The second reason for the fundamental attribution error and
the actor-observer difference is informational. 212 When observers
attribute a cause for an actor's behavior, the observers often have
insufficient data about the actor's different behavior in other situa-
tions, so the observers are unlikely to look to the situation as a
cause. 213 In contrast, when observers attribute a cause for their own
behavior, they have complete information about how their own be-
207. See NISBETT & ROSS, supra note 127, at 123-25; Nisbett et al., supra note 199, at 154.
208. See John B. Pryor & Mitchell Kriss, The Cognitive Dynamics of Salience in the Attribu-
tion Process, 35 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 49, 53 (1977).
209. See HEWSTONE, supra note 124, at 52-53; SEARS ET AL., supra note 125, at 134-36;
Krieger, supra note 36, at 1267; Leslie Zebrowitz McArthur, What Grabs You? The Role of Atten-
tion in Impression Formation and Causal Attribution, in 1 SOCIAL COGNITION 201, 201-06 (E.
Tory Higgins et al. eds., 1981); Shelley E. Taylor & Susan T. Fiske, Salience, Attention, and
Attribution: Top of the Head Phenomena, in 11 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY
249, 264-65 (Leonard Berkowitz ed., 1978).
210. See HEWSTONE, supra note 124, at 137-40; NISBETT & ROSS, supra note 127, at 122-25
(describing supporting studies); see also SEARS ET AL., supra note 125, at 136-40 (arguing that
"[s]alience is the most likely explanation for this attributional bias" because the behavior of oth-
ers is so salient that it engulfs an observer's perceptual field); Pryor & Kriss, supra note 208, at
53-54 (suggesting that the tendency to see actors as disproportionately causal in relation to their
environment is because actors are more salient, attract more of the observer's attention, and are
therefore more available for recall in memory); see also Trope & Gaunt, supra note 188, at 344
(describing research finding that because the "link between behavior and the person seems im-
mediate and natural, whereas the link between behavior and the situation seems derived and
remote," people anchor on internal, dispositional attributions, and then insufficiently adjust for
situational information).
211. See HEWSTONE, supra note 124, at 54-57; NISBETT & ROSS, supra note 127, at 123-25;
SEARS ET AL., supra note 125, at 137-40; Ross & Fletcher, supra note 130, at 100-03.
212. See NISBET & Ross, supra note 127, at 125-26; Wolfson & Salancik, supra note 206, at
441.
213. See Wolfson & Salancik, supra note 206, at 441.
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havior has varied in different contexts, so they are more likely to
look to a situational factor as a potential cause of their own acts. 214
Several social scientists have suggested that the employment
relationship is one in which the fundamental attribution error is
particularly likely to occur. 215 People are particularly prone to un-
derestimating the causal impact of situational constraints when
those constraints derive from underlying social roles-like the roles
of the questioners and contestants in the simulated quiz show ex-
periment described above-which is what exists in highly role-
differentiated employer-employee interactions. 216 This tendency to
overattribute other people's behavior to internal causes is particu-
larly likely to occur when the observer views the actor as a member
of a different "group,"217 when the actor's performance can be char-
acterized as a failure, 218 or when the actor's conduct has conse-
quences for the observer. 219 That suggests that the risk of the fun-
damental attribution error is heightened in the employment deci-
sionmaking context, where a member of "management" is evaluat-
ing one of the "employees" because of some conduct that may impact
performance on the job. Because observers disproportionately at-
tribute out-group members' failures to internal characteristics of
those individuals, rather than to situational constraints, employers
are at high risk of unknowingly committing the fundamental attri-
bution error when assessing employee performance.
The fundamental attribution error takes on particular sig-
nificance in the context of ADA perceived disability claims. Because
the social science research demonstrates a tendency to overattrib-
ute other people's behavior to internal causes, and the first element
of a perceived disability claim requires that the employer "regard"
the employee as having a limiting condition that originates from
within the employee, the fundamental attribution error should fa-
cilitate the occurrence of perceived disabilities. Even when an em-
ployer is avoiding the use of group-based prejudice and assumptions
and conducting the required individual assessment, the fundamen-
tal attribution error predicts that the employer still will tend to at-
tribute some employee behavior mistakenly to an internal condition
214. See id.
215. See Ross et al., supra note 189, at 494.
216. See id.
217. See Krieger, supra note 35, at 1191-92 n.136 (citing studies to support this finding).
218. See id. (citing studies to support this finding).
219. See Carroll & Payne, supra note 127, at 20 (noting research demonstrating that "the ex-
tent to which an act has consequences for the observer, its hedonic relevance, increases disposi-
tional judgments of the causes of the act").
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rather than to an external, situational constraint, thereby exagger-
ating the gravity of the condition.
An employer's failure to make an accurate external attribu-
tion for a particular incident on the job is illustrated by the facts in
Motto v. City of Union City.220 The plaintiff in that case was a truck
driver who was morbidly obese, which was a nondisabling condition
because it did not substantially limit any of the employee's major
life activities.221 While the plaintiff was removing some debris with
a pay loader as part of the plaintiffs job, a cinder block wall fell
over and damaged some personal property. 222 Evidence suggested
that the cause of the event was external: that the supervisors did
not train the plaintiff properly on how to use a pay loader, or that
the vines in the debris were overgrown through the wall, causing
the collapse when the debris was moved.223 However, the employer
attributed the incident to the employee's obesity-an internal
cause-believing that the employee's physical condition made him
incapable of driving a vehicle. 224 Based on the employer's misper-
ception, the plaintiff was able to state a triable issue on his per-
ceived disability discrimination claim. 2
25
Not all internal conditions constitute "impairments," how-
ever, because the ADA's definition of impairment also contains a
durational element. This second requirement of a perceived disabil-
ity claim means that an employer must also make an attribution to
a stable rather than a variable cause. The regulations explain that
conditions that are "temporary," "non-chronic," or "of short dura-
tion, with little or no long term or permanent impact" do not consti-
tute impairments under the ADA. 226 Transient conditions such as
pregnancy, broken bones, sprained joints, concussions, appendicitis,
220. No. CIV.A. 95-5678, 1997 WL 816509, at *1, 4 (D.N.J. Aug. 27, 1997).
221. Id. at *3-5.
222. Id. at *4.
223. Id.
224. Id. at *4-5.
225. Id. at *10. Note that because there was also direct evidence of conscious, group-based
animus against individuals who are obese, it was unclear whether the court would have applied
the perceived disability prong to a truly "innocent mistake" scenario. See id. at *1, 5; see also
Holihan v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 87 F.3d 362, 364, 366 (9th Cir. 1996) (denying employer's sum-
mary judgment motion on a perceived disability claim by a supermarket manager where there
was a factual dispute over whether the employer mistakenly attributed complaints about the
manager to a psychological disorder (an internal cause) or to aspects of the employee's job (an
external cause)); Mundo v. Sanus Health Plan, 966 F. Supp. 171, 172-73 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (noting
that the employer erroneously attributed an employee's work backlog to her inability to tolerate
stress (an internal cause), rather than to excess work, a poor computer system, and an inade-
quately defined job (external causes), but dismissing the employee's perceived disability claim for
failure to meet a different element of the prima facie case).
226. 29 C.F.R. app. §1630.2(j) (2001).
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or the typical flu are not considered impairments. 227 For an em-
ployer to regard an employee mistakenly as having a disability, the
employer must regard the employee as having a long-term physio-
logical or psychological condition 228-i.e., the employer must make
an attribution not only to an internal cause, but to a stable one as
well. As one court explained, if an employer "perceives [a] plaintiff
as having a minor, temporary condition, the plaintiff is not covered
by the Act[,]" but if the employer "considers the impairment as sig-
nificant, and potentially long-term, the Act's coverage is trig-
gered."229 Accordingly, if observers tend to err in the direction of
making stable, rather than variable, attributions for employee be-
havior, that type of cognitive bias would also tend to facilitate the
occurrence of perceived disabilities. Once again, the social science
research supports that conclusion.
The second attribution bias that social scientists have identi-
fied is a tendency to overattribute to stable causes and underattrib-
ute to causes that are variable. 230 Social scientists believe that this
attribution bias is driven by people's desire to feel like they under-
stand and can predict and control their social world, a feeling that
is enhanced "by referring transient and variable behavior and
events to relatively unchanging underlying conditions."231 As with
the fundamental attribution error, there is an actor-observer differ-
ence in the tendency to overattribute to stable causes. 232 Observers
make more stable attributions for other people's behavior than they
do for their own. 233 In addition, the tendency to overattribute other
people's behavior to stable causes is particularly strong when the
observer is also making an internal attribution. Not only do observ-
ers tend to overestimate the role that an actor's internal character-
istics play in determining the actor's behavior, but observers also
227. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(h), (j).
228. See Rondon v. Wal-Mart, Inc., No. C-97-0369 MMC, 1998 WL 730843, at *6 (N.D. Cal.
Oct. 8, 1998) ("If a defendant perceives plaintiff as having a minor, temporary condition, the
plaintiff is not covered by the Act." (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Mendez v.
Gearan, 956 F. Supp. 1520, 1524 (N.D. Cal. 1997))).
229. Mendez v. Gearan, 956 F. Supp. 1520, 1525 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (internal citations omitted)
(analyzing the analogous prong of the disability definition in the Rehabilitation Act).
230. See Ross & Fletcher, supra note 130, at 74 ("People are inclined to attribute actions to
stable or enduring causes, rather than to transitory or variable causes.").
231. See id.
232. See Regan & Totten, supra note 206, at 850.
233. See id.
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tend to exaggerate the existence of characteristics that are "endur-
ing and consistent."' 234
The study involving requests to volunteer time, described
above, illustrates this compound attribution bias. As explained
above, experimenters found that actors' responses to a request to
volunteer time were determined by the amount of money that the
experimenter offered-a cause that is both external and variable. 235
The observers, however, not only erred by attributing the actors'
responses to characteristics of the individual actors, but also tended
to select stable traits for their causal attributions.236 Accordingly,
the observers predicted that the actors would respond similarly to
future requests to volunteer time, while the actors themselves pre-
dicted that their own behavior would show much more variability
over time. 237
This second attribution error also takes on particular signifi-
cance in the context of ADA perceived disability claims. Because the
social science research demonstrates a tendency to overattribute
other people's behavior to stable causes, and the second element of
a perceived disability claim requires that the employer "regard" the
employee as having a permanent or long-term condition, the second
causal attribution bias should work in the same direction as the
first: facilitating the occurrence of perceived disabilities. Even if an
employer is properly engaged in an individual employee assess-
ment, free from disability-based animus, attribution research pre-
dicts that the employer still will tend to attribute employee conduct
mistakenly to a stable condition rather than a variable factor that
will change over time.
The facts in EEOC v. Texas Bus Lines illustrate an em-
ployer's failure to make an accurate variable attribution for conduct
that the employer witnessed during the course of an individual as-
sessment. 238 The plaintiff in that case was also morbidly obese,
which again was a nondisabling condition. 239 The plaintiff applied
for a job driving a passenger transport van between the airport and
234. NISBErr & Ross, supra note 127, at 31; see also Ross et al., supra note 189, at 491 (ex-
plaining that people are too often "nativists" by overestimating the causal role of stable individ-
ual differences, rather than variable situational determinants). Another way of stating this is to
describe the fundamental attribution error as having both an internal and a stable component.
Attribution theorists refer to this tendency to attribute behaviors automatically to stable disposi-
tional qualities as "spontaneous trait inference." See Krieger, supra note 36, at 1281-82.
235. See Nisbett et al., supra note 199, at 156-57.
236. See id. at 157.
237. See id.
238. See 923 F. Supp. 965, 967-68, 976-78 (S.D. Tex. 1996).
239. Id. at 967 n.1.
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hotels, and the employer required an individual medical examina-
tion as part of the application process. 240 When the plaintiff was
summoned from the waiting room for her exam, the evaluator saw
her have difficulty getting out of her chair and "waddling" slowly to
the exam room. 241 The employer attributed the plaintiffs behavior
to her obesity and assumed that she would always be unable to
stand up and walk rapidly, which would make her ineffective in
emergency situations on the job. 242 When the employer refused to
hire her, the plaintiff brought a perceived disability discrimination
claim, and the court allowed the claim to proceed. The court ex-
plained that the evaluator "did nothing to rule out the possibility
that [the plaintiff] had simply decided to walk slowly because she
had grown tired of sitting in the waiting room, or because her foot
had fallen asleep, or some other temporary, non-impairing rea-
son."241 Although the decisionmaker individually assessed the em-
ployee, the decisionmaker nevertheless erroneously regarded the
plaintiff as disabled by making a stable rather than a variable
causal attribution for one ambiguous observed behavior. 244
While the combination of these first two attribution biases
may explain why employers are likely to exaggerate the job-related
impact of internal and stable employee characteristics, the ADA's
240. Id. at 967.
241. Id. at 968.
242. Id. at 968, 976-78.
243. Id. at 978.
244. While the employer's mistake could have been solely cognitive in origin, the court found
other evidence indicating that conscious prejudice played a role, and the employer "made the
decision not to hire [the plaintiff] because of a perception of disability based on myth, fear or
stereotype." Id. at 979 (internal quotation marks omitted). Therefore, the court did not have to
decide whether the perceived disability prong would apply to solely cognitive mistakes.
There are several cases, however, in which employers have incorrectly made stable rather
than variable attributions, and there was no evidence of conscious animus upon which to base
the employee's perceived disability claim. See, e.g., Dipol v. New York City Transit Auth., 999 F.
Supp. 309, 311, 314 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) (permitting a perceived disability claim by an employee who
temporarily failed to control his nondisabling diabetes and whose employer mistakenly regarded
the resulting vision problems as permanent even after the symptoms had gone away); Colwell v.
Suffolk County Police Dep't, 967 F. Supp. 1419, 1426 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (permitting a perceived
disability claim when a police department refused to let a police officer return from limited duty
after he had recovered from a car accident and the employer mistakenly regarded the prior in-
jury as permanent despite receiving individual information to the contrary); Muller v. Hotsy
Corp., 917 F. Supp. 1389, 1398-1400, 1411-12 (N.D. Iowa 1996) (finding a triable issue on a per-
ceived disability claim by a plant foreperson whose employer incorrectly viewed his temporary
and nondisabling spinal injury as something from which the employee would never be able to
recover from); Mendez v. Gearan, 956 F. Supp. 1520, 1522-26 (N.D. Cal. 1977) (permitting a
perceived disability claim under the Rehabilitation Act when the Peace Corps conducted an
individualized assessment of the plaintiff but incorrectly evaluated the "expected duration" of
her nondisabling depression and refused to consider her for a job for at least a year).
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definition of "impairment" also has a third and final requirement.
For an internal and stable employee characteristic to be deemed an
"impairment" and qualify for statutory protection, the ADA requires
that the characteristic be unusual. 245 According to one court, "the
very concept of an impairment implies a characteristic that is not
commonplace." 246 The ADA's definition of impairment therefore ex-
cludes ordinary physical characteristics or conditions such as old
age, eye or hair color, left-handedness, or height, weight, or muscle
tone, if those characteristics are "within 'normal' range and are not
the result of a physiological disorder."247 Similarly, the definition
excludes "common personality traits," such as a quick temper or
poor judgment, unless the traits are symptoms of an underlying
psychological disease. 248 Thus, for an employer to "regard" an em-
ployee as having an impairment, the employer must also make an
attribution to a condition that lies outside of the "normal range."
Social science research suggests that we are likely to err in that
direction as well.
245. See Forrisi v. Bowen, 794 F.2d 931, 934 (4th Cir. 1986) (explaining that an impairment
must be "a characteristic that is not commonplace"); see also Taylor v. Pathmark Stores, Inc., 177
F.3d 180, 185-86 (3d Cir. 1999) ("The purpose of the ADA would be undermined if protection
could be claimed by those whose relative severity of impairment was widely shared."); Andrews
v. Ohio, 104 F.3d 803, 808 (6th Cir. 1997) ("The definition of the term 'impairment' does not
include physical characteristics such as eye color, hair color, left-handedness, or height, weight
or muscle tone that are within 'normal' range and are not the result of a physiological disorder."
(citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h) (App. 1995)).
246. Forrisi, 794 F.2d at 934; see also Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 490
(1999) ("[A]n employer is free to decide that physical characteristics or medical conditions that do
not rise to the level of an impairment-such as one's height, build, or singing voice-are prefer-
able to others.").
247. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(h), (j) (2001); see, e.g., Francis v. City of Meriden, 129 F.3d 281,
285 (2d Cir. 1997) (rejecting a firefighter's claim that his employer mistakenly regarded him as
disabled when he failed to meet the employer's weight guidelines because being overweight is
distinguishable from having "a physiological weight-related disorder," the former being a com-
mon "physical characteristic," and only the latter being a "physiological disorder" or "impair-
ment").
248. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(h); see, e.g., Daley v. Koch, 892 F.2d 212, 214-15 (2d Cir. 1989)
(rejecting a police applicant's perceived disability claim where the employer regarded him as
having only "commonplace" personality traits, including "poor judgment, irresponsible behavior
and poor impulse control," and the employer did not attribute those characteristics to "any par-
ticular psychological disease or disorder"); Mundo v. Sanus Health Plan, 966 F. Supp. 171, 173
(E.D.N.Y. 1997) (dismissing a supervisor's claim that her employer mistakenly perceived her low
tolerance for stress as a disability because "common personality traits" are not impairments
under the ADA); Greenberg v. N.Y., 919 F. Supp. 637, 642-43 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (rejecting a per-
ceived disability claim against an employer that denied the plaintiff a position as a corrections
officer because, even though the employer relied on a psychologist's view that the plaintiffs poor
judgment made him psychologically unfit for the job, the employer did not attribute that common
characteristic to "a particular psychological disease or disorder").
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In selecting a single cause for a social event, observers tend
to overattribute to uncommon or unusual causes, rather than to
causes that are common, ordinary, and far more likely to be influ-
ential. 249 This error is a result of the confluence of several different
cognitive processing biases. The first is what social scientists refer
to as the "representativeness heuristic." Heuristics are efficient
cognitive shortcuts or rules of thumb used to simplify complex so-
cial judgments. 250 The representativeness heuristic is the tendency
to assign items or social events to one conceptual category rather
than another because the main features of the item or event "repre-
sent" or resemble the category. 25 1
The strength of the representativeness heuristic frequently
causes people to ignore the base rate or prior probability of catego-
ries or events and to rely solely on a resemblance criterion. 2 2 When
a judgment requires an estimate of the likelihood that some event
is an instance of a particular category or class, people pick a cate-
gory that resembles the instance in some way, and they fail to con-
sider whether the category is a common or uncommon one, which
should be highly relevant to the observer's judgment. 253 People are
particularly likely to ignore very low base rates, thereby overesti-
mating or overattributing to very unlikely causes, characteristics,
or events. 2
54
249. See Nira Liberman et al., Promotion and Prevention Focus on Alternative Hypotheses:
Implications for Attributional Functions, 80 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 5, 7 (2001) (citing
studies finding that "causes that constitute abnormal conditions are perceived as better explana-
tions than.., normal conditions").
250. See HEWSTONE, supra note 124, at 94; NISBETT & ROSS, supra note 127, at 24-25; see
also Carroll & Payne, supra note 127, at 22 (explaining that although the representativeness
heuristic "often leads to correct judgments, it can lead to large and consistent biases").
251. See HEWSTONE, supra note 124, at 95; NISBETT & ROSS, supra note 127, at 24-25; see
also Carroll & Payne, supra note 127, at 22 (describing the representativeness heuristic as the
tendency to "predict the outcome that appears most representative of the evidence").
252. See NiSBETT & ROSS, supra note 127, at 25-26, 141-50; Ross, supra note 128, at 199; see
also Carroll & Payne, supra note 127, at 22 (describing studies finding that people show "rela-
tively little regard for prior probabilities or base rate").
253. See NISBETT & Ross, supra note 127, at 25-26, 141-50; Carroll & Payne, supra note 127,
at 22-24; see also Ross, supra note 128, at 200 (noting that "behavioral predictions, like category
predictions, may be relatively impervious to consensus or baseline information," and describing
an experiment in which subjects failed to use relevant baseline information in making causal
attributions to an unlikely cause).
254. In one study illustrating this cognitive bias, an experimenter asked subjects to judge
whether an individual was an engineer or a lawyer. Metalsky & Abramson, supra note 130, at
20. The experimenter told the subjects only that the individual enjoys math puzzles and shows
no political interest. Id. In some situations, the experimenter told the subjects that the individ-
ual came from a sample including seventy percent lawyers and thirty percent engineers, and in
some situations, the percentages were reversed. Id. The study found that subjects were much
more likely to judge the individual as an engineer, and they were just as likely to do so when told
530
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When causal attributions are involved, the representative-
ness heuristic means that people tend to assume that the cause
bears some similarity to its effects-we "demand[ ] that cause and
effect resemble one another in their outward features." 25 5 This as-
sumption is efficient because it allows rapid categorization and it
often leads to accurate causal attributions. 256 However, it also leads
people to overattribute to or exaggerate the likelihood of uncommon
causes, either because observers assume that an unusual behavior
generally must have an unusual cause or, more specifically, because
observers rely on an outward resemblance between a behavior and
a cause, regardless of the prior probability of a particular causal
antecedent. For example, an insomniac who suffers emotional dis-
tress from lack of sleep may assume that the cause of the insomnia
must resemble the emotional effect. 257 Accordingly, the insomniac
may believe that "emotional problems" are the cause, rather than
an overheated room or smoking, which are far more common causes
of insomnia, but which resemble the emotional effects to a lesser
degree. 25 8 This cognitive bias occurs consistently in the laboratory
even when experimenters provide people with perfect base rate in-
formation, so it is likely to occur even more frequently in the "real
world," which rarely graces us with such complete and accurate
data.259
The representativeness heuristic would typically work in the
same direction as the first two causal attribution biases: to facili-
tate employers' misperceptions of a nondisabled employee as dis-
abled. When an employer is trying to decide whether to attribute an
employee's performance problem to a common personality trait or to
an uncommon psychological disorder, for example, the employer is
likely to make the latter attribution more often than is warranted
that there was a thirty percent or a seventy percent base rate of engineers in the population. Id.
In other words, subjects relied solely on a resemblance criterion-that a few individual traits
seemed to resemble those of a prototypic engineer-at the expense of highly relevant base rate
information. See id.; see also Carroll & Payne, supra note 127, at 22 (describing a similar study
finding that although "the likelihood that any particular description belongs to an engineer
rather than a lawyer should be strongly influenced by the prior base-rate information," subjects
"largely ignored" information on prior probabilities). Thus, the representativeness heuristic was
responsible for overestimates in the low base rate scenario.
255. HEWSTONE, supra note 124, at 95; see also NISBETT & ROSS, supra note 127, at 26-27,
115-18, 120.
256. See NISBETT & Ross, supra note 127, at 26-27, 115-18, 120; see also Carroll & Payne,
supra note 127, at 22 (explaining that although the representativeness heuristic "often leads to
correct judgments, it can lead to large and consistent biases").
257. See NISBETT & ROSS, supra note 127, at 120.
258. See id.
259. See Ross, supra note 128, at 187.
2002]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
by its much lower base rate. Social scientists would expect that an
employer sometimes would err in the direction of believing that an
employee has an unusual, disabling illness or injury, rather than a
more common, nondisabling condition.
The facts in Schnake v. Johnson County Community College
illustrate this type of mistake. 260 After three years of satisfactory
performance as an administrative secretary, the plaintiff began ex-
hibiting "erratic behavior" immediately after her mother died. 261
Rather than attributing the plaintiffs behavior to the temporary
stress of her mother's death, the employer concluded that she had
an altered perception of reality that might be the result of multiple
personalities, and the employee was suspended. 262 Shortly thereaf-
ter, the employee again received outstanding performance reviews
at another job. 26 3 Based on the original employer's erroneous attri-
bution for her prior behavior, the employee was able to state an
ADA perceived disability claim.264
The second and perhaps more important cognitive shortcut
that can contribute to the tendency to overattribute to uncommon
causes is the "availability heuristic." Like the representativeness
heuristic, the availability heuristic is an efficient rule of thumb that
people use to cope with complex attribution tasks. "Availability" is
the ease at which something can be recalled in memory, and the
"availability heuristic" is the tendency to judge the causal impact of
a particular factor by how "available" it is.265 The more easily an
observer can recall or bring to mind a particular antecedent, the
greater causal significance the observer will assign to it.266 While
availability of a particular item in memory is often correlated with
the commonness of that item, that is not always the case. Some-
times very uncommon events become highly available in memory,
and the availability heuristic therefore results in overattribution to
unlikely causes. 26 7
260. See 961 F. Supp. 1478, 1479-80, 1482 (D. Kan. 1997).
261. Id. at 1479.
262. Id. at 1479, 1482.
263. Id. at 1480.
264. Id. at 1482.
265. See HEWSTONE, supra note 124, at 96; NISBETT & Ross, supra note 127, at 122; Pryor &
Kriss, supra note 208, at 49; Ross, supra note 128, at 198.
266. See HEWSTONE, supra note 124, at 96; NISBETT & ROSS, supra note 127, at 122; David
M. Sanbonmatsu et al., Overestimating Causality: Attributional Effects of Confirmatory Process-
ing, 65 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 892, 900-01 (1993).
267. See NISBETT & Ross, supra note 127, at 122 ("[T]he causal significance of highly avail-
able antecedents is overestimated."); see also Ross, supra note 128, at 198 (explaining that the
availability heuristic causes people's "estimates of the frequency or probability of events to re-
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This error takes place because salience, or the attention-
grabbing nature of the item or event, has a profound influence on
availability. 268 Experimenters in one study gave subjects a series of
statements about an actor and an object, and the experimenters
systematically manipulated the salience of each item. 269 In some
statements the experimenters made the actor salient (e.g., "John
likes the car"), and in some statements the experimenters made the
object salient (e.g., "the restaurant was liked by Sue"). 270 The study
found that subjects had better recall of the salient items-i.e., that
salience was directly correlated with availability-and that the
more available the items were in recall, the more causal influence
the subjects attributed to them.271 Because unusual or uncommon
characteristics often have disproportionate salience, the availability
heuristic can contribute to the tendency to overattribute to poten-
tial causes that are unlikely to be the actual cause of the event.272
This tendency to ignore potentially relevant causes is exacerbated
by another cognitive simplification mechanism known as the "hy-
draulic" model of causation: the assumption that each event has one
and only one cause. 273 Moreover, people tend to stop searching for
potential causes at the first plausible explanation they identify,274
which is typically the one most salient.
In the employment setting, the availability heuristic could
explain why employers would exaggerate the causal significance of
known or visibly obvious nondisabling conditions of their employ-
flect the ease of imagining or remembering those events," and that because "availability is often
poorly correlated with frequency or probability, systematic errors and biases in judgment inevi-
tably result"); Sanbonmatsu et al., supra note 266, at 900-01 (arguing that observers may overes-
timate the causal significance of "novel and distinct" causes because of their salience).
268. See Pryor & Kriss, supra note 208, at 51-53.
269. See id. at 51.
270. See id.
271. See id. at 50, 52-53.
272. See HEWSTONE, supra note 124, at 97; see also SEARS ET AL., supra note 125, at 134-36
("Bias arises because the most perceptually salient stimuli often dominate causal explanations
even when they are not actually the most powerful causes."); Harold H. Kelley, Causal Schemata
and the Attribution Process, in ATTRIBUTION: PERCEIVING THE CAUSES OF BEHAVIOR 151, 170
(Edward E. Jones et al. eds., 1972) (noting that "not all plausible causes for a given effect may be
salient to the attributor at any given time," and therefore, "[n]ot surprisingly, he may simply
overlook some of the possibly relevant causes").
273. See NISBETT & ROSS, supra note 127, at 127-28; Krieger, supra note 35, at 1223; San-
bonmatsu et al., supra note 266, at 893, 895.
274. See NISBETT & ROSS, supra note 127, at 119-20, 127-30; see also John McClure, Dis-
counting Causes of Behavior: Are Two Reasons Better than One?, 74 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 7, 14 (1998) (explaining that "[p]eople anchor on the first cause and give insufficient
weight to evidence implicating other causes"); Sanbonmatsu et al., supra note 266, at 893, 895
(explaining that "the search for evidence is typically truncated following the identification of a
likely cause").
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ees. Many perceived disability discrimination claims arise when a
previously unimpaired employee becomes ill or injured and the em-
ployer must decide if the condition will affect job performance, or
when the employer is otherwise aware of an employee's nondis-
abling physical characteristic, such as an employee who is obese,
has a cosmetic disfigurement, or is known to take medication, wear
glasses, or otherwise use mitigating measures for a nondisabling
illness or disease. 275 It is the rare case indeed in which an ADA per-
ceived disability claim stems from an employer's mistaken belief
that the employee has a condition that the employee lacks alto-
gether; claims almost always arise when an employer exaggerates
the gravity of a real but nondisabling condition. 276 Because these
known and often visibly salient impairments are likely to be highly
"available" in an employment decisionmaker's mind when assessing
the employee, there is an increased chance that the employer will
assign those characteristics a disproportionately causal role. The
availability heuristic suggests that an employer simply cannot help
but think about the employee's condition when observing the em-
ployee on the job.
Although the causal attribution literature has not focused
directly on the problem of misperceived disabilities in nondisabled
individuals, there has been some research involving individuals
with actual disabilities that supports this thesis. This research has
found that known disabilities take on exaggerated causal signifi-
cance for observers. 277 When an observer knows about an actor's
actual disability, the observer mistakenly views the disability as
the cause of a wide range of ordinary and unrelated behaviors and
events. 278 For example, when an individual with mental retardation
has a performance problem, observers are too prone to attribute the
problem to the disability, even if the problem also commonly occurs
among the nondisabled. 279 Individuals with histories of mental ill-
ness are acutely aware of this "putative deviance" phenomenon. 28 0
They report that they are often afraid to engage in vigorous argu-
ments with coworkers or employers because any display of strong
275. See Vande Walle, supra note 66, at 904, 911 n.112.
276. See id.
277. See Ross & Fletcher, supra note 130, at 780 (citing ERVING GOFFMAN, STIGMA: NOTES
ON THE MANAGEMENT OF SPOILED IDENTITY 15 (1963)).
278. See id.; see also Blanck & Marti, supra note 37, at 374 (explaining that the "[s]tudy of
attitudes and behavior about known hidden disabilities may reveal the meanings ascribed by
employers, coworkers or others to the behavior of qualified persons with disabilities").
279. See Ross & Fletcher, supra note 130, at 780 (citing GOFFMAN, supra note 277, at 15).
280. See id.
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emotion is likely to be misattributed to their prior mental illness. 281
This phenomenon occurs because observers overattribute to the
most salient potential cause: the actor's internal, stable, and un-
common physical or mental disability. While these studies focused
on attribution errors involving conditions that typically would meet
the ADA's definition of an actual disability, the results are likely to
be the same with salient nondisabling impairments, which are pos-
sessed by most individuals who bring claims under the ADA's per-
ceived disability prong.
While all of this research on cognitive biases thus predicts
that mistaken perceptions of physical or mental "impairments" are
likely to occur, not all impairments constitute statutory "disabili-
ties." For an employer to regard a nondisabled employee mistakenly
as having a disability, the employer must not only believe that the
employee has an impairment, but also that the impairment "sub-
stantially limits" one of the employee's "major life activities."282 Ma-
jor life activities are basic functions such as walking, sitting, stand-
ing, lifting, reaching, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learn-
ing, or caring for oneself.283 In addition, the regulations list "work-
ing" as a major life activity. 284 The regulations suggest that "work-
ing" should be used as a major life activity only as a last resort,
when the employee is unable to show substantial limitations in any
of the other enumerated tasks. 285 Nevertheless, working is still the
most common major life activity relied on in ADA perceived disabil-
ity claims.286 The definition of a perceived disability is based solely
281. See id.
282. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(C) (1994); Taylor v. Pathmark Stores, Inc., 177 F.3d 180, 192 (3d
Cir. 1999) ('Liability attaches only to a mistake that causes the employer to perceive the em-
ployee as disabled within the meaning of the ADA, i.e., a mistake that leads the employer to
think that the employee is substantially limited in a major life activity.").
283. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (2001); 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(i) (2001).
284. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i).
285. See id. In addition, the Supreme Court has questioned whether "working" should count
as a major life activity at all. See Toyota Motor Mfg. v. Williams, 122 S. Ct. 681, 692 (2002) (ex-
plaining in dicta that "[b]ecause of the conceptual difficulties inherent in the argument that
working could be a major life activity, we have been hesitant to hold as much," but concluding
that the Court "need not decide this difficult question today"); Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc.,
527 U.S. 471, 492 (1999) (noting in dicta "that there maybe some conceptual difficulty in defin-
ing major life activities to include work," but "[a]ssuming without deciding that working is a
major life activity" for purposes of deciding the case (internal quotation marks omitted)).
286. See Rondal I. Goldstein, Note, Mental Illness in the Workplace after Sutton v. United
Airlines, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 927, 966 (2001) (stating that "most perceived disability claims by
mentally ill individuals concern the major life activity of working"); see also Sutton, 527 U.S. at
490 (highlighting the fact that in the first major perceived disability case to reach the Supreme
Court, the severely myopic plaintiffs "do not make the obvious argument that they are regarded
due to their impairments as substantially limited in the major life activity of seeing," but in-
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on the employer's perception of the employee, not on the employee's
actual condition. It is typically easier to infer an employer's percep-
tions about the employee's ability to work than it is to infer an em-
ployer's perceptions about any of the other activities on the regula-
tory list.
In general, an employee is "substantially limited" in a major
life activity if the employee is:
i. Unable to perform a major life activity that the average person in the general
population can perform; or
ii. Significantly restricted as to the condition, manner or duration under which an
individual can perform a particular major life activity as compared to the con-
dition, manner, or duration under which the average person in the general
population can perform that same major life activity.2 7
When the major life activity is "working," the regulations provide
more specific guidance. An impairment "substantially limits" the
major life activity of working only if the employee is "significantly
restricted in the ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad
range of jobs in various classes as compared to the average person
having comparable training, skills and abilities." 288 According to the
regulations, "the inability to perform a single, particular job does
not constitute a substantial limitation in the major life activity of
working."28 9
stead, "[t]hey contend only that respondent mistakenly believes their physical impairments
substantially limit them in the major life activity of working").
287. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1). The regulations list three factors to consider when determining
if an impairment is substantially limiting: "(i) [t]he nature and severity of the impairment; (ii)
[tihe duration or expected duration of the impairment; and (iii) [t]he permanent or long term
impact, or the expected permanent or long term impact of or resulting from the impairment." Id.
§ 1630.2(j)(2); see also 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(j) (explaining that duration "refers to the length of
time an impairment persists," and impact "refers to the residual effects of an impairment").
288. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.20)(3) (emphasis added).
289. Id. The regulations list three main factors to determine if an employee is unable to per-
form "either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes":
(A) The geographical area to which the individual has reasonable access;
(B) The job from which the individual has been disqualified because of an im-
pairment, and the number and types of jobs utilizing similar training,
knowledge, skills or abilities, within that geographical area, from which
the individual is also disqualified because of the impairment (class of
jobs); and/or
(C) The job from which the individual has been disqualified because of an im-
pairment, and the number and types of other jobs not utilizing similar
training, knowledge, skills or abilities, within that geographical area, from
which the individual is also disqualified because of the impairment (broad
range of jobs in various classes).
Id.; see also 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(j) (listing examples of limitations that affect a class of jobs or
a broad range of jobs in various classes (citing Forrisi v. Bowen, 794 F.2d 931 (4th Cir. 1986);
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When an employee is alleging a perceived rather than an ac-
tual disability, the employer must mistakenly believe that the em-
ployee is unable to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of
jobs in various classes. A court must find that the employer's mis-
perception goes beyond just the employee's ability to perform the
specific job at issue in the case. 290 "[Clourts have differentiated be-
tween an employer's rejection of an employee or potential employee
due to a perception that the individual is unable to perform the du-
ties of that job, and denial because the employer believes the indi-
vidual is inherently incapable of working at any of a number of
jobs."291 The former is a "job-specific perception" and does not meet
the "substantially limiting" requirement, while the latter is a "more
generalized perception that the applicant is impaired in such a way
as would bar her from a large class of jobs," which is necessary to
establish the "substantial limitation" element of an ADA perceived
disability claim. 292
This distinction between a "generalized perception" about an
employee's ability to work and a "job-specific perception" about an
employee's ability to perform the employer's particular job is an ex-
ample of the final causal attribution dimension: global versus spe-
cific. For an employee to state an ADA perceived disability claim,
the employer must make a global causal attribution, rather than a
specific causal attribution. The employer must believe that the em-
ployee's characteristics will produce the same outcome in many dif-
ferent situations: that the employee will be unable to perform in a
"class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes."293 If the
employer believes that the employee's characteristics will impact
Jasany v. United States Postal Serv., 755 F.2d 1244 (6th Cir. 1985); E.E. Black, Ltd. v. Marshall,
497 F. Supp. 1088 (D. Haw. 1980))).
290. Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 527 U.S. 516, 523 (1999) (explaining that the em-
ployee "must be regarded as precluded from more than a particular job" in order to state a per-
ceived disability claim using "working" as the relevant major life activity).
291. Smaw v. Commonwealth of Va. Dep't of State Police, 862 F. Supp. 1469, 1474 (E.D. Va.
1994) (emphasis added) (interpreting the parallel definition in the Rehabilitation Act and con-
cluding that "the latter may qualify as handicapped under the statute, while the former cannot").
292. Joyce v. Suffolk County, 911 F. Supp. 92, 97 (E.D.N.Y. 1996); see also Foreman v. Bab-
cock & Wilcox Co., 117 F.3d 800, 806 (5th Cir. 1997):
An employer does not necessarily regard an employee as having a substantially
limiting impairment simply because it believes that she is incapable of perform-
ing a particular job; the statutory reference to a substantial limitation indicates
instead that an employer regards an employee as substantially limited in his or
her ability to work by finding the employee's impairment to foreclose generally
the type of employment involved.[;.
Forrisi v. Bowen, 794 F.2d 931, 934 (4th Cir. 1986) (making the same distinction for the parallel
language in the Rehabilitation Act).
293. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3); see Murphy, 527 U.S. at 523.
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only the specific job that the employer is offering, the employee has
not been "regarded as" disabled.
Once again, social science research suggests that when we
make mistakes, we are likely to do so in a direction that would fa-
cilitate the occurrence of perceived disabilities: we overattribute to
global causes and we underattribute to specific causes. 294 In other
words, people tend to overestimate the level of cross-situational
consistency in other people's behavior. 95 Although "slight differ-
ences in situations often produce large differences in the behavior
of most people in those situations," observers erroneously believe
that an actor will behave similarly in many different contexts. 296
There is also an actor-observer difference on this variable, with ob-
servers believing that other people's behavior will demonstrate
much more cross-situational consistency than their own. 29 7
In one illustrative study, experimenters asked subjects to
describe their own behavior in many different potentially anxiety-
arousing situations (such as taking an exam or giving a speech),
and in many different potentially hostility-arousing situations
(such as getting blamed for someone else's error or having. someone
open one's personal mail).298 Each subject then had a close friend
and an acquaintance (the "observers") predict the subject's behavior
in the same array of situations. 299 The experimenters found that the
observers consistently predicted more cross-situational consistency
in the subjects' behavior than did the subjects themselves, which
indicates that the observers were basing their judgments on global
rather than specific causal attributions.300
294. See Ross, supra note 128, at 184-85, 193-94 (explaining that people "too readily... ex-
pect[ I] consistency in behavior or outcomes across widely disparate situations and contexts").
295. See NISBETT & ROSS, supra note 127, at 120; Ross et al., supra note 189, at 491; see also
Dennis T. Regan et al., Liking and the Attribution Process, 10 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL.
385, 397 (1974) (stating that "observers tend consistently to overemphasize individual differ-
ences at the trait level despite scant evidence for.., cross-situational consistency in behavior").
This attribution bias is exacerbated by the "correlation error," which is the tendency to over-
estimate the strength of the relationship among observable characteristics and behaviors. See
Ross, supra note 128, at 202. By overestimating the degree of relationship between variables
that are present in a social situation, observers end up "consistently overestimat[ing] the degree
of cross-situational consistency existing in the relevant behavioral measures and outcomes." Id.
296. NISBETT & Ross, supra note 127, at 120.
297. See Clarry Lay et al., The Perception of Situational Consistency in Behaviour: Assessing
the Actor-Observer Bias, 6 CANADIAN J. BEHAV. SCI. 376, 377-83 (1974) (describing two studies
finding that people overattribute other people's conduct to global causes, by assuming more
cross-situational consistency in other people's behavior than in their own behavior).
298. See id. at 379.
299. See id.
300. See id. at 379-80.
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Our attribution bias on the global/specific dimension works
in the same direction as our other attributional biases. Even during
an individual employee assessment that avoids group-based as-
sumptions about "the disabled," social science research predicts
that employers will err by assuming too much cross-situational con-
sistency for employees' behavior. Employers predictably will as-
sume that more employees are substantially limited in the major
life activity of working than is actually the case. Although psy-
chologists have not studied this phenomenon specifically in the con-
text of perceived disabilities, some research on actual disabilities
supports this view. In one study, an individual who was blind asked
various social agencies for a specific, limited service, such as a
housekeeper or a reader. 3 1 The study found that agency workers
viewed the individual's blindness as a global rather than a specific
cause, and incorrectly assumed that the individual would require
extensive and wide-ranging services to perform a variety of other
tasks.302
The facts in Deane v. Pocono Medical Center illustrate a
similar failure to make an accurate specific attribution for an em-
ployee's nondisabling wrist injury.3 03 In Deane, the employer
learned that a registered nurse on the medical/surgical ward was
unable to lift more than fifteen to twenty pounds or to perform re-
petitive manual tasks. 30 4 Although the employer properly conducted
an individual assessment, the employer mistakenly regarded the
employee's limitations as "far worse than they actually were," and
"fundamentally misunderstood and exaggerated the limitations
that the wrist injury imposed."305 The employer mistakenly believed
that because of the nondisabling impairment, the plaintiff was un-
able to perform not only specific, limited tasks such as typing, but
also a wide range of other job duties. The plaintiffs employer
viewed her as unable to "push or pull anything, assist patients in
emergency situations, [or] move or assist patients in the activities
of daily living," and incorrectly believed that she could not "perform
CPR, use the rest of her body to assist patients, work with psychi-
atric patients, or use medical equipment." 306 Accordingly, the plain-
tiffs employer regarded her as unable to perform any patient care
301. See Ross & Fletcher, supra note 130, .at 784 (citing R.A. SCOTT, THE MAKING OF BLIND
MEN: A STUDY OF ADULT SOCIALIZATION 180 (1969)).
302. See id.
303. See 142 F.3d 138, 141 (3d Cir. 1998) (en banc).
304. Id.
305. Id. at 142, 145.
306. Id. at 142.
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job, either at the employer's medical center or at any other hospi-
tal.30 7 In reality, the plaintiffs nondisabling condition allegedly did
not prevent her from working in many patient care jobs, including
jobs in pediatrics and oncology wards. 308 Despite the fact that the
employer acted without prejudice or group-based assumptions, the
employer nevertheless regarded the plaintiff as disabled by errone-
ously making a global rather than a specific causal attribution.30 9
Thus, our predictable attribution biases of overattributing to
internal, stable, uncommon, and global causes are all the same
types of errors that are needed for an employer to perceive a non-
disabled employee mistakenly as disabled. 310 For an employer's
307. Id.; see also id. at 145 (noting expert testimony concluding that Deane would have been
precluded from a wide ranges of jobs if she had been impaired to the extent perceived by the
employer).
308. Id. at 142, 145.
309. See id.; see also Taylor v. Pathmark Stores, Inc., 177 F.3d 180, 190 (3d Cir. 1999) (per-
mitting a perceived disability claim against an employer whose individual assessment of an
employee's nondisabling ankle injury was "dominated by miscommunications and misinterpreta-
tions," causing the employer to conclude erroneously that the employee was "incapable of per-
forming a wide range of jobs"); Jimeno v. Mobil Oil Corp., 66 F.3d 1514, 1521-22 (9th Cir. 1995)
(permitting a perceived disability claim under the state's analogous antidiscrimination statute
when an employer conducted an individual assessment of a mechanic's nondisabling spinal im-
pairment but erroneously concluded that the impairment "foreclosed generally the possibility of
employment as a truck mechanic" and "affect[ed] his ability to find employment anywhere in his
chosen profession"); Dipol v. New York City Transit Auth., 999 F. Supp. 309, 311, 314 (E.D.N.Y.
1998) (holding that an employee stated a perceived disability claim against an employer that
conducted an individual assessment but incorrectly regarded the employee's nondisabling diabe-
tes as precluding the employee from working in a broad range of jobs involving heights, hazard-
ous conditions, or the operation of any vehicle or equipment); Coleman v. Keebler Co., 997 F.
Supp. 1102, 1108, 1114 (N.D. Ind. 1998) (allowing a perceived disability claim against an em-
ployer that erroneously perceived an employee's nondisabling arthritis as precluding her from
thirteen different job classifications); McAlpin v. Nat'l Semiconductor Corp., 921 F. Supp. 1518,
1520, 1523 (N.D. Tex. 1996) (finding a triable issue on an employee's perceived disability claim
where the employer individually assessed the employee's nondisabling sarcoidosis but errone-
ously viewed her as unable to work at any job in the company, rather than being precluded only
from jobs involving direct exposure to chemicals); EEOC v. Chrysler Corp., 917 F. Supp. 1164,
1166, 1169 (E.D. Mich. 1996) (holding that an employee stated a perceived disability claim
against an employer that individually assessed the employee's nondisabling high blood pressure
but incorrectly regarded the employee as unable to work as an electrician or in "a wide range of
other jobs").
310. As noted above, some social scientists have periodically identified a fourth causal attri-
bution dimension-volitional versus nonvolitional-which has received limited support. See
supra note 152. The ADA and its legislative history arguably indicate that a condition must be
nonvolitional to constitute a "disability." See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7) (1994) (describing
"individuals with disabilities" as a discrete and insular minority who have been discriminated
against "based on characteristics that are beyond the control of such individuals"); 135 CONG.
REC. S10765, S10796 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1989) (statement of Sen. Rudman) (arguing that the
ADA's definition of mental disabilities should not cover illegal drug users in part because drug
use involves behavior "which individuals are engaging in of their own volition"); 135 CONG. REC.
H5064, H5065 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 1989) (statement of Rep. Hoyer) (suggesting that the ADA
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misperception to trigger the ADA's perceived disability prong, the
misperception must involve an attribution to the exact types of
causes to which we are most likely to assign too great a causal role.
Of course, because our attributional errors are only tenden-
cies, it is difficult to conclude with any certainty that they will be
outcome determinative or result in any particular number of per-
ceived disabilities. However, the potential for such nonmotivational
misperceptions appears to be fairly significant. As explained above,
the employment setting is one in which causal attribution activity
is particularly likely to occur. Moreover, attribution errors occur
with notable frequency even under the "pristine conditions" of a
laboratory, where experimenters often provide subjects with com-
pletely relevant, sufficient, and accurate data for their
decisionmaking tasks.31' Employers are likely to be at higher risk of
making attribution errors because they often lack the complete in-
formation or sufficient time to maximize the accuracy of their social
judgments and decisions. Thus, causal attribution research at least
lends serious plausibility to the view that so-called "innocent mis-
takes" may occur with some frequency. Even during an individual
employee assessment free from invidious, group-based animus, the
predictable errors from employers' automatic cognitive processes
suggest that sometimes employers will still mistakenly perceive a
nonexistent disability, particularly by exaggerating the role of sali-
ent nondisabling conditions. 312
This explanation is even more plausible given that not all of
the attributional biases need to be in play for an employer's misper-
ception to meet the definition of a perceived disability. For an em-
should only protect individuals who have disabilities "through no fault of their own"); 134 CONG.
REC. S5106, S5114 (daily ed. Apr. 28, 1988) (statement of Sen. Harkin) (explaining that "persons
with disabilities" have been "subjected to a history of purposeful unequal treatment... based on
characteristics that are beyond the control of such persons").
However, courts have rejected this suggestion and applied the ADA's disability definition
even to individuals whose impairments were caused in whole or in part by the individual's own
behavior. See, e.g., Cook v. Rhode Island, 10 F.3d 17, 24 (1st Cir. 1993) (holding that the ADA
"indisputably applies to numerous conditions that may be caused or exacerbated by voluntary
conduct"). The volitional nature of the employee's conduct should be particularly irrelevant for
perceived disability claims, which focus entirely on the employer's perception of the employee's
condition, rather than on the condition itself. See id. at 24 (allowing a perceived disability claim
based on an employer's misperception of an employee's obesity, regardless of whether the obesity
was within the employee's control). Thus, even if there is a fourth causal attribution dimension
categorizing causes as either volitional or nonvolitional, that dimension is not relevant in pre-
dicting the occurrence of perceived disabilities.
311. See NISBETT & ROSS, supra note 127, at 114.
312. Cf. Krieger, supra note 35, at 1200 (arguing that other aspects of "cognitive efficiency"
cause "systematic biases [that] may in turn lead to predictable types of error in social judgment,"
and that those errors explain much of current intergroup race and sex discrimination).
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ployer to regard a nondisabled employee as disabled, the employer
must perceive the employee as having a physical or mental impair-
ment that substantially limits a major life activity, but only one
element of that definition needs to be a mistake. For example, as
noted above, the vast majority of perceived disability claimants do
have some type of nondisabling physical or mental "impairment,"
which just does not rise to the level of an actually disabling condi-
tion. Often employers correctly attribute various behaviors, per-
formance, or limitations to the individual's nondisabling impair-
ment. If, however, the employer mistakenly believes that the non-
disabling impairment substantially limits the employee's ability to
work (i.e., the employer's only mistake is on the global/specific di-
mension), the employer has regarded the employee as disabled un-
der the perceived disability prong. The bottom line: "[A] little causal
analysis is a dangerous thing."3 13
B. Errors in Predicting the Future
While some employment decisions about individuals with
nondisabling conditions are made solely on the basis of attributions
for the employee's prior conduct, some involve predictions about the
employee's future conduct as well. Causal attributions for past be-
havior play a central role in predictions of future performance. In
fact, social scientists believe that predicting others' behavior is a
primary reason that we make causal attributions in the first
place. 314
Thus, the consequences of biased causal attributions are of-
ten magnified as they are translated into biased predictions. The
Texas Bus Lines case, described above, illustrates this phenome-
non. 315 The plaintiff in that case, who was nondisabled but morbidly
obese, was rejected for a job driving a passenger transport van.316
313. See NISBETT & ROSs, supra note 127, at 185.
314. See HEWSTONE, supra note 124, at 61; SEARS ET AL., supra note 125, at 117-18; Carroll
& Payne, supra note 127, at 18; Frieze, supra note 130, at 95; Kelly, supra note 137, at 22;
Krieger, supra note 36, at 1281 (explaining that, "[r]ightly or wrongly, we assume that under-
standing why something has happened will improve our power to predict or even control what
will happen in the future"); Lau & Russell, supra note 136, at 29; Liberman et al., supra note
249, at 7 (describing this position as part of "classic attribution theories"); Metalsky & Abram-
son, supra note 130, at 17; Town & Harvey, supra note 137, at 291; Ybarra & Stephan, supra
note 137, at 718, 726. See generally Ross & Fletcher, supra note 130, at 104 (collecting social
science studies that provide empirical support for the hypothesis that "people make attributions,
in part, to enhance their control over the environment").
315. 923 F. Supp. 965 (S.D. Tex. 1996).
316. Id. at 967.
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During the application process, the evaluator saw the plaintiff hav-
ing difficulty getting out of her chair and "waddling" out of the
waiting room. 31 7 In deciding not to hire the plaintiff, the decision-
maker first assessed the cause of that past behavior-by allegedly
attributing it to the plaintiffs obesity, rather than to a temporary,
nonimpairing condition like fatigue or a foot that had fallen
asleep.318 The decisionmaker then relied on that internal, stable,
and global attribution to predict how the plaintiff would perform in
the future-by allegedly concluding that the plaintiff would always
be unable to stand up and walk rapidly, making her ineffective in
potential emergencies on the job. 31 9 As a combination of both of
these biased judgments, the employer exaggerated the gravity of
the plaintiffs nondisabling condition, and the plaintiff was able to
state a perceived disability claim.
Social scientists have discovered that this connection be-
tween backward-looking assessments and forward-looking predic-
tions is extraordinarily strong, as causal attributions directly affect
our future expectations.3 20 This problem is most severe when the
employer's attribution is to. an internal, stable, and global cause,
which consistently triggers overgeneralization in predictions about
future events.3 21 A decisionmaker who makes a stable, dispositional
attribution for an actor's past failure, for example, will expect simi-
lar failures on the same task in the future.3 22 Observers are most
likely to translate their causal attributions into predictions about
the target's future behavior when they are making judgments to
317. Id. at 968.
318. See id. at 978-79.
319. See id. at 968, 976-78.
320. See SEARS ET AL., supra note 125, at 117; see also Krieger, supra note 35, at 1204
('[Clausal attribution substantially affects how past events inform our predictions about the
future."); Ross, supra note 128, at 175 (explaining that people make attributions to help "form
expectations and make predictions about future actions and outcomes"). See generally Ybarra &
Stephan, supra note 137, at 718 (analyzing "how the prediction of another person's behavior is
affected by prior attributions").
321. See Abramson et al., supra note 150, at 68 (explaining how attributions to internal, sta-
ble, and global causes create expectations of an unchanging future).
322. See Frieze, supra note 130, at 98; Liberman et al., supra note 249, at 7 (explaining that
"dispositional attributions enable one to predict how the target will behave in future situations");
Ross & Fletcher, supra note 130, at 90; Weiner, supra note 136, at 7-8; see also Carroll & Payne,
supra note 127, at 19 (citing research showing that "[e]xpectancies for future performance ... are
dependent on judgments of stability"). See generally Ybarra & Stephan, supra note 137, at 718
(providing empirical support for an "attribution-prediction bias," meaning that observers who
attribute an actor's past behavior to internal, dispositional causes expect the actor to engage in
more negative behavior in the future than observers who attribute the actor's past behavior to
situational constraints).
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fulfill duties or obligations,3 23 which occurs in the employment deci-
sionmaking context. This means that an employer that incorrectly
attributes a single episode of poor performance to a physical or
mental impairment may decide to fire, refuse to promote, or limit
compensation based on the erroneous assumption that the poor per-
formance will continue over time.
People's expectations about another person's future behavior
will, in turn, influence the way they behave toward that individ-
ual.324 Causal attributions work as "mediators" between one's ob-
servations and reactions towards others. 325 For example, when an-
other person makes a negative remark, an observer might attribute
the remark to an intense job deadline causing temporary stress (an
external and variable cause), or to a vindictive personality (an in-
ternal and stable cause).3 26 In the first situation, the observer likely
would predict the person to be friendlier in the future, and the ob-
server would therefore be forgiving and decide to avoid the individ-
ual for just a short period of time.327 In the latter situation, the ob-
server likely would predict the person to remain unfriendly, and the
observer would therefore be angry and decide to avoid the individ-
323. See Liberman et al., supra note 249, at 5, 7, 14-15.
324. See NISBETT & Ross, supra note 127, at 30 (explaining that people's theories of the
causes of human behavior "determine the meaning we extract from social interaction, and, in
large measure, they determine the way we behave in response to the actions of our fellows"); see
also HEWSTONE, supra note 124, at 63 (same); SEARS ET AL., supra note 125, at 117 (same); Car-
roll & Payne, supra note 127, at 18 (explaining that attribution theory studies how people make
judgments about the causes of events, "and how these judgments are used and so affect the per-
son's behavior"); Robert S. Wyer Jr. & Alan J. Lambert, The Role of Trait Constructs in Person
Perception: An Historical Perspective, in SOCIAL COGNITION: IMPACT ON SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 109,
129 (Patricia G. Devine et al. eds., 1994) (explaining that "people's social behavior is guided in
part by their expectations of how others will respond, and these expectations, in turn, are often
determined by perceptions of the others' general traits").
325. SEARS ET AL., supra note 125, at 118 (explaining that "[o]ur reactions to other people-
liking, aggression, helping, conformity, and so on-frequently depend on our interpretation of
their behavior"); see also John S. Carroll et al., Sentencing Goals, Causal Attributions, Ideology,
and Personality, 52 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 107, 110-17 (1987) (describing two studies
finding that people who attribute crime to internal and stable traits of offenders are more likely
to believe in punishment, while people who attribute crime to external causes are more likely to
believe in welfare and rehabilitation); Stanley Feldman, Economic Individualism and American
Public Opinion, 11 AM. POL. Q. 3, 10-25 (1983) (describing a study showing that people who
attribute the poverty level of blacks in America to discrimination and other environmental fail-
ures are more likely to support government aid, while people who attribute the poverty level to
individual laziness and unwillingness to get job training are more likely to oppose government
aid).
326. See SEARS ETAL., supra note 125, at 117.
327. See id.
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ual permanently.328 Attribution errors thus can have very signifi-
cant practical consequences for the attribution target.
This mediating role of causal attributions takes on particular
importance in contexts where one party is evaluating and determin-
ing outcomes for another. Most research in this area has involved
criminal punishment and parole decisions. In one study, experi-
menters asked subjects to recommend the punishment level for of-
fenders with varied backgrounds and criminal records. 329 The study
found that subjects recommended the most severe sentences when
they attributed an offender's past crime to an internal and stable
cause rather than to an external or variable cause. 3 0 Experiment-
ers have found similar results in parole decisions. 331 When parole
decisionmakers attributed an inmate's past crime to an internal
and stable cause, they viewed the inmate not only as more worthy
of punishment, but also more likely to recidivate, and the inmate
was therefore the least likely to be granted parole. 332
In the employment context, this means that causal attribu-
tions mediate between an employer's evaluations of an employee's
past behavior, predictions of the employee's future performance,
and decisions about the employee's job. 333 In one experiment, re-
searchers found that when observers attributed an incident of un-
desirable job-related behavior to an internal and stable characteris-
tic of the employee, they were more likely to suggest greater job-
related sanctions than for another employee who acted in exactly
the same way.334 Thus, an employer's mistaken perception of a non-
disabled employee as having an internal and stable impairment is
likely to have very real consequences for the employee's job. As Pro-
fessor Linda Hamilton Krieger has explained, "The causal attribu-
tion of success and failure plays a critical role in performance
evaluation, promotion, compensation, and discharge decisions."3 35
328. See id.
329. See John S. Carroll & John W. Payne, Crime Seriousness, Recidivism Risk, and Causal
Attributions in Judgments of Prison Term by Students and Experts, 62 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 595,
596-600 (1977).
330. See id.
331. See Weiner, supra note 136, at 20-21.
332. See id.
333. See Krieger, supra note 35, at 1207 ("The causal attribution of success and failure plays
a critical role in performance evaluation, promotion, compensation, and discharge decisions.");
Kerry L. Yarkin et al., Cognitive Sets, Attribution, and Social Interaction, 41 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 243, 243 (1981) (explaining that observers select between alternative courses of
action based on causal attributions of other people's behavior).
334. See Krieger, supra note 35, at 1205-07 (describing a study by Bodenhausen and Wyer).
335. Id. at 1207.
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These effects of mistaken attributions are lasting ones, in
part because causal attributions tend to increase belief persever-
ance. Once an observer has organized social information and estab-
lished social beliefs based on erroneous attributions, those beliefs
will remain even after the observer learns that the original attribu-
tions were incorrect. 36 Ability-related attributions are particularly
resistant to change. In one set of studies, observers evaluated two
different actors in a series of tasks. One actor started out perform-
ing well, followed by steadily decreasing levels of success, while the
other actor performed with the opposite pattern.3 7 The observers
judged the former actor as more intelligent and they had higher
expectations for the former actor's future performance. 338 Thus, the
initial attributions rapidly entrenched an estimate of future ability,
and those estimates were resistant to change, even in the face of
new and discrepant information. 339
This attribution perseverance occurs even when the ob-
server's original data is fully and completely discredited. Experi-
menters in another study asked subjects to observe actors try to
distinguish authentic from fictitious suicide notes while the ex-
perimenters provided completely fabricated feedback about the ac-
tors' accuracy on each note. 340 The observers made causal attribu-
tions and formed impressions of each actor as they watched the
false-feedback manipulation. 341 The experimenters then told the
observers that the feedback was fabricated, and the experimenters
asked the observers to make their own assessment of the actors'
past performance and general abilities, and to provide their own
predictions about the actors' future performance on the same or re-
336. See HEWSTONE, supra note 124, at 64; NISBETT & ROSS, supra note 127, at 184-85 (ex-
plaining that causal attributions can play a role "in reinforcing and maintaining more abstract
and general theories," and identifying studies finding that people believe that their causal attri-
butions are plausible even in the face of later evidence that the connection is nonexistent);
Krieger, supra note 36, at 1290-91 (describing studies demonstrating that "even after a belief is
discredited, the causal explanations generated to support it persist, giving the discredited belief
a kind of cognitive life after death"); Ross, supra note 127, at 205 (describing studies demonstrat-
ing that "errors in ... social judgments are difficult to reverse and may survive even the com-
plete negation of their original evidential basis"); Vincent Yzerbyt et al., Stereotypes as Explana-
tions: A Subjective Essentialistic View of Group Perception, in THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF
STEREOTYPING AND GROUP LIFE 20, 28 (Russell Spears et al. eds., 1997) (compiling studies dem-
onstrating "the impressive ability of theories to self-perpetuate if they are adequately backed up
by an explanatory framework").
337. See Ross & Fletcher, supra note 130, at 90.
338. See id.
339. See id.
340. See Ross, supra note 128, at 205.
341. See id.
[Vol. 55:481
PERCEIVED DISABILITIES
lated tasks. 342 The study found that "[t]he totally discredited initial
outcome manipulation produced significant 'residual' effects" on the
observers' assessments. 343 The observers evaluated the actors con-
sistent with their original ability-related attributions, even though
the observers knew that their original attributions were completely
baseless. 344 The fact that people are overly confident in the accuracy
of their causal attributions exacerbates this phenomenon.3 45 And
this extraordinary resistance to reattributing impression-relevant
data is likely to be even stronger outside the laboratory, where em-
ployers rarely obtain such immediate, complete, or incontrovertible
new data regarding their erroneous perceptions about a nondis-
abled employee.3 46
This belief perseverance is further facilitated because prior
expectations actually distort the way that observers view and in-
terpret new events. 347 Once an observer has formed expectations
about a person's future behavior based on causal attributions for
past behavior, the observer typically will selectively seek and recall
new data only if it confirms the observer's prior causal theory.348
Data from new observations of the actor are thus " 'selectively'
342. See id.
343. Id.
344. See id. at 206-07. In another study demonstrating this phenomenon, experimenters gave
subjects several case studies of individual firefighters and asked the subjects to hypothesize the
relationship between firefighters' risk preference as trainees and their later success on the job.
See NISBETT & ROSS, supra note 127, at 185 (describing 1979 study on theory perseverance). The
subjects then provided causal attributions for the hypothesized relationship. See id. Experiment-
ers then told the subjects that the underlying data was completely fictitious and there was no
relationship whatsoever between a firefighter's prior risk preference and later job performance.
See id. Nevertheless, the subjects persevered in their original causal attributions, still believing
their own underlying explanations. See id. at 185-86 (explaining that "[p]eople's facility in form-
ing causal explanations is so great that they usually will be able to explain most events and
relationships they observe," and that "[t]hese explanations may often prove so convincing that
they survive even the total discrediting of the 'evidence' that prompted their invention in the
first place").
345. See NISBETT & ROSS, supra note 127, at 119-20; see also Susan E. Brodt & Lee D. Ross,
The Role of Stereotyping in Overconfident Social Prediction, 16 SOC. COGNITION 225, 225-26
(1998) (collecting studies demonstrating "that people tend to make social predictions with
greater subjective certainty or confidence than can be justified by their objective accuracy").
346. See NISBETT & ROSS, supra note 127, at 251.
347. See Ross, supra note 128, at 206 ("The capacity of existing impressions and expectations
to bias interpretations of social data is, of course, a well-replicated phenomenon in social psy-
chology.").
348. See HEWSTONE, supra note 124, at 64 & ch. 6; NISBET & ROSS, supra note 127, at 186-
88; Ross, supra note 128, at 210; Sanbonmatsu et al., supra note 266, at 892-93. But see Krieger,
supra note 36, at 1268-69 (describing research showing that observers actually recall disconfirm-
ing evidence more readily than confirming evidence, but explaining that the result was because
the observers used increased cognitive processing efforts to attribute the expectancy-inconsistent
information in a way that would insulate the observer's original theory from modification).
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coded in accord with one's biased prior impressions." 349 For exam-
ple, if the observer has already made an internal and stable attri-
bution for a person's past behavior, the observer will selectively
continue to make that attribution for future behavior that confirms
the observer's original hypothesis, but will make external and/or
variable attributions for future disconfirming behavior, rather than
using the new data to reevaluate and modify the initial causal ex-
planation. 350 This process of selective encoding is so strong that
"virtually any random sample of newly considered evidence ... will
seemingly support the existing belief or theory."3 51 Many research-
ers are already convinced that these cognitive processes can play an
important role in maintaining racial stereotypes, 52 and the effect is
likely to be the same with perceived disabilities. An employer's ini-
tial misperception of a nondisabled employee as disabled is likely to
stick, regardless of what the employee does to try to change that
impression.
Moreover, mistaken causal attributions of an actor by an ob-
server can actually affect the way that the actor will later behave.
The mere act of making a causal attribution for another person's
behavior tends to polarize the observer's responses toward that in-
dividual, making the responses either more positive or more nega-
tive than they would have been if no causal attribution had oc-
curred at all.3 53 Actors then tend to respond in ways suggested by
349. Ross, supra note 128, at 210.
350. See HEWSTONE, supra note 124, at 64 & ch. 6; Ross, supra note 128, at 210.
351. Ross, supra note 128, at 210. Selective encoding is another example of a typically ra-
tional cognitive processing strategy, which trades off some predictable mistakes for the benefit of
great efficiency. See id.; see also Krieger, supra note 36, at 1268-69 (describing research on the
"expectancy-confirming attribution bias").
352. See, e.g., NISBETT & ROSS, supra note 127, at 238-41; Brown et al., supra note 35, at
1495 (citing research demonstrating that once observers have assigned someone to a specific
social group, "their reactions may be dominated by this single characteristic; and they may fail to
notice other important facts about the person"); Krieger, supra note 36, at 1265-70 (citing evi-
dence that "biases in the attribution of causation frequently result in discrimination against
members of stereotyped outgroups"); Krieger, supra note 35, at 1198 (arguing that social cogni-
tion research "indicates that normal cognitive processes can lead to the creation and mainte-
nance of social stereotypes," and that current Title VII jurisprudence does not account for such
nonmotivational sources of discrimination).
353. See Yarkin et al., supra note 333, at 245-51 (studying the behavioral responses of sub-
jects who did and did not make causal attributions for an actor's behavior and finding that "sub-
jects in the attribution measure conditions generally exhibited more pronounced behavioral
responses relative to subjects in the no-attribution measure conditions"); Yarkin-Levin, supra
note 140, at 304-09 (describing the results of a study finding that the act of making causal attri-
butions makes people's behavior towards the individual-whether positive or negative behav-
ior-more extreme in later interactions than the behavior of people who did not engage in causal
attribution); see also Town & Harvey, supra note 137, at 293-98.
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the observer's original hypothesis, through the well-documented
phenomenon of the "self-fulfilling prophecy."3 54 Thus, employers
with mistaken perceptions about an employee will not only continue
to see nonexistent evidence to support their perception, they will
also create confirming evidence in response to their own polarized
behavior. What all of this research suggests is that once an em-
ployer mistakenly perceives a nondisabled employee as disabled,
that mistake is likely to last: "[T]he perception of a disability, so-
cially constructed and reinforced, is difficult to destroy." 355
III. RECOMMENDATIONS
As explained above, most courts that have addressed nonmo-
tivational misperceptions either have held that the ADA's perceived
disability prong does not apply at all-the "no liability" approach-
or they have applied the perceived disability prong identically to
both nonmotivational and motivational mistakes-the "full liabil-
ity" approach. In contrast, at least one court has suggested an in-
termediate alternative. 356 Rather than excluding nonmotivational
mistakes from the perceived disability definition altogether, or
treating nonmotivational mistakes exactly the same as mistakes
that are invidiously motivated, courts could apply a form of "limited
liability." Courts could apply the perceived disability prong to non-
motivational mistakes, but treat the employer's lack of animus or
the absence of group-based decisionmaking as a mitigating factor
that limits the available remedies to fit this particular type of
harm. Rather than equating the mistake requirement with one of
intent when assessing liability, courts could address the intent is-
sue when determining what the appropriate remedy should be. This
section argues that this intermediate approach is the most appro-
priate. Tailoring remedies is a more precise way to achieve the de-
sired substantive outcome than the rather loose fit that can be ob-
tained solely by line-drawing at the liability stage.
354. See NISBETT & ROSS, supra note 127, at 187-88; see also Wyer & Lambert, supra note
324, at 129-30 (explaining that observers who believed that another person possessed a particu-
lar trait "interacted with the other in a way that actually elicited the type of behavior they ex-
pected, thereby confirming their predictions").
355. Deane v. Pocono Med. Ctr., 142 F.3d 138, 148 n.12 (3d Cir. 1998) (en banc); see Travis,
supra note 4, at 997-98 (explaining how an employer's misperception of a nondisabled individual
as disabled can have lasting discriminatory effects even after the employer is disabused of its
misperception).
356. See Taylor v. Pathmark Stores, Inc., 177 F.3d 180, 182-83 (3d Cir. 1999) (noting in dicta
that while "an employer's innocent mistake ... is sufficient to subject it to liability under the
ADA .... the employer's state of mind is clearly relevant to the appropriate remedies").
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A. What's Wrong with the "No Liability" Approach
Courts that have adopted the "no' liability" approach for
nonmotivational mistakes tend to view the ADA narrowly as a
weapon aimed at combating purposeful discrimination. 357 While
purposeful discrimination is a central concern of the ADA,3 58 it is by
no means the exclusive one, and it should not be used as a rationale
for limiting the scope of perceived disability claims.
Courts that have taken the "no liability" approach have done
so in part because of imprecision in the EEOC's historic account of
the perceived disability prong. In 1987, in School Board of Nassau
County v. Arline, the U.S. Supreme Court first interpreted the "re-
garded as" language in the ADA's predecessor statute, the Rehabili-
tation Act. 359 According to the Supreme Court, the perceived dis-
ability prong reflected congressional acknowledgement "that soci-
ety's accumulated myths and fears about disability and disease are
as handicapping as are the'physical limitations that flow from ac-
tual impairment. '" 360 When drafting the ADA to extend protection
into the private sector, Congress adopted the Rehabilitation Act's
definitions and cited the Arline opinion to justify retaining the "re-
garded as" language in the ADA. 361 The EEOC's implementing regu-
lations for the ADA therefore correctly cited Arline as evidence of
congressional intent. But the EEOC did so in a way that may have
proved too much.
357. See supra notes 89-104 and accompanying text.
358. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7) (1994) (stating in the preamble that the ADA is based
on Congress's finding that individuals with disabilities have been "subjected to a history of pur-
poseful unequal treatment"); 136 CONG. REC. S9680, S9680 (daily ed. July 13, 1990) (statement
of Sen. Kennedy) (emphasizing discrimination based on "ignorance," "fear," and "prejudice"); 136
CONG. REC. S7422, S7441 (daily ed. June 6, 1990) (statement of Sen. Harkin) (stating that "the
spirit of the ADA is to end discrimination based on ignorance and prejudice").
The ADA's predecessor statute, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, originally covered only actu-
ally disabling impairments, until Congress amended the Act in 1974 to add the "regarded as"
prong. See Amendments to the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-516, § 111(a), 88 Stat.
1617, 1619 (1974) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 705(20)(B)(i)-(iii) (Supp. V 1999)). Con-
gress justified the amendment in part based on the belief that nondisabled individuals who are
mistakenly "regarded as" disabled are subject to the same type of purposeful discrimination as
those with actual disabilities. See S. REP. No. 93-1297 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6373, 6389-90.
359. 480 U.S. 273, 283-84 (1987).
360. Id. at 284.
361. See, e.g., 136 CONG. REC. E1913, E1913 (daily ed. June 13, 1990) (statement of Rep.
Hoyer) (defining the ADA's "regarded as" prong as the Arline Court had interpreted the same
language in the Rehabilitation Act).
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While the Arline Court had merely described the effect of
motivational mistakes as one potential rationale for the perceived
disability prong, the EEOC arguably seemed to equate that descrip-
tion with a requirement that the mistakes be motivational in origin.
Citing Arline, the EEOC states: "[I]f an individual can show that an
employer.., made an employment decision because of a perception
of disability based on myth, fear or stereotype, the individual will
satisfy the regarded as part of the definition of disability."' 362 Al-
though the reference to myth and stereotype could be interpreted to
encompass a variety of unintentional forms of discrimination, 36 3
many courts have viewed those terms narrowly to include only
group-based misperceptions or intentionally discriminatory acts. 364
Similarly, while the EEOC's statement does not necessarily pre-
clude liability when the perception of disability is "based on" some-
thing other than myth, fear, or stereotype, these courts have used
this regulation as a basis for denying liability for nonmotivational
mistakes when an employer regards a nondisabled employee as dis-
abled during the course of an individual evaluation.
That interpretation of the EEOC's regulations ignores the
underlying rationale for the perceived disability prong articulated
by both Congress and the Supreme Court. Simply put, the rationale
is that individuals who are treated as disabled will be disadvan-
taged in employment whether they are actually disabled or not. 365
362. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(l) (2001) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).
363. Arguably, the use of the word, "stereotype," by itself indicates that the ADA covers cog-
nitive mistakes. Professor Jody David Armour has described stereotypes as "well-learned sets of
associations among groups and traits established in children's memories at an early age."
ARMOUR, supra note 35, at 121. He distinguishes those cognitive constructs from "prejudiced
personal beliefs," which he describes as "the endorsement or acceptance of a negative cultural
stereotype." Id. While prejudice is conscious and motivational, stereotypes often work at an un-
conscious level outside of one's own awareness. See id. at 121-22. It is unclear if the EEOC's use
of the term "stereotype" was intended to include this cognitive view of the stereotyping process,
or whether it was intended to describe the conscious and motivational use of group-based gener-
alizations to determine the fate of individuals within the group. To the extent that the EEOC's
wording can be viewed as a recognition of cognitive sources of discrimination, that provides an
even more direct basis for arguing that the perceived disability prong should cover nonmotiva-
tional mistakes.
364. See, e.g., Wright v. Ill. Dep't of Corr., 204 F.3d 727, 731 (7th Cir. 2000) (citing 29 C.F.R.
app. § 1630.2(l) (2000) to support the conclusion that the perceived disability prong requires that
the employer's mistake be based on conscious forms of prejudice); McDowell v. Farmland Indus.,
Inc., No. 98-3100, 1999 WL 311477, at *2 (10th Cir. May 18, 1999) (same); Miller v. Airborne
Express, No. 3:98-CV-0217-R, 1999 WL 47242, at *6 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 22, 1999) (same); Rondon v.
Wal-Mart, Inc., No. C-97-0369 M, 1998 WL 730843, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 8, 1998) (same).
365. See Arline, 480 U.S. at 283-84 (explaining that a nondisabling impairment that is re-
garded as a disability "might not diminish a person's physical or mental capabilities, but could
nevertheless substantially limit that person's ability to work as a result of the negative reactions
of others to the impairment"); see also 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(l).
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That rationale applies to all types of perceived disabilities, whether
the employer's misperception of a nondisabled individual originates
cognitively or from conscious and invidious motivations. As one
court has explained, "[T]he perception of the employer is as impor-
tant as reality. 3 66 Because an employer's misperception causes
negative consequences whether or not the mistake is motivationally
or cognitively based, the ADA's perceived disability prong should
apply to both.3 67 Moreover, because an employer's initial mispercep-
tion of a nondisabled employee as disabled is likely to persevere,
regardless of what the employee does to try to change that impres-
sion, employees are unlikely to be the "cheapest cost avoiders,"
which undermines one potential economic argument for a "no liabil-
ity" approach. 68
As has been demonstrated with other forms of employment
discrimination, the market alone is unlikely to eliminate these em-
ployer misperceptions. If firms with managers who consistently ex-
aggerate the gravity of nondisabling impairments faced real compe-
tition relative to firms with managers who made accurate attribu-
tions, then arguably there would be no need for legal liability in
addition to market penalties, and the "no liability" approach would
make sense. But there are several reasons to believe that the mar-
ket will not sufficiently discipline these types of discriminators.
First, although people predictably err in their causal attributions in
a way that is likely to harm certain individuals disproportionately,
the causal attribution process overall is more often accurate than
not, and it is an extremely rapid way to organize social information
366. E.E. Black, Ltd. v. Marshall, 497 F. Supp. 1088, 1097 (D. Haw. 1980); see also Moberly,
supra note 51, at 363 (explaining the view that "individuals with perceived disabilities and those
with actual disabilities may be equally deserving of statutory protection" because "an individual
who is incorrectly perceived to have a disability may be as aggrieved by discriminatory treatment
as a person who actually has a disability").
367. Professor David Oppenheimer has made a similar point in arguing that Title VII should
apply to forms of unconscious racism:
[T]he victims of unconscious discrimination have suffered the same economic
damages, and often the same emotional damages, as the victims of knowing
bigotry. The nature of the wrong committed by the employer who decides not to
hire African Americans, or women, or members of ethnic or religious minority
groups, because of a self-acknowledged prejudice, may be greater than that of
the employer who is merely unaware of his own propensities, but the harm
caused by the unconscious discrimination is largely the same.
Oppenheimer, supra note 35, at 916; see also Lawrence, supra note 35, at 322-23 (arguing that
"equal protection doctrine must find a way to come to grips with unconscious racism").
368. See, e.g., Wax, supra note 125, at 1199-1206 (viewing the victims of race-based employ-
ment discrimination as the "cheapest cost avoiders," and suggesting that "it could well make
sense to let the costs of unconscious [racial] bias remain where they fall" because "employees
might be able to control that risk more efficiently than employers").
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and make useful predictions about future behavior. Because non-
motivational perceived disabilities are the result of typically effec-
tive cognitive processes rather than the consistent application of
irrational prejudice, the market may not penalize these types of
mistakes sufficiently.
In fact, there may even be some rewards for this type of dis-
crimination, making the net market penalty zero, or even providing
employers with a net positive result. In addition to the standard
arguments about reducing internal governance costs by increasing
workforce homogeneity, 369 causal attribution biases may also be
working in some ways like a form of statistical discrimination,3 70
even if not knowingly done so. If individuals with nondisabling im-
pairments are, on average, more likely to become costly employees
than are fully able-bodied workers (for example, by being more
likely, on average, to later become actually disabled and entitled to
workplace accommodations, or to take sick days, or to draw work-
ers' compensation, etc.), then acting on attribution biases may end
up being economically efficient for an individual employer. By sys-
tematically basing employment decisions on exaggerated assess-
ments of nondisabling impairments, employers may actually be
profit maximizing, if it is costly to make more accurate assess-
ments. Thus, misperceptions that function as a form of statistical
discrimination may remain stable even in a competitive market.371
But even if statistical discrimination is profit maximizing for the
individual firm, it can be "inefficient for society as a whole." 372 Sta-
tistical discrimination may, for example, distort the incentives for
investment in human capital by divorcing individual productivity
from wages. 373 If so, ADA liability is needed to address this form of
discrimination.
Even if the market is unlikely to eliminate perceived disabil-
ity discrimination on its own, advocates of the "no liability" ap-
proach may still argue that the ADA should not apply to cognitively
based misperceptions. While the social science literature indicates
that there can be very real job-related consequences for nondisabled
369. See generally RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
LAw (1992).
370. Cf. John J. Donohue III, Further Thoughts on Employment Discrimination Legislation:
A Reply to Judge Posner, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 523, 531-33 (1987) (describing "statistical discrimi-
nation" in the context of Title VII and race discrimination).
371. Cf. id. at 532 (making this point in the context of Title VII and race discrimination, stat-
ing that "[slince statistical discrimination can be profit-maximizing, it tends to be stable while
[animus-based] discrimination tends to be eroded by competitive markets").
372. Id.
373. See id. at 532-33.
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employees who are subject to cognitively based misperceptions by
their employers, it does not necessarily indicate that the conse-
quences are identical to nondisabled employees who are subject to
motivational mistakes. Advocates of the "no liability" approach
could point to at least two potential differences between the harm
faced by nondisabled employees who are misperceived during an
individual evaluation and those who are misperceived due to invidi-
ous prejudice or group-based decisionmaking.
First, proponents of the "no liability" approach may argue
that nondisabled employees who face motivational misperceptions
are subjected to a more widespread form of employment discrimina-
tion. Some commentators believe that "a particular employer's mis-
taken perception will seldom limit an individual's general ability to
secure employment elsewhere."3 74 Nondisabled employees will face
systemic exclusion only if they possess some characteristic "about
which other employers might form a similar (albeit mistaken) im-
pression." 7 ' Some may argue that such shared misperceptions will
occur more often with mistakes based on group-based prejudice
than with mistakes based on cognitive processing errors. Motiva-
tional prejudice, which is "socially created and social-norm en-
forced,"376 may be shared by many employers and triggered by simi-
lar employee characteristics, while mistakes that arise during an
individual employee assessment may be less likely to be duplicated
by others. If so, nondisabled employees who are victims of an em-
ployer's nonmotivational misperception may not face the same type
of systemic workplace exclusion as those who are victims of con-
scious prejudice. This is relevant because the heart of the disability
rights movement was focused on independence, self-sufficiency,
mainstreaming, and integration for those who had been systemati-
cally excluded from workforce participation.3 77 Imposing liability
374. Moberly, supra note 51, at 363 (citations omitted).
375. Id. (citations omitted).
376. Mark Kelman, Does Disability Status Matter?, in AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES:
EXPLORING IMPLICATIONS OF THE LAW FOR INDIVIDUALS AND INSTITUTIONS 91, 94 (Leslie
Pickering Francis & Anita Silvers eds., 2000) (explaining why prejudice against historically
subordinated group members is less likely to be corrected by market competition than irrational
treatment of a member of a socially advantaged group).
377. See JOSEPH P. SHAPIRO, No PITY: PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES FORGING A NEW CIVIL
RIGHTS MOVEMENT 52, 144 (1993); see also S. REP. No. 101-116, at 10 (1989) (describing the
ADA's "critical goal" of "allow[ing) individuals with disabilities to be part of the economic main-
stream of our society"); 135 CONG. REC. 19,892 (1989) (statement of Sen. Biden) (emphasizing the
goals of participation, integration, independence, self-determination, and self-sufficiency); cf.
Moberly, supra note 51, at 363 (explaining that one argument for not covering perceived disabili-
ties at all is that "the primary purpose of laws prohibiting disability discrimination is to insure
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only in the face of systemic exclusion may be a logical way to differ-
entiate truly discriminatory employment decisions from mere "idio-
syncratic irrationality" (such as when a manager mistakenly un-
derestimates an employee's capabilities because the employee re-
minds the manager of a lazy relative), which is likely to have few
lasting consequences given the presence of other employment op-
portunities. 8
While this argument has some appeal, the social science lit-
erature suggests that perceived disabilities from cognitive process-
ing biases are likely to be neither unusual nor idiosyncratic. Causal
attribution biases work in predictable directions, and they are par-
ticularly likely to occur during employment decisionmaking about
an individual with a nondisabling but salient impairment. More-
over, even if the pervasiveness of the harm is a distinguishing fea-
ture in fact, it is not a distinguishing feature in law. The ADA's
statutory language covers single, even anomalous, instances of dis-
ability-based discrimination. 379 The EEOC and courts agree that
one employer's misperception is enough to trigger the ADA's per-
ceived disability prong, whether or not that misperception is shared
by any other employer. 380
In addition, Congress recognized that there are many differ-
ent types of discrimination when disabilities are involved. 381 Al-
though the legislative history does not explicitly acknowledge dis-
crimination from the types of cognitive processing errors discussed
above, Congress articulated a multifaceted view of disability dis-
crimination. Although purposeful discrimination was a central con-
that the 'truly disabled' are free from discrimination based on unfair stereotypes or prejudice," so
disability protection should only apply to those who "suffer from impairments that 'significantly
decrease [their] general ability to obtain satisfactory employment elsewhere'" (footnotes omitted)
(alteration in original)).
378. See Kelman, supra note 376, at 94 (explaining that one reason the law might not protect
a straight, white, able-bodied male who was the victim of irrational treatment by a particular
employer whom he reminded of a loathed stepfather, for example, is because that type of irra-
tionality "is likely to be corrected by market competition rather than state action," while irra-
tional treatment of members of historically subordinated social groups is likely to result in per-
sistent disadvantage); see also id. at 97 ('Markets presumably fail to eliminate irrational treat-
ment where irrationalities are widespread rather than idiosyncratic.").
379. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a), (b) (1994) (defining term discriminate).
380. See, e.g., EEOC v. Texas Bus Lines, 923 F. Supp. 965, 975 (S.D. Tex. 1996) (citing 29
C.F.R. § 1630.2()); see 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(l) (2001) (stating that the perceived disability prong
applies "if an individual can show that an employer.., made an employment decision because of
a perception of disability" (emphasis added)).
381. See 135 CONG. REC. S4979, S4986 (daily ed. May 9, 1989) (statement of Sen. Harkin)
('Discrimination includes harms affecting individuals with disabilities ... that are based on false
presumptions, generalizations, misperceptions, patronizing attitudes, ignorance, irrational fears,
and pernicious mythologies.").
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cern, Congress noted that disability discrimination could be both
intentional and unintentional, and even perpetrated in good
faith. 82 More specifically, some members of Congress endorsed the
view that the ADA should cover "both conscious and unconscious,
unthinking discrimination. '" 383 That statement is broad enough to
encompass discrimination that results from unconscious causal
attribution biases and other nonmotivational mistakes.38 4
The second potential difference between the type of harm
suffered by nondisabled individuals who are misperceived because
of motivational mistakes and those who are misperceived because of
cognitive processing errors is that the former may face a form of
dignitary injury not felt by the latter. Employers' misperceptions
may only warrant a legal remedy when they stem from an individ-
ual's membership in an historically subordinated group, because
the error conveys a unique form of stigma to the individual victim
382. See 136 CONG. REC. H2599, H2618 (daily ed. May 22, 1990) (statement of Rep. Fawell)
(noting that "there are going to be countless violations of this act made unintentionally and in
good faith"); 136 CONG. REC. H2421, H2434 (daily ed. May 17, 1990) (statement of Rep. Unsoeld)
(stating that disability discrimination "has the same impact" whether it is "unintentional or
deliberate"); 135 CONG. REC. S10765, S10795 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1989) (statement of Sen. Lieber-
man) (describing both "intentional and unintentional" forms of disability discrimination); 134
CONG. REC. S5106, S5108 (daily ed. Apr. 28, 1988) (statement of Sen. Weicker) (explaining that
the ADA's provisions "encompass both intentional and unintentional acts of discrimination").
Congress agreed with the Supreme Court's assessment that discrimination against individu-
als with disabilities was "most often the product, not of invidious animus, but rather of thought-
lessness and indifference-of benign neglect." See Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 295 (1985)
(deciding a case under the Rehabilitation Act and explaining that "[flederal agencies and com-
mentators on the plight of the handicapped similarly have found that discrimination against the
handicapped is primarily the result of apathetic attitudes rather than affirmative animus"); 136
CONG. REC. H2421, H2440 (daily ed. May 17, 1990) (statement of Rep. Fish) (quoting Alexander
and arguing that much of disability discrimination "is not the malicious, violent, ugly discrimina-
tion experienced on account of one's race, national origin or religion"); 134 CONG. REC. S5106,
S5108 (daily ed. Apr. 28, 1988) (statement of Sen. Weicker) (citing Alexander favorably).
383. 136 CONG. REC. H2599, H2622 (daily ed. May 22, 1990) (statement of Rep. Hoyer); see
also 135 CONG. REC. S10765, S10802 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1989) (statement of Sen. Heinz) (explain-
ing that the ADA was intended to address "institutional, structural, and psychological barriers").
384. See Mayerson, supra note 12, at 602 (documenting the ways in which the ADA's legisla-
tive history "emphasizes the need for broad [perceived disability prong] coverage"); see also
Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967) (referring to "the familiar canon of statutory
construction that remedial legislation should be construed broadly to effectuate its purposes"); cf.
ARMOUR, supra note 35, at 79-80 (arguing that the correct legal approach regarding race dis-
crimination should be a broad one "that refuses to give the state's imprimatur to ... bias-
whether conscious or unconscious, voluntary or involuntary"); Oppenheimer, supra note 35, at
899, 935-36 (using legislative history to make a similar argument with respect to Title VII on the
basis that "[u]nderlying the Congressional focus on the consequences of discrimination, as op-
posed to discriminatory intent, may be an implicit recognition of the existence of unconscious
discrimination, and its importance in the analysis of Title VII cases").
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and indirectly victimizes other members of the group as well. 385 Pro-
ponents of the "no liability" approach may argue that those broader
injuries may occur when an employer misperceives a nondisabled
individual as disabled because of group-based assumptions about
"the disabled," but may not occur when the mistake is a cognitive
evaluation error during the course of an individual assessment.
Arguably, the latter situation does not reflect the same expression
of social dominance, disrespect, neglect, and devaluation as the for-
mer.386
There is evidence, however, that stigmatic injury is based on
cultural context and that it may attach even without invidious in-
tent or animus. 387 Cognitively based misperceptions are not "acci-
dents," in that they are not evenly distributed, random events.
Moreover, these employees are experiencing job-related conse-
quences because they are perceived to be members of a class that
undisputedly has been subjected to historic subordination and ex-
clusion: a class that is likely to experience stigma even from unin-
tentional forms of discrimination. In any event, even assuming that
dignitary harm can distinguish between the consequences of moti-
vational and cognitive mistakes, that does not necessarily preclude
a broad application of the perceived disability prong. To the extent
that the type of harm is different when motivational and nonmoti-
vational mistakes are involved, that difference should be reflected
by awarding different types of remedies, rather than holding the
employer liable for one form of error but not the other.
Some might argue, however, that even a "limited remedies"
approach has the potential to cause undesirable substitution effects
by employers. If employers are likely to respond to the threat of
ADA liability by deciding not to hire anyone with a nondisabling
impairment in the first place, those individuals conceivably could
end up worse off with ADA protection than without it. Although the
ADA also prohibits discriminatory hiring decisions, discriminatory
385. See Lawrence, supra note 35, at 350-52 (describing the unique harms from stigmatizing
actions); see also Kelman, supra note 376, at 94-95 (explaining that one reason antidiscrimina-
tion laws may only protect against irrational employment decisionmaking against members of
historically subordinated groups is because only those irrational decisions "express the social
power of one group over another, or demean the victim"); id. at 97 ("Arguably, we invoke anti-
discrimination law only for those who legitimately experience such treatment as stigmatizing.").
386. See David Wasserman, Distributive Justice, in DISABILITY, DIFFERENCE,
DISCRIMINATION: PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE IN BIOETHICS AND PUBLIC POLICY 147, 175 (Anita
Silvers ed., 1998) (using these concepts to help draw other difficult lines in discrimination law).
387. See Lawrence, supra note 35, at 352-55 (stating that "stigma often occurs regardless of
the intent of those who have engaged in the stigmatizing action ... [and that] ... evil intent ....
while perhaps sufficient, is not necessary").
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hiring may be the most difficult to detect and litigate successfully,
which would make it rational for an employer to hire fewer indi-
viduals in the protected class. 388 With a limited remedies proposal,
this risk presumably would exist only for the jurisdictions currently
taking a "no liability" approach, where the scope of the ADA would
be expanded, but not for jurisdictions currently taking a "full liabil-
ity" approach, where potential ADA damages would actually be re-
duced. Even in the "no liability" jurisdictions, this substitution ef-
fect is likely to be smaller under a limited remedies proposal than
under a full liability regime.38 9
Refusal to hire as a negative substitution effect is also likely
to be smaller in the perceived disability context than with respect
to race or sex, for example. Unlike an employee's race and sex, an
employee's nondisabling impairments are more often unknown to
an employer prior to hiring. The ADA prohibits prehire medical ex-
aminations, 3 90 which means that at the time of hiring, employers
will only be aware of visibly obvious nondisabling impairments,
such as cosmetic disfigurements. In addition, many nondisabling
impairments do not exist until after the employee is hired. Per-
ceived disability cases often arise when a current employee suffers
from an illness or injury, prompting any nondisabling residual im-
pairments to come to the employer's attention and become salient
after the hiring decision has already taken place. Accordingly, re-
fusing to hire is unlikely to be a widespread option for employers in
response to a legal approach that applies the ADA's perceived dis-
ability prong to cognitively based mistakes. Thus, the anticipated
388. Cf. Richard A. Posner, The Efficiency and the Efficacy of Title VII, 136 U. PA. L. REV.
513, 517 (1987) (arguing that Title VII's prohibition on race discrimination will give employers
''an economic incentive to employ fewer blacks" because even though the law also forbids making
race-based hiring decisions, that part of the law is "very difficult to enforce"). See generally John
J. Donohue III & Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of Employment Discrimination Litiga-
tion, 43 STAN. L. REV. 983 (1991) (documenting the dramatic shift from hiring-based to firing-
based employment discrimination litigation under Title VII).
389. Recent empirical work by Paul Oyer and Scott Schaefer is arguably consistent with this
prediction. Paul Oyer & Scott Schaefer, Sorting, Quotas, and the Civil Rights Act of 1991: Who
Hires When It's Hard to Fire? (Apr. 2001), at
http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.tafabstract-id=265509. Oyer and Schaefer have found that after
Title VII was enacted to prohibit race and gender discrimination, the employment shares for
African-Americans and women in industries with medium and low representation increased. See
id. However, after the Civil Rights Act of 1991 made compensatory and punitive damages avail-
able for Title VII suits, the employment shares for African-Americans and women decreased in
those same industries. See id. This suggests that employers may respond to antidiscrimination
laws by hiring fewer individuals in the protected class primarily when there is a risk of large
compensatory and punitive damage awards.
390. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d) (1994).
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benefits of applying the ADA to these types of misperceptions are
likely to outweigh the potential costs.
B. What's Wrong with the "Full Liability" Approach
While some courts have refused to apply the ADA's perceived
disability prong to cognitively based misperceptions, other courts
have taken a position on the opposite extreme. These courts have
applied the perceived disability prong to cognitive errors in exactly
the same way as to errors that result from disability-based animus
or conscious, group-based decisionmaking. While the "no liability"
approach falls short of the ADA's objectives, this "full liability" al-
ternative goes too far.
First, misperceiving a nondisabled employee as disabled be-
cause of an overbroad application of consciously held prejudice or
the deliberate application of group-based generalizations is argua-
bly normatively worse than unconsciously overestimating the im-
pact of a nondisabling condition during the course of an individual
assessment. 391 The former misperception more clearly represents a
knowing choice and invidious intent, and it may cause a more wide-
spread and stigmatic form of injury, as explained above. Cognitively
motivated mistakes, in contrast, represent at least an attempt to
avoid the use of group-based assumptions. This "lack of moral
blameworthiness," however, "does not translate into a lack of legal
responsibility."3 92 While nonmotivational mistakes may be less rep-
rehensible than those based on conscious prejudice, that difference
should only be considered when evaluating the appropriate remedy
for the resulting harm. 393
Second, imposing the full array of remedies against an em-
ployer for both motivational and cognitive errors could actually de-
crease voluntary efforts at compliance. If all perceived disabilities
result in the same liability, employers will be even more unwilling
391. Cf. Oppenheimer, supra note 35, at 916 (noting in the Title VII context that "[t]he na-
ture of the wrong committed by the employer who decides not to hire African Americans, or
women, or members of ethnic or religious minority groups, because of a self-acknowledged preju-
dice, may be greater than that of the employer who is merely unaware of his own propensities");
see also Wax, supra note 125, at 1220 (stating that "[ilnadvertent discrimination would under-
standably be regarded as less morally blameworthy than animus-based bias" by triers of fact).
392. Oppenheimer, supra note 35, at 971 (arguing that unconscious forms of race discrimina-
tion should be covered under Title VII).
393. Cf. id. at 916 (arguing that Title VII should cover unconscious race discrimination be-
cause it causes the same harm as knowing bigotry, but "[i]ntentional, bigoted decisions may be
appropriately the subject not only of compensatory but of punitive damages as well, and thus
properly distinguished").
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to acknowledge their cognitive biases, which will reduce voluntary
efforts to fix the problem. 394 If courts explicitly recognize that some
employer misperceptions are not the result of conscious thought or
invidious animus, and courts limit the scope of liability for such
cognitive mistakes in a meaningful way, employers would not face
the same type of moral opprobrium by acknowledging when such
errors occur.
395
Professor Linda Hamilton Krieger has made this point per-
suasively in the context of Title VII race discrimination claims. Pro-
fessor Krieger argues that by failing to explicitly distinguish be-
tween cognitive and motivational forms of discrimination, Title VII
jurisprudence exacerbates intergroup tensions by either failing to
identify some forms of biased decisionmaking, or by wrongfully at-
tributing a discriminatory motive to well-intentioned, but errone-
ous, decisionmakers.3 96 By forcing all forms of individual discrimi-
nation to be litigated under a motivational, intentional tort model,
394. Cf. Jessie Allen, Note, A Possible Remedy for Unthinking Discrimination, 61 BROOK. L.
REV. 1299, 1317 (1995) (arguing that the failure to cover nonmotivational forms of discrimination
under Title VII "may actually discourage employers ... from acknowledging, let alone actively
investigating, the risks of their own unconscious racism," because "[tihey receive no credit for
doing so and may subject themselves to greater potential liability").
In another context, the U.S. Supreme Court recently acknowledged the risk that applying
punitive damages too broadly for Title VII violations could actually "reduce the incentive for
employers to implement anti-discrimination programs." Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass'n, 527 U.S.
526, 544 (1999). Under current law, punitive damages are possible when a decisionmaker inten-
tionally discriminates in the face of a perceived risk that the conduct violates federal law. Id. at
536. Accordingly, the Court rejected a lenient "scope of employment" standard for imposing vi-
carious liability for punitive damages on the employer. Id. at 544-45. The Court wanted to avoid
an interpretation of the punitive damage provision that would "exacerbate concerns among em-
ployers" that the law "penalizes those employers who educate themselves and their employees on
Title VII's prohibitions." Id. at 544. "Dissuading employers from implementing programs or poli-
cies to prevent discrimination in the workplace," the Court explained, "is directly contrary to the
purposes underlying Title VII." Id. at 545.
395. See Allen, supra note 394, at 1318 ("In theory, anyway, the moral stigma of a finding of
intentional discrimination should not attach to negligent discrimination, because acting negli-
gently is simply not considered as blameworthy as causing intentional harm."); Krieger, supra
note 35, at 1243-44 (arguing that Title VII should treat cognitively based discrimination different
from motivational forms of discrimination by prohibiting compensatory and punitive damages in
the former category, because "[a]ttaching moral opprobrium or the risk of substantial financial
liability to cognitive intergroup judgment errors can only serve to heighten intergroup anxieties
and ... exacerbate categorical responding"); Lawrence, supra note 35, at 325-26 (arguing that if
equal protection doctrine acknowledged liability for "unconscious" discrimination, it would "obvi-
ate[ ] the need for fault, as traditionally conceived, without denying our collective responsibi'ity
for racism's eradication," and, as a result, "our resistance to accepting the need and responsibil-
ity for remedy will be lessened"); cf. Allen, supra note 394, at 1317-19 (predicting that a negli-
gence theory for race discrimination claims would "assign responsibility for discriminatory ac-
tions without demonizing and isolating the person who negligently discriminates").
396. See Krieger, supra note 35, at 1217.
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Title VII law discourages voluntary settlement, increases litigation
costs, and decreases the validity of employment discrimination ad-
judications. 397 Professor David Oppenheimer similarly has proposed
the creation of a negligence model for unconscious forms of race dis-
crimination under Title VII.398 He suggests that Title VII should
cover nonmotivational bias, including discrimination from cognitive
processing errors, but punitive damages should be prohibited to
avoid the moral stigma associated with intentional discrimina-
tion. 399 These arguments should apply equally in the disability con-
text with regard to cognitively based perceived disability claims.
The third reason for providing different remedies is that the
ADA's goal of eliminating misperceptions400 may not be achieved in
the same way for motivational and cognitive mistakes. When mis-
taken perceptions are the result of consciously held, group-based
prejudice or assumptions, then increasing monetary sanctions suffi-
ciently should cause employers to ferret out and eliminate their
misperceptions, or at least to stop acting on them. In contrast, er-
rors that result from typically unconscious, automatic, and largely
adaptive cognitive processes are unlikely to be cured simply by the
threat of a large monetary sanction. 401 In fact, social scientists have
397. See id.
398. See Oppenheimer, supra note 35, at 916 (arguing that unconscious race discrimination
should be redressed by Title VII, but that only knowing, intentional discrimination should sub-
ject the employer to punitive damages).
399. See id. at 970-72 (arguing that one social benefit that would result from recognizing neg-
ligent discrimination under Title VII "stems from the recognition that a finding of liability
should not be equated with a determination of moral wrongfulness," and that "negligent dis-
crimination need not and ought not to be viewed as morally reprehensible conduct").
400. See, e.g., 136 CONG. REC. H4614, H4625 (daily ed. July 12, 1990) (statement of Rep. Ed-
wards) (stating that the ADA will "go a long way" toward having individuals "judged by their
abilities"); 136 CONG. REC. H4614, H4627 (July 12, 1990) (statement of Rep. Oberstar) (explain-
ing the ADA's goal of "eliminating... misconceptions"); 136 CONG. REC. S9527, S9542 (daily ed.
July 11, 1990) (statement of Sen. Dole) (stating that the ADA "is all about.., replacing misun-
derstanding with understanding"); 136 CONG. REC. H2421, H2430 (daily ed. May 17, 1990)
(statement of Rep. Bartlett) (explaining that one goal of the ADA is to "reshape attitudes toward
disability"); 135 CONG. REC. S10765, S10791 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1989) (statement of Sen. Riegle)
(stating that the purpose of the ADA is to "eradicate" misconceptions); 135 CONG. REC. S4984,
S4985 (daily ed. May 9, 1989) (statement of Sen. Harkin) (describing the ADA's purpose of elimi-
nating decisionmaking "on the basis of presumptions, generalizations, misperceptions, ignorance,
irrational fears, patronizing attitudes, or pernicious mythologies").
401. See Brown et al., supra note 35, at 1497, 1512 (noting that "cognitive shortcuts often will
override even volitional good will" and that unconscious cognitive processes are difficult to pre-
vent); Lawrence, supra note 35, at 349 (noting that "unconscious prejudice presents an additional
problem in that it is not subject to self-correction" through normal processes of reason or moral
persuasion).
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found that monetary incentives for accuracy produce no systematic
improvement in subjects' cognitive processing biases. 402
Because of this additional challenge with cognitive errors,
Professor Amy Wax has argued in the Title VII context that anti-
discrimination statutes should not cover unconscious disparate
treatment at all.40 3 Professor Wax has argued that there is cur-
rently no known way to control unconscious bias effectively, 40 4 and
thus she concludes that imposing liability under Title VII will have
no deterrent effect 40 5 and will cause employers to overinvest in inef-
fective precautionary measures. 406
While unconscious bias is indeed more difficult to control
and deter, deterrence is not the only purpose of the ADA. Compen-
sating employees is an independent objective that may be served by
providing certain forms of "make whole" relief. Accordingly, while
the limitations on deterring unconscious forms of bias provide a
persuasive reason for not allowing deterrence-focused remedies,
such as punitive damages, they do not necessarily support a "no
liability" approach. 40 7
In addition, while monetary incentives do not appear to sys-
tematically improve observers' perceptual accuracy, social scientists
are continuing to discover other methods that may be more effec-
tive. These methods, which are described below, involve procedural
manipulations in an observer's evaluation and decisionmaking
strategies. 408 While this research is admittedly far from complete
402. See NISBETT & ROSS, supra note 127, at 253.
403. See Wax, supra note 125, at 1332-33 (arguing that antidiscrimination statutes should
not cover unconscious disparate treatment in the workplace because "employers have little effec-
tive control over unconscious bias").
404. See id. at 1133 (arguing that "there are no known methods for effectively controlling un-
conscious bias in the workplace").
405. See id. at 1175 ("Because employers do not know how to respond constructively to such
incentives, there is no reason to believe that the risk of unconscious discrimination will be re-
duced by encouraging employers to take steps against decisionmaking bias. Put bluntly, liability
for unconscious discrimination will not deter unconscious discrimination.").
406. See id. at 1184 (arguing that liability for unconscious bias would cause employers to
overinvest in precautions that will reduce liability potential "without effectively reducing the
influence of unconscious bias on its decisionmaking processes").
407. See Lawrence, supra note 35, at 344 (countering arguments "that the law should govern
only consciously motivated actions").
408. See infra notes 437-70; see also Brown et al., supra note 35, at 1512 (citing cognitive
theory and empirical studies providing reasons to be "guardedly optimistic" that people can over-
ride their automatic cognitive processing errors when sufficiently motivated to do so); Krieger,
supra note 36, at 1332 (arguing that cognitive sources of intergroup discrimination can be cor-
rected, but correction requires "further deliberate mental effort"); Lee Ross, Comment on Gilbert,
in ATTRIBUTION AND SOCIAL INTERACTION: THE LEGACY OF EDWARD E. JONES 53, 56 (John M.
Darley & Joel Cooper eds., 1998) (noting that the fundamental attribution error "could be at-
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and may not yet give employers adequate direction about how to
avoid causal attribution and prediction biases, this research at least
suggests that proper incentives may lead employers to find ways to
improve their assessments of employees' physical and mental condi-
tions. Given the legislative interest in protecting employees from
"both conscious and unconscious, unthinking, discrimination," 40 9
and the legislative desire to get employers to make decisions "based
on facts,"410 any risk of overinvestment in precautionary measures
appears to be one that Congress was willing to take with respect to
the ADA.
If eliminating misperceptions is one goal of antidiscrimina-
tion laws, Professor Wax's argument that large monetary sanctions
are unlikely to achieve that goal in the Title VII context probably
applies with equal force to the ADA. Nonetheless, that should not
relieve employers of responsibility for the very real consequences of
their cognitive mistakes. Instead, the unique challenge of eliminat-
ing individual, cognitively based misperceptions provides additional
support for carefully tailoring the types of remedies available,
rather than abandoning liability altogether.
C. The "Limited Remedies" Approach
The ADA incorporates by reference the remedies provided
under Title VII, which governs employment discrimination on the
basis of race, color, sex, national origin, and religion. 411 For "inten-
tional" discrimination, Title VII remedies may include declaratory
judgments, injunctions, attorney's fees and costs, hiring or rein-
statement, back pay, front pay, "or any other equitable relief as the
court deems appropriate."412 The Civil Rights Act of 1991 expanded
the remedies for intentional discrimination for both Title VII and
the ADA. Since 1991, plaintiffs alleging intentional discrimination
tenuated or reversed" by manipulating a variety of perceptual underpinnings in the laboratory);
Yaacov Trope, Dispositional Bias, in Person Perception: A Hypothesis-Testing Perspective, in
ATTRIBUTION AND SOCIAL INTERACTION: THE LEGACY OF EDWARD E. JONES 67, 93 (John M. Dar-
ley & Joel Cooper eds., 1998) (arguing that "with sufficient motivation to be accurate and ade-
quate processing resources, perceivers may adopt careful, diagnostic inference rules, rather than
pseudodiagnostic heuristics, and thus avoid drawing overconfident dispositional inferences from
behavior"); Timothy D. Wilson & Nancy Brekke, Mental Contamination and Mental Correction:
Unwanted Influences on Judgments and Evaluations, 116 PSYCHOL. BULL. 117, 130-35 (1994)
(discussing preconditions and potential techniques for correcting "mental contamination").
409. 136 CONG. REC. H2599, H2622 (daily ed. May 22, 1990) (statement of Rep. Hoyer).
410. 136 CONG. REC. H2599, H2632 (daily ed. May 22, 1990) (statement of Rep. Owens).
411. See 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) (1994) (incorporating the remedies available under Title VII,
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1994)).
412. § 2000e-5(g), (k).
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may also seek compensatory damages (e.g., emotional pain, suffer-
ing, inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, and
other nonpecuniary losses)' and punitive damages, up to specific
statutory caps. 41 3
Title VII also recognizes claims of "unintentional" discrimi-
nation against protected groups, under the systemic "disparate im-
pact" model.4 14 For disparate impact claims, Title VII imposes li-
ability on the employer, but does not allow the newly added com-
pensatory or punitive damage awards, in recognition of the unin-
tentional nature of the employer's act. 415 But the disparate impact
model does not apply -to the types of unintentional discrimination
identified in this Article. The disparate impact model only applies
when an employer uses a particular, neutral employment practice
that produces a statistically significant disparity in outcomes for
members of one group as compared to members of another group,
thereby placing one group at a collective disadvantage. 416 While
disparate impact claims need not be class actions, the success of an
individual employee's claim depends upon a showing of group-based
harm. A group-based model of unintentional discrimination is ill-
suited to address the unintentional cognitive processing biases that
are at work during individual employee assessments. As Professor
Krieger has explained in the Title VII context, the disparate impact
model was developed to address "ostensibly empirical selection tools
on their own empirical terms," not to address the cognitive biases
involved in "subjective, individualized interpersonal decisionmak-
ing."417 Because the ADA tracks Title VII, the ADA similarly lacks a
general model for redressing unintentional forms of individual dis-
crimination, absent a showing of group-based harm.
However, the ADA does include one specific remedial caveat,
which effectively recognizes at least one form of individual, but un-
intentional, harm. Moreover, this caveat treats the employer's lack
of intent as a basis for remedial mitigation, rather than as a ticket
413. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 102, 105 Stat. 1071, 1072-73, codi-
fied at 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a), (b) (1994).
414. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k).
415. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, § 102.
416. See § 2000e-2(k); Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 457-59 (1982) (Powell, J., dissent-
ing) (explaining that the disparate impact model, by definition, "invites the plaintiff to prove
discrimination by reference to the group rather than to the allegedly affected individual," and
that a disparate impact claim will fail "in the absence of disparate impact on a group"); see also
Krieger, supra note 35, at 1228, 1231.
417. Krieger, supra note 35, at 1237; see also id. at 1227-37 (explaining why the disparate
impact paradigm "is an inappropriate analytical tool" to address cognitive forms of discrimina-
tion under Title VII).
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out of liability. The ADA defines the term "discriminate" to include
seven different types of conduct, six of which mirror the forms of
prohibited discrimination under Title VII.418 The additional way
that an employer may violate the ADA is by "not making reasonable
accommodations" for an individual with a disability. 419 When the
Civil Rights Act of 1991 expanded the remedies for intentional dis-
crimination under Title VII and the ADA, Congress also added the
following provision:
Reasonable accommodation and good faith effort. In cases where a discriminatory
practice involves the provision of a reasonable accommodation .... [compensatory
and punitive] damages may not be awarded under this section where the covered
entity demonstrates good faith efforts, in consultation with the person with the
disability who has informed the covered entity that accommodation is needed, to
identify'and make a reasonable accommodation .... 420
By adding this provision, Congress acknowledged that some forms
of disability discrimination are unique. Unlike the antidiscrimina-
tion mandate in Title VII, the ADA's reasonable accommodation
provision requires employers to take specific affirmative steps. As
the EEOC regulations explain:
This process requires the individual assessment of both the particular job at issue,
and the specific physical or mental limitations of the particular individual in need
of reasonable accommodation. With regard to assessment of the job, "individual as-
sessment" means analyzing the actual job duties and determining the true purpose
or object of the job .... After assessing the relevant job, the employer, in consulta-
tion with the individual requesting the accommodation, should make an assess-
ment of the specific limitations imposed by the disability on the individual's per-
formance of the job's essential functions. 42'
The remedial caveat added by the Civil Rights Act of 1991
applies when an employer makes a good faith effort to carry out
this individual assessment procedure, but nevertheless makes an
error and fails to provide the accommodations that the ADA re-
quires. In that situation, the statute will still hold the employer
liable for discrimination, but the employee will not be eligible for all
of the statutory remedies. The statute will only permit declaratory
relief, injunctions, attorney's fees and costs, back pay, and front
pay, but will not provide the compensatory or punitive damages
added by the 1991 Act. Thus, the statute explicitly acknowledges at
418. See Karlan & Rutherglen, supra note 69, at 5-6 nn.18-21 (explaining in detail the paral-
lel discrimination provisions in the ADA and Title VII). Compare § 2000e-2(a) (describing unlaw-
ful discriminatory employment practices), with 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(1)(7) (1994) (defining the
scope of the term "discriminate").
419. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5).
420. Civil Rights Act of 1991, § 102.
421. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.9 (2001).
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least one form of unintentional individual disparate treatment, and
while the employer's lack of intent is calculated into the remedy
analysis, it is deemed irrelevant at the liability stage.
That approach is one way that individual, cognitively based
misperceptions could be treated under the ADA's perceived disabil-
ity prong. When an employer attempts to individually assess an
employee's capabilities but unintentionally views a nondisabling
impairment as a disability, the court could hold the employer liable
for a perceived disability claim but find the employee ineligible for
the forms of compensatory damage or the punitive damages that
were added by the 1991 Act (similar to a disparate impact claim). 422
Excluding these two types of remedies would appropriately balance
the concerns raised by the proponents of both the "no liability" and
the "full liability" approaches. Imposing liability would recognize
the economic reality that misperceived but nondisabled individuals
are indeed disadvantaged by the employer's misperception. On the
other hand, excluding the forms of compensatory damage covered
by the 1991 Act would acknowledge that individuals who are sub-
ject to intentional discrimination, prejudice, and invidious animus
may suffer unique and additional forms of dignitary and emotional
harm. In addition, prohibiting punitive damages would reflect the
unintentional nature of the employer's act and the presently un-
known potential for deterrence.
This particular approach for applying the ADA's perceived
disability prong to individual, cognitively based mistakes would not
require any change in the statutory language. Courts would only
need to construe the individual assessment requirement not merely
as a procedural obligation, but also as a substantive one. Although
Congress and the EEOC describe the purpose of the individual as-
sessment as preventing the use of group-based generalizations, 423
an employer should not be deemed to have satisfied that require-
ment simply by avoiding the use of conscious prejudice. To effec-
tively address all of the types of discrimination-intentional and
unintentional, conscious and unconscious-that are recognized in
the ADA's legislative history, courts should view the individual as-
422. Cf. Krieger, supra note 35, at 1243 (arguing that courts "should differentiate more
clearly between intentional and unintentional forms of disparate treatment discrimination").
423. See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.5 (2001); see also 135 CONG. REC. S10765, S10779 (daily ed.
Sept. 7, 1989) (statement of Sen. Domenici) (explaining that one reason for the individualized
assessment rule is to ensure that people diagnosed with mental disorders are not "automatically
discriminated against ... because of some of the niches that they are put in," but instead receive
"an unbiased evaluation of their capability").
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sessment requirement independent from an employer's motivation.
In other words, the ADA should be read not only to impose a pro-
scriptive duty not to act with prejudice, but also a prescriptive duty
to assess employees' physical and mental impairments accu-
rately. 424 Employers must not only adopt the right type of individu-
alized evaluation procedure, but the evaluation must also be sub-
stantively correct.
This approach could be conceptualized as a limited form of
strict liability (where the employer is liable for a subset of remedies
based on causation alone), rather than simply defaulting to "no li-
ability" when cognitive errors cannot be shoehorned comfortably
into a "full liability" intentional tort box. This narrow form of strict
liability with limited remedies is arguably consistent with legisla-
tive intent. When Congress prohibited the use of group-based gen-
eralizations, it intended to substitute the use of accurate factual
assessments. As one legislator explained, the ADA's goal is to pro-
hibit the use of "averages and group-based predictions," by requir-
ing employers to make employment decisions "based on facts, not on
presumptions as to what a class of individuals with a particular
disability can or cannot do." 425 Thus, the ADA was drafted to elimi-
nate even forms of statistical discrimination.
The Third Circuit interpreted the ADA in this way in Taylor
v. Pathmark Stores, Inc. In Taylor, the court explained that an em-
424. See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.9 (stating that the ADA "requires the individual assessment of
... the specific physical or mental limitations of the particular individual"); cf. Krieger, supra
note 35, at 1166, 1245 (arguing with respect to discrimination under Title VII that "the nondis-
crimination principle, currently interpreted as a proscriptive duty 'not to discriminate,' must
evolve to encompass a prescriptive duty of care to identify and control for category-based judg-
ment errors and other forms of cognitive bias in intergroup settings").
425. 136 CONG. REC. H2599, H2632 (daily ed. May 22, 1990) (statement of Rep. Owens) (em-
phasis added); see also 136 CONG. REC. S9680, S9681 (daily ed. July 13, 1990) (statement of Sen.
Kennedy) (explaining that the ADA's "fundamental premise" is that "disabled Americans should
be judged on the basis of facts and not fear"); 136 CONG. REC. S9527, S9542 (daily ed. July 11,
1990) (statement of Sen. Dole) (stating that the ADA's goal was to ensure that employment deci-
sions "must be made about individuals, not groups, and must be based on facts, not fears"); 136
CONG. REC. S7422, S7437 (daily ed. June 6, 1990) (statement of Sen. Harkin) ('The thesis of the
Americans With Disabilities Act is simply this: That people with disabilities ought to be judged
on the basis of their abilities; they should not be judged nor discriminated against based on un-
founded fear, prejudice, ignorance, or mythologies; people ought to be judged based upon the
relevant medical evidence and the abilities they have."); 135 CONG. REC. S10765, S10798 (daily
ed. Sept. 7, 1989) (statement of Sen. Simon) ("The ADA is designed to ensure that persons with
disabilities are treated as individuals and that employment decisions are not made on the basis
of stereotypes."); 135 CONG. REC. S4984, S4985 (daily ed. May 9, 1989) (statement of Sen.
Harkin) ("The ADA sends a clear and unequivocal message to people with disabilities that they
are ... to be judged as individuals on the basis of their abilities and not on the basis of presump-
tions, generalizations, misperceptions, ignorance, irrational fears, patronizing attitudes, or per-
nicious mythologies.").
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ployer "has the initial responsibility to evaluate employees cor-
rectly," and that, regardless of an employer's motivation, the em-
ployer "has to be right when it decides that . . . restrictions are
permanent and that they prevent the employee from performing a
wide class of jobs." 426 Under that interpretation, the Third Circuit
correctly concluded that a nondisabled employee could bring a per-
ceived disability discrimination claim even if the employer is "inno-
cently wrong about the extent of his or her impairment.'" 427 In dicta,
the court went on to note that while a nonmotivational mistake
should be "sufficient to subject [an employer] to liability under the
ADA, . . . the employer's state of mind is clearly relevant to the ap-
propriate remedies." 428 Thus, by moving away from just a simple
comparison to prototypic intentional discrimination claims (for
which the full array of statutory remedies would be available), it
becomes easier to reject the "no liability" approach.
Another way to achieve a "limited remedies" alternative
would be to conceptualize individual, cognitively based mispercep-
tions as a form of negligence. The primary differences between a
negligence approach and a strict liability approach are that the neg-
ligence model would require the employee to prove that the em-
ployer breached a duty of reasonable care (rather than basing liabil-
ity on causation alone), but, in turn, the employee would be entitled
to the new compensatory damages (e.g., emotional distress) added
by the 1991 Act. Under both models, punitive damages would be
unavailable.
Professor Oppenheimer has made a similar suggestion in the
Title VII context, arguing persuasively that Title VII should apply
to unconscious forms of discrimination on the basis of race, color,
sex, religion, and national origin. 429 Professor Oppenheimer has
proposed that Title VII recognize not just "intentional" discrimina-
tion but also "negligent" discrimination, which would make the em-
ployee ineligible for a punitive damage award. 430 By explicitly rec-
:ognizing a form of negligent discrimination for unconscious bias,
the law would validate the harm from cognitive processing errors as
worthy of compensation, but a negligence finding would "carry less
426. 177 F.3d 180, 190-92 (3d Cir. 1999) (emphasis added).
427. See id. at 191.
428. See id. at 182-83.
429. See generally Oppenheimer, supra note 35.
430. See id. at 967.
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moral weight, and less stigma for the employer."431 Professor Op-
penheimer has argued that if Title VII covered unconscious forms of
individual discrimination-but under a negligence theory rather
than an intentional tort model-the law would properly focus "on
the discrimination, not the motivation," and would correctly direct
its attention "toward healing the wounded, rather than assessing
blame."432 A two-tiered remedy scheme should have similar benefits
if applied to individual, cognitively based mistakes under the ADA's
perceived disability prong. 433
Under Professor Oppenheimer's proposal for unconscious
discrimination under Title VII, negligence liability would attach
[w]henever an employer fails to act to prevent discrimination which it knows, or
should know, is occurring, which it expects to occur, or which it should expect to
occur .... Liability should also be recognized when an employer breaches the
statutorily established standard of care by making employment decisions which
have a discriminatory effect, without first scrutinizing its processes, searching for
431. See id. at 971-72 (arguing that negligence liability for racial discrimination under Title
VII would benefit employees, "whose suffering is being recognized," and it would benefit employ-
ers, "who are no longer being accused of bigotry"); see also Lawrence, supra note 35, at 325-26
(making a similar argument with respect to discrimination law under the Equal Protection
Clause).
432. Oppenheimer, supra note 35, at 970-72.
433. Note that the second tier of remedies for intentional claims could be triggered in several
different ways. Recall that to state an ADA claim, the plaintiff typically must show three things:
(1) the plaintiff has a "disability," by either having an actually disabling impairment, having a
record of such an impairment, or being mistakenly regarded as having such an impairment, see
42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(2), 12112(a) (1994); (2) the plaintiff is a "qualified individual" who can per-
form the essential job functions with or without reasonable accommodation, see 42 U.S.C. §§
12111(8), 12112(a) (1994), and (3) the employer took an adverse employment action because of
the disability, see § 12112(a), (b). The analysis in this Article technically has dealt only with the
first requirement in the plaintiffs case: whether the plaintiff has a "disability." One way to es-
tablish the "intent" for an intentional discrimination claim is through evidence submitted for the
"disability" requirement of the plaintiffs case. When a plaintiff proves that he or she has a per-
ceived disability because the employer made a motivational mistake, the "intent" needed for
expanded remedies exists. In contrast, when a plaintiff proves that he or she has a perceived
disability because the employer made a cognitive mistake, the evidence does not demonstrate the
"intent" element required for the expanded remedies of an intentional discrimination claim.
In some cases involving nonmotivational mistakes, however, a court still could find inten-
tional discrimination based on the evidence submitted for the third requirement of an ADA
claim. To meet the third requirement, the plaintiff must show that the employer made an ad-
verse employment decision because of the plaintiffs perceived disability, and that decision may
itself be intentional or unintentional in nature. For example, if the employer innocently misper-
ceived a nondisabled employee as disabled, but then deliberately required the employee to work
the night shift because of concerns about customer reaction to someone with a disability, then
the evidence submitted to prove the third element of the plaintiffs case would be sufficient to
demonstrate "intent." In contrast, if an employer innocently misperceives a nondisabled em-
ployee as disabled, and then rationally determines that a person with the condition that the
employee is believed to possess is not qualified to perform an essential job function, there would
be no evidence of "intent" in any portion of the plaintiffs case to trigger the expanded remedies
for intentional discrimination claims.
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less discriminatory alternatives, and examining its own motives for evidence of
stereotyping .... [And liability should attach] [w]here an employer has created job
screening procedures which fail to correct for unconscious discrimination, and such
discrimination influences the process. 434
This begins to define a workable definition of an employer's "duty,"
which would be necessary for a negligence model to work. However,
some critics of Oppenheimer's negligence model-and even some
proponents-have suggested that a more precise definition of the
standard of care is needed to avoid uncertainty, large litigation
costs, and resulting inefficiency, and that the state of social science
knowledge is not yet up to that task. 4 5 While I am less concerned
than some about the potential difficulties in defining negligent dis-
crimination, and I agree with those who believe that negligence
theory is one direction in which employment discrimination law
should be moving, one benefit of a strict liability model is that it
may be adopted more easily without statutory amendment. Al-
though portions of the ADA, such as the reasonable accommodation
mandate, arguably implicitly incorporate negligence concepts al-
ready,43 6 it may be harder to find those concepts imbedded in the
ADA's other antidiscrimination provisions.
Whether limited liability is imposed under a strict liability
model or a negligence model, however, the result should be to en-
courage employers to implement job screening and employee
evaluation procedures with self-conscious care. 4 7 This is exactly
what is necessary to eliminate misperceptions that result from
highly adaptive causal attributions. 438 A precondition to improving
434. Oppenheimer, supra note 35, at 969-70.
435. See, e.g., Krieger, supra note 35, at 1245 (arguing that Title VII should cover uncon-
scious forms of discrimination, and "agree[ing] with David Oppenheimer's suggestions that a
negligence approach ... would further Title VII's purpose," but concluding that she is "not confi-
dent . . . that we know enough about how to reduce cognition-based judgment errors to enable us
to translate such a duty into workable legal rules"); Wax, supra note 125, at 1153-54 (arguing
that if Title VII applied to unconscious discrimination-to which she is opposed-a strict liability
approach would be superior to a negligence approach that requires "fixing the standard of care,"
which is "likely to be quite complex, cumbersome, and error-prone"); Allen, supra note 394, at
1320, 1322-24 (arguing that Title VII should apply to unconscious racism, but not under a negli-
gence model because "a standard of care for positive race consciousness is difficult to define in
practical terms").
436. See Oppenheimer, supra note 35, at 943-44.
437. Cf. id. at 970 (arguing in the Title VII context that "[a]nother social benefit of negligent
discrimination is its likely impact on employment policies," because "[i]mposing negligence liabil-
ity should have the effect of encouraging greater care, and discouraging those who would look the
other way and deny apparent discrimination").
438. Cf. Krieger, supra note 35, at 1239-40 (explaining why a simple admonition not to dis-
criminate in the Title VII context will not end all racial disparate treatment because the cogni-
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perceptual accuracy is persuading decisionmakers that they are
prone to predictable and identifiable inferential errors. 4 9 Applying
the perceived disability prong to nonmotivational mistakes would
be the first step in getting employers to recognize this propensity.
Once decisionmakers recognize that they make predictable causal
attribution and prediction errors, they must take conscious, proac-
tive steps to improve the accuracy of their inferential judgments. 440
Social scientists have already studied ways to increase
causal attribution accuracy outside of the employment context.
Much of this research has been done in developing ways to treat
clinical depression. Psychologists have discovered that some forms
of depression are the result of particularly maladaptive causal at-
tribution styles, in which patients show atypically strong biases in
overattributing negative outcomes to external, stable, and global
causes. 441 As a form of cognitive therapy, psychologists have ex-
perimented with various "attributional retraining" strategies and
"reattribution techniques," which teach people to become aware of
their causal inferences and modify their causal attributions. 442 This
demonstrates that social scientists are able to develop processes for
reducing causal attribution biases, and it provides optimism that
more targeted research in the employment context would be worth-
while.
tive processes that lead to some intergroup bias are not only "automatic and beyond ordinary
conscious self-awareness, they are adaptive, indeed, essential to effective cognitive functioning").
439. See NISBETT & ROSS, supra note 127, at 280; Margo J. Monteith et al., Prejudice and
Prejudice Reduction: Classic Challenges, Contemporary Approaches, in SOCIAL COGNITION:
IMPACT ON SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 323, 336 (1994) (citing studies demonstrating that increasing
peoples' awareness of subtle, prejudiced responses would motivate change); Wilson & Brekke,
supra note 408, at 119; cf. Gordon B. Moskowitz et al., Preconsciously Controlling Stereotyping.
Implicitly Activated Egalitarian Goals Prevent the Activation of Stereotypes, 18 SOC. COGNITION
151 (2000) (using empirical evidence to demonstrate that people who consciously adopt egalitar-
ian goals will preconsciously control against the use of stereotypes because members of a stereo-
typed group will automatically trigger egalitarian cognitive constructs rather than implicit
stereotypes).
440. Cf. ARMOUR, supra note 35, at 17, 124-26, 139-41, 145, 149-51, 158 (arguing that in or-
der to combat unconscious forms of racial discrimination, people need to implement a "proactive
strategy," by consciously and systematically "inhibiting their automatic negative responses to
Blacks and replacing them with controlled, nonprejudiced ones"); Oppenheimer, supra note 35, at
970 (similarly arguing in the Title VII context that "[w]here unconscious motivations abound,
self-conscious and cautious procedures are necessary"); see also Monteith et al., supra note 439,
at 333-41 (citing supporting studies).
441. See HEWSTONE, supra note 124, at 65; Metalsky & Abramson, supra note 130, at 14-16;
Seligman et al., supra note 152, at 242-43.
442. See HEWSTONE, supra note 124, at 65 (describing the use of "attributional retraining" as
a therapeutic technique for depression, by inducing patients to make more variable and external
attributions for their failures); Metalsky & Abramson, supra note 130, at 14-16 (same).
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While such targeted research has not yet been undertaken,
general research on improving causal attribution accuracy can pro-
vide a start. To begin with, social scientists believe that debiasing
techniques can be implemented most effectively in judgments made
in recurrent, institutional settings.443 This is particularly true when
evaluation criteria are identified specifically, decisions are based on
an array of individual diagnostic information, 444 and individual de-
cisionmakers know that they will be monitored by peers and held
individually responsible for the accuracy of their results. 445 This
means that employee selection and evaluation decisions are good
candidates for procedural change. 446
The most promising way that researchers have found to re-
duce the fundamental attribution error is to force the observer to
take the actor's perspective. Recall that the tendency to overattrib-
ute to internal causes occurs when observers assign causes for other
people's behavior, but not when they assign causes for behavior of
their own.447 Social scientists believe that this actor-observer differ-
ence occurs in part because people believe causal significance is re-
lated to salience. 448 When observers are identifying a cause for an
actor's behavior, the actor is salient, thereby facilitating attribu-
tions to causes that are internal to the actor; when observers are
identifying a cause for their own behavior, the situation is salient,
causing more external causal attributions to occur.449 Social scien-
tists have discovered that if observers are forced to take the actor's
perspective, the fundamental attribution error can be reversed. 450 If
443. See NISBETT & ROSS, supra note 127, at 291.
444. See Veronica F. Nieva & Barbara A. Gutek, Sex Effects on Evaluation, 5 ACAD. MGMT.
REV. 267, 271 (1980) (summarizing research in this area). See generally J. Scott Armstrong et al.,
The Use of the Decomposition Principle in Making Judgments, 14 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. &
HuM. PERFORMANCE 257 (1975) (providing empirical support for the proposition that individuals
make better judgments when they consider multiple factors).
445. Cf. Edward Donnerstein & Marcia Donnerstein, Variables in Interracial Aggression: Po-
tential Ingroup Censure, 27 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 143, 148-50 (1973) (finding that
decisionmakers who are white tend to discriminate less against individuals who are non-white
when allocating sanctions if the decisionmakers are aware that peers may monitor and censure
their conduct); see also Gifford Weary et al., Chronic and Temporarily Activated Causal Uncer-
tainty Beliefs and Stereotype Usage, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 206, 211-13 (2001)
(finding that decisionmakers relied less on stereotypes when assessing others and doling out
punishments if the decisionmakers were initially instructed that they would "be held account-
able" for their judgment and would "have to be able to explain and justify" their assessments).
446. See id.
447. See supra notes 205-06 and accompanying text.
448. See supra notes 207-11 and accompanying text.
449. See supra notes 207-11 and accompanying text.
450. See HEWSTONE, supra note 124, at 55 (compiling studies); NISBETT & ROSS, supra note
127, at 123-25 (same); Fiona Lee & Mark Hallahan, Do Situational Expectations Produce Situ-
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observers view the situation as the actor does, their causal attribu-
tions shift from internal to external and no longer diverge from the
actor's causal attributions for his or her own conduct.
In the most influential study in this area, experimenters
asked two subjects (the actors) to have a conversation in the pres-
ence of two observers. 451 Each observer could view one of the actors
(who was seated across from that observer) but could not view the
other actor (who was seated next to that observer).45 2 The experi-
menters then asked the actors and the observers to provide causal
attributions for the degree of nervousness, friendliness, talkative-
ness, and dominance displayed by the actor they were viewing dur-
ing the conversation. 45 3 In the control condition, the attributions
were made immediately after the conversation. 454 As expected, the
observers committed the fundamental attribution error and attrib-
uted their target actor's behavior more to internal, dispositional
qualities of the actor than did the actors themselves, who instead
provided more external, situational explanations. 455
In the experimental condition, the researchers changed the
participants' perceptual focus. After the conversation, the observers
viewed a videotape of the interaction before making their causal
attributions. 45 6 For one observer, the videotape changed the per-
spective from which the observer had viewed the conversation
live. 45 7 That observer watched a tape of the actor next to whom he
or she had been sitting during the conversation and who had previ-
ously been hidden from view. 458 The study found that the observer
who had his or her original perspective reversed by the videotape
also reversed the causal attribution pattern seen in the control con-
dition.45 9 After the observer had viewed the actor from the actor's
perspective on the videotape, the observer attributed the actor's
behavior as much to situational factors as had the actor himself in
ational Inferences? The Role of Future Expectations in Directing Inferential Goals, 80 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 545, 545 (2001) (same); Ross & Fletcher, supra note 130, at 101-
02 (same).
451. See M.D. Storms, Videotape and the Attribution Process: Reversing Actors' and Observ-
ers' Point of View, 27 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 165, 166-67 (1973).
452. See id. at 167.
453. See id. at 168.
454. See id. at 167-68.
455. See id. at 168-69.
456. See id. at 167-68.
457. See id.
458. See id.
459. See id. at 169-71.
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the original scenario. 460 Thus, when the observer was forced to take
the perspective of the actor, the observer's attributions resembled
those of the actor, demonstrating that the fundamental attribution
error can indeed be undone.
While forcing observers to take the actor's literal perspective
appears to be the best way to reduce observers' tendency to overat-
tribute to internal causes, researchers have discovered that merely
taking the actor's perspective figuratively can achieve similar re-
sults. 461 In the laboratory, observers were generally less likely to
exhibit the fundamental attribution error if the experimenter told
them to empathize with the actor and to try to see things the way
the actor would.462 Empathy instructions made observers more
aware of situational constraints and more able to recall situational
details, and the added salience of the situation resulted in in-
creased external attributions for the actor's behavior. 463 Empathy
instructions worked particularly well to mitigate the fundamental
460. See id.; see also Lee & Hallahan, supra note 450, at 545 (listing other studies that also
found that "[o]bservers who took the target's visual perspective made more situational inferences
for the target's behavior because the target's situation (rather than the target) was more visually
salient").
461. See Lee & Hallahan, supra note 450, at 545 (summarizing research demonstrating that
"observers emphasize situational inferences when they are instructed to take the target's per-
spective or when they are oriented to understand the situation").
462. See HEWSTONE, supra note 124, at 56; SEARS ET AL., supra note 125, at 140; Sharon S.
Brehm & David Aderman, On the Relationship Between Empathy and the Actor Versus Observer
Hypothesis, 11 J. RES. PERSONALITY 340, 340-44 (1977); Lee & Hallahan, supra note 450, at 545
(compiling studies); Regan & Totten, supra note 206, at 852-54. But see Lee & Hallahan, supra
note 450, at 545-46 (noting some mixed results and citing some studies that found no relation-
ship or the opposite relationship between perspective taking and social inferences); id. at 546-60
(describing studies that suggest that an observer will reduce the fundamental attribution error
by taking the perspective of the target primarily when the observer expects to be in the same
situation as the target in the future).
In one experiment, observers watched two actors get acquainted with one another. See Regan
& Totten, supra note 206, at 852-54. Some of the observers were told to empathize with one of
the actors, while some of the observers received no empathy instruction. See id. After watching
the conversation, all of the observers gave attributions for the actors' behavior. See id. Observers
who were not instructed to empathize demonstrated the fundamental attribution error by pro-
viding more internal attributions than the actors did for their own behavior. See id. Observers
who were instructed to empathize did not demonstrate the fundamental attribution error, but
instead provided external attributions similar to those provided by the actors themselves. See id.
463. See Regan & Totten, supra note 206, at 852-54 (describing the salience effect of empathy
instructions); see also Harvey et al., supra note 139, at 553-57 (analyzing a study finding that
observers who were told to empathize while watching a couple have a heated discussion about
their relationship were later able to recall more situational information correctly than observers
who were not told to empathize).
2002] PERCEIVED DISABILITIES 575
attribution error when the observer was making a causal attribu-
tion for an individual's failure, rather than success. 464
Providing an empathy instruction is not the only technique
that can mitigate the fundamental attribution error. Researchers
have found that any technique that orients the observer to the
situation or gets the observer to identify with the actor will have
the same result: the observer provides more external attributions
for the actor's behavior, thereby more closely matching the actor's
self-attributions for his or her own acts. 465 For example, if the ex-
perimenter tells the observer that the observer will have to engage
in the same task that the observer is watching the actor perform,
the observer's attributions for the actor's performance shift from
internal to external. 466 Requiring decisionmakers to summarize con-
trary evidence and make a case for the opposite decision than the
one they intend to make also may reduce the biasing effect of prior,
erroneous theories. 467 Making situational factors more salient,
"priming" observers to think about situational effects, or obtaining
specific situational information about the particular constraints
under which the target was working, rather than just general in-
formation about the workplace itself, have all been shown to have
similar results in decreasing the fundamental attribution bias. 468
464. See Brehm & Aderman, supra note 462, at 340-44 (describing a study finding that em-
pathy instructions made observers shift from internal to external attributions for an actor's
behavior, particularly when the actor's behavior resulted in a negative outcome); Robert Gould &
Harold Sigall, The Effects of Empathy and Outcome on Attribution: An Examination of the Diver-
gent-Perspectives Hypothesis, 13 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 480, 484-88 (1977) (describing
a study finding that observers who were told to empathize with a male actor who failed to make
a good impression on a female actor provided more external attributions for the negative result).
465. See SEARS ET AL., supra note 125, at 140; Lee & Hallahan, supra note 450, at 546; Wolf-
son & Salancik, supra note 206, at 444-49.
466. See Wolfson & Salancik, supra note 206, at 444-49. In one study, subjects watched an
actor perform poorly in a task requiring the actor to maneuver a toy car on a model racing track.
See id. When experimenters had informed observers that they would have to perform the same
task themselves, the observers gave more external attributions for the actor's poor performance,
just as the actor provided for his or her own behavior. See id. When the observers did not expect
to have to perform the task later themselves, the observers demonstrated the fundamental attri-
bution error and provided more internal attributions for the actor's poor performance than the
actor did. See id.
467. See Krieger, supra note 36, at 1330; Donnerstein & Donnerstein, supra note 445, at 148-
50; see also Sanbonmatsu et al., supra note 266, at 898-99 (concluding from empirical work that
causal attribution accuracy increased when subjects were prompted to consider alternative
causes for an outcome).
468. See Trope & Gaunt, supra note 188, at 346-51 (describing three recent experiments); see
also Jack S. Croxton, Attributional Activity in Explaining Disconfirmed Expectancies: The Search
for Constraint, 7 SOC. COGNITION 338, 340 (1989) (citing research finding that "the activation of
situational cues prior to an attributional task increased the likelihood of situational attribu-
tions"); Eliot R. Smith, Social Cognition Contributions to Attribution Theory and Research, in
SOCIAL COGNITION: IMPACT ON SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 77, 96-97 (1994) (citing research finding that
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Overall, "active" or "involved" observers appear to provide more ac-
curate judgments and predictions, while "passive" or "neutral" ob-
servers appear to be most at risk for causal attribution errors. 469
While these results suggest that employment decisionmakers
may be able to improve their attribution accuracy when assessing
nondisabled employees, it is admittedly difficult to translate this
research immediately into concrete employment practices or proce-
dures. In general, when employers individually assess an em-
ployee's capabilities, the evaluator should try to use techniques self-
consciously and systematically that force the evaluator to take the
employee's perspective. In theory, by actively changing focus in this
way during the evaluation, the evaluator should be less prone to
make internal, stable, and global attributions, and therefore less
likely to misperceive individuals with nondisabling conditions as
disabled. 4 0 As a practical matter, however, this is likely to be far
easier in the laboratory than in the workplace, where not all indi-
vidual employment decisions can be turned into carefully controlled
experiments.
Very recently, however, many courts have interpreted the
ADA to require employers to engage in an "interactive process" with
an employee who is suspected of having a disability, in order to
identify the employee's precise limitations. 471 These recent decisions
now obligate employers to meet with the employee, ask the em-
ployee questions, and "request information about the condition and
what limitations the employee has."472 In most jurisdictions, failure
to engage in a meaningful interactive discussion with the employee
is now considered an ADA violation in and of itself.473 By involving
the employee in the evaluation process, this new obligation is con-
"priming" a causal factor or increasing its salience increases the likelihood that it will be cited by
an observer as the cause of an event).
469. See Wolfson & Salancik, supra note 206, at 444-49.
470. In addition, when an employee does have an actually disabling condition, this process
should help the employer view the employee's limitations more accurately as a product of struc-
tural or operational aspects of the workplace, rather than as a result of the employee's impair-
ment, which should help in identifying appropriate accommodations.
471. See, e.g., Barnett v. U.S. Air, Inc., 228 F.3d 1105, 1113 (9th Cir. 2000) ("The interactive
process is at the heart of the ADA's process and essential to accomplishing its goals."), cert.
granted in part, 121 S. Ct. 1600 (2001).
472. Taylor v. Phoenixville Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d 296, 317 (3d Cir. 1999); see also Barnett, 228
F.3d at 1114-15 (explaining that employers must consult with the employee, "communicate di-
rectly," and "exchange essential information"); 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.9 (2001) (describing the
obligation as "a flexible, interactive process that involves both the employer and the [employee]").
473. See Barnett, 228 F.3d at 1111-14 (compiling cases from other jurisdictions) (citing H.R.
REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 65 (1990); S. REP. No. 101-116, at 34 (1989); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3)
(2001); 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.9 (2001)).
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sistent with social cognition research on improving accuracy. In
fact, the obligatory "interactive process" may provide the built-in
laboratory that employers need to identify methods to avoid exag-
gerating the gravity of nondisabling conditions.
Thus, while the argument that imposing liability for uncon-
scious bias will cause employers to overinvest in precautionary
measures may be well taken in the Title VII context, it may not ap-
ply to the ADA. Unlike Title VII, the ADA already requires employ-
ers to take careful, time-consuming, and perhaps costly precaution-
ary steps to evaluate employees believed to have a disability. Ac-
cordingly, imposing liability for individual, cognitively based mis-
takes as well as mistakes based on prejudice or group-based deci-
sionmaking would not require as great a marginal investment as it
would if liability were similarly extended under Title VII. The risk
of overinvestment would also be reduced by eliminating the poten-
tial for the compensatory and punitive damage awards added by the
Civil Rights Act of 1991.
CONCLUSION
The ADA's perceived disability prong is likely to play an in-
creasingly significant role in ADA litigation. There has been a
strong trend in the courts to narrow the ADA's definition of an ac-
tual disability, and therefore to circumscribe the reach of the ADA's
actual disability prong. 474 This trend is exemplified by the U.S. Su-
preme Court's 1999 decision in Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc.475
Prior to Sutton, most circuit courts had followed the EEOC's regula-
474. See Peter David Blanck & Michael Millender, Before Disability Civil Rights: Civil War
Pensions and the Politics of Disability in America, 52 ALA. L. REV. 1, 2 (2000) (noting the "string
of Supreme Court decisions that have rejected expansive readings" of the ADA); Ruth Colker,
The Americans with Disabilities Act: A Windfall for Defendants, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 99,
103-10 (1999) (same); Catherine J. Lanctot, Ad Hoc Decision Making and Per Se Prejudice: How
Individualizing the Determination of "Disability" Undermines the ADA, 42 VILL. L. REV. 327, 328
(1997) (describing the detrimental effects of the "judicial narrowing of [the ADA's] provisions");
Steven S. Locke, The Incredible Shrinking Protected Class: Redefining the Scope of Disability
Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 107, 108 (1997) (arguing that
courts have raised the standards that disability discrimination plaintiffs must meet); Mayerson,
supra note 12, at 587 (arguing that a "disturbing trend developing in case law is the narrowing
construction of the definition of disability which thereby deprives qualified individuals of the
opportunity to prove that they have been discriminated against"); Bonnie Poitras Tucker, The
Supreme Court's Definition of Disability Under the ADA- A Return to the Dark Ages, 52 ALA. L.
REV. 321, 321 (2000) (arguing that a recent trilogy of Supreme Court cases "drastically curtailed"
the number of people who can seek protection under the ADA's actual disability prong); see also
Toyota Motor Mfg. v. Williams, 122 S. Ct. 681, 691 (2002) (holding that key terms in the ADA's
definition of an actual disability "need to be interpreted strictly to create a demanding standard
for qualifying as disabled").
475. 527 U.S. 471, 479-87 (1999).
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tions and held that employers must determine if an employee is ac-
tually disabled based on the employee's capabilities without any
corrective or assistive devices. 4 6 In Sutton, the Supreme Court re-
jected that view. 477 The Court held that actual disability status
should be based on an employee's functioning with the use of any
measures that the employee adopts to mitigate his or her impair-
ment. 4 8 Accordingly, many high-functioning individuals with im-
pairments that are substantially limiting in their untreated condi-
tion are no longer protected under the ADA's actual disability
prong. These employees are the most at risk to be misperceived as
disabled, because of their salient impairments. To protect these in-
dividuals fully, courts should apply the ADA's perceived disability
prong in the expansive manner that Congress intended.
One step in that direction would be for courts to acknowledge
that employers' misperceptions may be cognitive in origin. This rec-
ognition would be consistent with the rapidly growing research on
cognitive bias and race discrimination, which is where legal schol-
ars have made the most effective use of social cognition theory. 47 9
Experts in social cognition have long emphasized the "increasingly
important goal" of not just identifying the information processing
models that people use in their daily lives, but of understanding
"the sources of systematic bias or distortion in judgment that lead
the intuitive psychologist to misinterpret events and hence to be-
have in ways that are personally maladaptive [and] socially perni-
cious."480
One of the "socially pernicious" effects of cognitive bias is
when an employer misperceives a nondisabled employee as dis-
abled, and the employee suffers negative employment consequences
as a result. To recognize the harm that results from such a mistake,
the mistake should not "be forgiven, as Pope's 'to forgive, divine'
ending implies."48' Rather, employers should be held responsible for
accurately assessing individual impairments. On the other hand, it
would be inappropriate for the employer's mistake to "remit noth-
ing, leaving the actor's culpability lessened not a whit,"482 because
individual, cognitive errors are qualitatively different from motiva-
476. See id.
477. See id.
478. See id.
479. See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
480. Ross, supra note 128, at 181.
481. Finkel & Groscup, supra note 1, at 66.
482. Id.
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tional or group-based errors, and they should be treated as such.
Accordingly, this Article recommends a middle-ground approach, in
which the employer's mistake is "judged culpable to a degree,
though mitigated by the mistake."48 3 Rather than ignoring the very
real harm that results from cognitive mistakes, as do courts taking
a "no liability" approach, or ignoring the very real distinctions be-
tween cognitive and motivational errors, as do courts taking a "full
liability" approach, a tailored remedies approach should achieve the
best balance between the competing interests at stake.
483. Id.
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